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Abstract 
 
The Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) problem requires finding an optimal partition of a 
set of n agents. An optimal partition means one that maximizes global welfare. Computing an 
optimal coalition structure is computationally hard especially when there are externalities, i.e., 
when the worth of a coalition is dependent on the organisation of agents outside the coalition.  
A number of algorithms were previously proposed to solve the CSG problem but most of 
these methods were designed for systems without externalities.  Very little attention has been 
paid to finding optimal coalition structures in the presence of externalities, although 
externalities are a key feature of many real world multiagent systems. Moreover, the existing 
methods, being non-heuristic, have exponential time complexity which means that they are 
infeasible for any but systems comprised of a small number of agents.  
The aim of this research is to develop effective heuristic methods for finding optimal coalition 
structures in systems with externalities, where time taken to find a solution is more important 
than the quality of the solution. To this end, four different heuristics methods namely tabu 
search, simulated annealing, ant colony search and particle swarm optimisation are explored. 
In particular, neighbourhood operators were devised for the effective exploration of the search 
space and a compact representation method was formulated for storing details about the 
multiagent system. Using these, the heuristic methods were devised and their performance 
was evaluated extensively for a wide range of input data.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter sets the background for this research and lists the main aims and objectives of 
this research. 
 
1.1 Background 
In the modern age of computing, complex systems have evolved to become more independent 
and self-aware. There is an increasing trend towards designing software systems that work 
mostly autonomously requiring little or no human input. An intelligent agent is an agent that 
exhibits three main characteristics (Wooldridge, 2009): pro-activeness, reactivity and social 
ability. An agent is said to be proactive if it exhibits goal-directed behaviour, i.e. is capable 
of taking initiative to better achieve its intended goal. It is said to be reactive if it can respond 
to changes in the environment in time for the response to be useful. It is said to be social if it 
is able to interact with other agents. 
A multiagent system (MAS) is comprised of multiple intelligent agents that interact and 
coordinate with each other. A key characteristic of a MAS is that the individual agents in it 
have different skills and capabilities and each agent is limited in terms of its capabilities. 
Cooperation and coordination between agents is therefore necessary in order for them to 
achieve big and complex goals, i.e., goals that cannot be achieved by an agent individually. 
Working together in some instances also helps the agents achieve the goals more efficiently 
(Shehory & Kraus, 1998; Zlotkin & Rosenschein, 1994).  
To bring about this cooperation, the individual agents in a MAS must form a group and work 
together. In this context, the following two terms are useful:  
Coalition: It is a subset of the agents that comprise a MAS.  
Coalition structure: A typical MAS requires the formation of several coalitions that work 
simultaneously. In this context, the term coalition structure refers to a partition of the agents 
in a MAS. 
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The following are some applications that require the formation of coalitions:  
1. Autonomous sensors networks where coalitions help to improve the coverage of 
the surveillance area (Glinton et al., 2008). 
2. A coalition of buyers working together to get cheaper prices by purchasing in bulk 
(Sukstrienwong, 2011). 
3. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to provide secure and dependable cloud 
computing service (Liu et al., 2015). 
4. Distributed vehicle routing applications where delivery companies need to 
optimally allocate resources to coalitions within a structure (Sandholm & Lesser, 
1997). 
5. E-commerce systems where buyers group together to obtain discounts (Tsvetovat 
& Sycara, 2000). 
6. E-business systems that need to optimally allocate resources to market partitions 
(Norman et al., 2004). 
7. Distributed grid computing where virtual organisations must optimally share 
resources (Foster & Kesselman, 2003; Yong et al., 2003). 
8. Information gathering systems where clusters of information servers must process 
queries together by forming optimal coalitions (Klusch & Shehory, 1996). 
9. Multi-sensor surveillance networks where coalitions are used to provide better 
coverage over a large area (Dang et al., 2006). 
 
1.2 Coalition Formation in Multiagent Systems 
The success of a MAS is frequently measured in terms of the overall system performance of 
the system. The performance of a MAS depends on what coalitions form. Coalitions can form 
in many different ways. If formed correctly, coalitions can increase the productivity of a MAS. 
Likewise, badly formed coalitions can be counter-productive. It is therefore important for the 
right coalitions to form. But finding the right coalitions is a difficult problem. This thesis is 
aimed at finding methods for overcoming this difficulty. More precisely, the aim of this 
research is to devise computational methods for finding optimal coalitions.  
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In order to understand the complexity of the problem, consider a system comprised of 3 
agents. Let {a, b, c} be the set of agents. There are 7 different ways in which a coalition can 
form:  
1. {a} 
2. {b} 
3. {c} 
4. {a, b} 
5. {b, c} 
6. {a, c} 
7. {a, b, c} 
 In general for a system comprised of n agents, there are 2𝑛−1 possible coalitions.  
Again consider the system comprised of 3 agents {a, b, c}. There are 5 possible coalition 
structures, i.e., 5 different ways of partitioning the 3 agents:  
1. {{a}, {b}, {c}} 
2. {{a, b}, {c}} 
3. {{a, c}, {b}} 
4. {{a}, {b, c}} 
5. {{a, b, c}} 
In general, for a system of n agents, the number of possible coalition structures is the Bell 
number (𝐵𝑛) (see section 1.2.4 for details).  
Different coalition structures yield different levels of performance. The problem is therefore 
to determine an optimal coalition structure, i.e., a structure that optimizes system 
performance. 
In order to find an optimal coalition structure, we must first use a suitable representation for 
describing the worth of a coalition and the worth of a coalition structure. The most commonly 
used representation comes from the literature in game theory (Chalkiadakis et al., 2012).  
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A coalition game is defined in terms of the players playing the game (i.e., the agents that 
comprise a MAS) and the worth of coalitions and coalition structures (Chalkiadakis et al., 
2012). There are two types of coalition games characteristic function games (CFG) and 
partition function games (PFG).  
1. Characteristic function games (Di Mauro et al., 2010; Keinänen & Keinänen, 2008; 
Rahwan et al., 2012; Rahwan et al., 2013; Sen & Dutta, 2000; Yeh, 1986): These are 
games in which the worth of a coalition depends on its member agents alone.  
2. Partition function games (Banerjee & Kraemer, 2010; Epstein & Bazzan, 2013; 
Michalak et al., 2008; Rahwan et al., 2012; Thrall & Lucas, 1963): These are games 
in which the worth of a coalition depends not only on its member agents but also on 
how the external agents form coalitions. 
The difference between PFGs and CFGs is that PFGs take into account externalities from 
forming coalitions. In PFGs the utility that is obtained from forming a coalition could be 
influenced by other coalitions that are concurrently being formed. This means that the value 
of a coalition depends on the coalition structure it is embedded with. 
Example 
Consider a game comprised of three agents {a, b, c}. For a CFG, the value of a coalition, say 
{a}, is given in terms of the elements of the set {a}. The value of any coalition is a real number. 
Thus the value of {a} in the structure {{a}, {b, c}} is equal to the value of {a} in the structure 
{{a}, {b}, {c}}. However, this is not the case for PFGs. For a PFG, the value of {a} in the 
structure {{a}, {b, c}} need not be equal to the value of {a} in the structure {{a}, {b}, {c}}. 
Most of the existing literature on determining optimal coalition structures has focussed on 
CFGs (Rahwan et al., 2015). However, in many cases, such as resource allocation (Dunne, 
2005), the performance of a coalition is directly influenced how the external players are 
organized. In such cases, a coalition that increases its consumption of resources in one part of 
the system can have adverse effects that could impact the effectiveness of agents in another 
part of the system.  Another example of the occurrence of externalities is conspiracy attempt 
in oligopolies. In these situations, cooperating organisations explore ways to undermine the 
competitiveness of other companies in the market (Catilina & Feinberg, 2006). 
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Type of externality 
Externalities can be of two types (Rahwan et al., 2009): positive or negative.  Externalities are 
said to be positive (negative) if the merger of two coalitions has a beneficial (harmful) impact 
on the external players. 
 An example of positive externalities is environmental policy arrangement among countries 
(Plasmans et al., 2006). A decision made by a coalition of countries to cut pollution levels 
will have a beneficial impact on the countries outside the coalition (Finus, 2003). An example 
of negative externalities is the merger of technological companies; if say a giant like Microsoft 
were to merge with Facebook, then this decision will typically have a negative impact on other 
companies such as Google and Oracle.  
Negative externalities also arise when major technology corporations decide to cooperate in 
order to develop a new technology standard; those that are not part of the coalition see a 
reduction their competitive position. For instance when a group of companies decided to form 
Blu-ray Disc Association (BDA), the industry consortium that develops and licenses Blu-ray 
Disc technology, the others that did not join BDA were recipients of negative externalities.   
The effects of this can clearly be seen in the collapse of HD DVD developed by the DVD 
Forum (Edwards et al., 2005). PFGs are necessary to model such systems with externalities. 
 
1.2.1 Coalitions and Coalition Structures 
In this section, we will introduce notation and formalize terms. The set of agents in a MAS 
will be denoted 𝐴𝑔 = {𝑎1, … . , 𝑎𝒏}. The term coalition refers to a non-empty subset of 𝐴𝑔. 
The term coalition structure refers to a set of pairwise-disjoint coalitions. Formally, a 
coalition structure, 𝐶𝑆 is a set 𝐶𝑆 = {𝐶1 … . 𝐶𝑘} of disjoint coalitions such that 
 ⋃𝐶𝑖 = 𝐶, and 𝐶𝑖 ∩ 𝐶𝑗  =   for every 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1 … . 𝑘} 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.  
We will denote the set of all coalition structure over 𝐶 as Π𝐶 . 
For example, for the four agent set 𝐴𝑔 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3, 𝑎4}, a possible coalition is 𝐶 =
{𝑎2, 𝑎3, 𝑎4} while a possible coalition structure is {{𝑎1}, {𝑎2}, {𝑎3, 𝑎4}}.  
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A coalition in a coalition structure will be denoted as 𝐶 combined with a subscript for example 
𝐶1 or 𝐶𝑖 and combined with primes either in the form of 𝐶
′ or 𝐶′′. 
In coalitional games where externalities are considered, an embedded coalition is a pair 
consisting of a coalition and a coalition structure over 𝐴𝑔. For example, (𝐶, 𝐶𝑆) is an 
embedded coalition where 𝐶 represents a coalition and 𝐶𝑆 represents a coalition structure 
which includes 𝐶, i. e., 
𝐶𝑆 ∈ Π𝐴𝑔 and 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝑆. 
The space of all embedded coalitions will be denoted ℇ𝐶. 
 
1.2.2 Characteristic Function Games 
A characteristic function games is a pair (𝐴𝑔, 𝑣) where 𝐴𝑔 denotes a finite set of agents and 
𝑣: 2𝐴𝑔 → ℝ  is the characteristic function representing the value 𝑣(𝐶)  given to coalition 𝐶 ∈
P(𝐴𝑔) where 𝐶 is the powerset of 𝐴𝑔 excluding the empty set.  The value 𝑉(𝐶𝑆) of a coalition 
structure 𝐶𝑆 is the sum of the values of the coalitions in the structure 𝐶𝑆:  
 
 𝑉(𝐶𝑆) =  ∑ 𝑣(𝐶𝑖)
𝐶𝑖∈𝐶𝑆
 (1.1) 
1.2.3 Partition Function Games 
Games in partition function form were introduced by Thrall and Lucas (Thrall & Lucas, 1963) 
based on research into cooperative game theory by Neumann and Morgenstern (Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947). For PFGs the value of a coalition is influenced both by the identities of 
its members together with the ways non-members are partitioned. A PFGs is a pair (𝐴𝑔, 𝑣) 
where  𝐴𝑔 is the set of agents and 𝑣, represents the value given to an embedded coalition, 
(𝐶, 𝐶𝑆). Thus the value of a coalition C in the coalition structure CS is given by 𝑣((𝐶, 𝐶𝑆)). 
Formally, this is expressed as 𝑣: ℇ𝐶 → ℝ.  
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The value of a coalition structure 𝑉(𝐶𝑆) is given by: 
 
 𝑉(𝐶𝑆) =  ∑ 𝑣(𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆)
𝐶𝑖∈𝐶𝑆
 (1.2) 
This means that in a typical CFG, a coalition 𝐶 ⊆ 𝐴𝑔 has only one value, whereas in a PFG 
C may have as many values as the number of ways to partition the agents in 𝐴𝑔\𝐶. 
 
1.2.4 Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) 
The coalition structure generation (CSG) problem for both CFGs and PFGs involves finding 
an optimal coalition structure 𝐶𝑆∗ ∈  Π𝐴𝑔 such that: 
𝐶𝑆∗ ∈  
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑉(𝐶𝑆)).
𝐶𝑆 ∈ Π𝐴𝑔
 
Solving the CSG problem is important because there are numerous applications in various 
fields including bioinformatics, data mining, semantic web, natural language processing and 
machine learning (Di Mauro et al., 2014). The problem of finding an optimal coalition 
structure is computationally hard (Aziz & De Keijzer, 2011). While it is solvable using brute 
force search, its time complexity is exponential in the number of agents in 𝐴𝑔. This is not 
feasible with the processing capacity of the current state of the art computers. 
For n agents, the number of possible coalition structures is given by the Bell number 
𝐵𝑛 (Graham et al., 1994) or Stirling number of the second kind 𝑆(𝑛, 𝑘)  (Knuth, 1992) where 
the 𝑛th of these numbers counts the number of different ways to partition a set with 𝑛 elements 
into exactly 𝑘 nonempty subsets. This is calculated by the following recursive formula: 
𝐵𝑛+1 = ∑ (
𝑛
𝑘
)
𝑛
𝑘=0
𝐵𝑘.  
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Table 1.1 – Number of possible coalition structures. 
Number of elements/agents  
𝑛 
Bell number 𝐵𝑛  
(Possible Number of Coalition Structures) 
5 52 
10 115,975 
15 1,382,958,545 
20 51,724,158,235,372 
25 4,638,590,332,330,743,949 
27 545,717,047,947,902,329,359 
Table 1.1 shows how quickly the Bell number grows in 𝑛. Given these numbers, it is clear 
that a brute force method using present computational technology is impractical for finding 
an optimal coalition structure. Alternative methods that are practically feasible must be 
devised.  This is the goal of this thesis. 
 
1.2.5 Methods for Optimal Coalition Structure Generation 
Existing methods for solving the coalition structure generation problem can be divided into 
three categories (Service & Adams, 2011): 
(i) Anytime algorithms (Changder et al., 2016a; Rahwan et al., 2009; Rahwan et al., 
2012; Sandholm et al., 1998; Service & Adams, 2010) – the quality of the solution 
generated improves with their execution time. Their disadvantage is that, in the 
worst case, they need to check all coalition structure requiring 𝑂(𝑛𝑛) time 
complexity. 
(ii) Design-to-time algorithms (Yeh, 1986) – These methods guarantee returning an 
optimal solution, however can only do so if allowed to run to completion.  DP 
(Yeh, 1986) belongs to this category and has a time complexity of 𝑂(3𝑛). 
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(iii) Heuristics algorithms (Di Mauro et al., 2010; Guo & Wang, 2006; Keinänen & 
Keinänen, 2008; Sen & Dutta, 2000; Sukstrienwong, 2011) – These algorithm 
prioritise speed over solution quality. However, when used, it is impossible to 
provide any form of guarantees. 
For CFGs, and more so for PFGs, finding an optimal coalition structure is computationally 
hard. In the existing literature, a number of methods have been studied for CFGs but the 
optimal coalition structure determination problem for PFGs has only recently become the 
focus of attention (see Chapters 3 and 4 for a review of existing methods). A number of 
deterministic methods have been developed for PFGs but they have exponential time 
complexity. This presents the need for developing effective heuristic methods for finding a 
good enough solution as quickly as possible, especially for settings with a large number of 
agents. Such methods are important for example in mission critical systems where a group of 
agents representing emergency responders need to partition their resources so the emergency 
situation is handled optimally. In these systems the agents need to react quickly and time lost 
looking for the absolute optimal can severely impact on handling the emergency. A quick 
locally optimal solution would be better than a delayed globally optimal one because the 
situation may have changed during the time (Di Mauro et al., 2014). 
Against this background, the objectives of this research are as follows.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to develop effective heuristic solutions to the coalition 
structure generation problem. To this end, four different heuristic search methods will be 
explored. Specifically, these four methods are as follows:  
1. Tabu search method 
2. Simulated annealing method 
3. Ant colony search method 
4. Particle swarm optimization method 
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A key consideration in the design of heuristics will be their suitability to CFGs and also to 
PFGs. Other considerations are their running time memory space requirement, and their 
scalability.   
Given the complexity of the problem, it is especially important and desirable when designing 
an algorithm, to balance the running time and the amount of memory required to execute a 
method. This can be achieved, perhaps by using efficient memory management which has 
been proven successfully adaptable in other combinatorial optimisation problems (Galinier et 
al., 2008). For example, having a tabu list which is relatively small could potentially be a more 
efficient way of using memory compared to the memory usage of other algorithms such as 
Dynamic Programming (Yeh, 1986). It is also worth noting there are no existing heuristic 
algorithms solving the optimal coalition structure generation problem for PFGs.  
Thus, the aim of this thesis is to explore the above list heuristic approaches for solving the 
coalition structure generation problem and conduct a comparative analysis of their 
performance. Performance will be measured in terms of the above mentioned desirable 
characteristics.  
 
1.4 Research Contributions 
Heuristic methods have been applied to related optimisation problems such as the travelling 
salesman problem (Fiechter, 1994), bin packing problem (Lodi et al., 2004) and scheduling 
problems (Nonobe & Ibaraki, 2002). In solving the CSG problem without externalities i.e. 
CFGs, there are several heuristic methods such as greedy (Di Mauro et al., 2010), ant colony 
(Sukstrienwong, 2011), simulated annealing (Keinänen & Keinänen, 2008) and genetic 
algorithms (Sen & Dutta, 2000) that have been applied with promising results. However, there 
are no existing heuristic methods for generating optimal coalition structures for PFGs. This 
research contributes to the state of the art in the following ways: 
1) Devising a range of heuristic methods for solving the coalition structure generation 
problem for CSGs and for PFGs. 
2) Devising neighbourhood operators for effective exploration of the search space. 
3) Devising compact representations for PFGs.  
4) Analysing the performance of each heuristic method. 
5) Conducting a comparative analysis of the heuristic methods.  
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Publications from this research 
A. Hussin and S. Fatima (Hussin & Fatima, 2016), Heuristic methods for optimal coalition 
structure generation, Lecture Notes in AI, 10207, pages 1 – 16, 2017. (DOI: 10.1007/978-3-
319-59294-7 11) 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background 
information on coalitional games. Chapters 3 and 4 review the existing algorithms for solving 
the coalition structure generation problem. The methods reviewed cover all three types of 
methods present in literature, namely anytime algorithms, design to time algorithms and 
heuristic algorithms. Chapter 3 reviews the existing literature for CFGs and Chapter 4 covers 
existing methods for solving the CSG problem for PFGs. These including centralised and 
distributed methods. 
Chapter 5 describes the four heuristic search methods: tabu search, simulated annealing, ant 
colony search, and particle swarm search methods.  
Chapter 6 is a description of the set-up for conducting simulations for performance evaluation.  
Chapter 7 provides the result of the simulations. Performance is evaluated both in terms of 
the time taken to generate a solution and the quality of solution. The heuristic methods are 
also evaluated in terms of their scalability and how well they handle externalities. This chapter 
analyses the performance of each of the four heuristic methods for six different probability 
distribution data.   
Chapter 8 presents an analysis of the average performance of each heuristic method across all 
the data sets. Scalability and the impact of externalities on performance are also analysed. 
Chapter 9 lists the main conclusions of this research and provides pointers for further research. 
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Chapter 2 Coalitional Games 
 
 
This chapter is a background on coalitional games. Section 2.1 introduces characteristic 
function games and provides details regarding the definition of values of coalitions. Section 
2.2 does the same for partition function games. 
2.1 Characteristic Function Games 
In some multi-agent systems, each coalition pursues its own goal with little or no interaction 
with other coalitions.  A lack of interaction between coalitions means that the value generated 
by a coalition is independent of the external coalitions. Games with no externalities are known 
as characteristic function games (CFGs). 
A CFG is represented as a pair (𝐴𝑔, 𝑣) where 𝐴𝑔 is the set of agents and 𝑣 is the characteristic 
function that gives the value of any coalition (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947; Rapoport, 
1970). 
𝑣: 2𝐴 → ℝ. 
Figure 2.1 is an illustration of values for an example game of 3 agents. 
 
Figure 2.1 – A typical characteristic function game and its input. 
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Definition 1. A coalition structure is an exhaustive partition of a set of agents 𝐴𝑔 into 
pairwise-disjoint (or non-overlapping) coalitions. For example, for 𝐴𝑔 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3}, there 
are exactly 5 possible coalition structures:  
{{𝑎1}, {𝑎2}, {𝑎3}}, {{𝑎1, 𝑎2}, {𝑎3}}, {{𝑎1, 𝑎3}, {𝑎2}}, {{𝑎1}, {𝑎2, 𝑎3}} and {{𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3}} 
For n agents, there are Bell (𝐵𝑛) ∼𝑂(𝑛
𝑛) possible coalition structures, i.e., the number of 
coalition structures is exponential in 𝑛. 
The value of a coalition structure is the sum of the values of its coalitions: 
 𝑉(𝐶𝑆) = ∑ 𝑣(𝐶𝑖)
𝐶𝑖∈𝐶𝑆
 
(2.1) 
The precise details about how the value of a coalition is defined will be the subject of Chapter 
6.  
 
2.2 Partition Function Games 
For partition function games (PFGs), the value of a coalition can be effected by the way the 
agents external to the coalition are organised (Thrall & Lucas, 1963). 
 
2.2.1 The General Partition Function Game 
A coalition structure 𝐶𝑆 is a partition of the set of agents in 𝐴𝑔. Any coalition 𝐶 ⊆ 𝐴𝑔 that is 
a member of a coalition structure 𝐶𝑆 is embedded in 𝐶𝑆. If the value assigned to a coalition 𝐶 
is influenced by other coalitions in that structure, then each coalition may have different 
values depending on which structure it is embedded in. Let (𝐶; 𝐶𝑆) denote an embedded 
coalition. Let ℇ𝐶 represent the set of all embedded coalitions, and Π the set of all coalition 
structures.  
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A PFG is comprised of: 
 A set of agents, 𝐴𝑔 = {𝑎1, . . , 𝑎𝑛} 
 A partition function 𝑤 that takes an embedded coalition (𝐶, 𝐶𝑆) ∈ ℇ𝐶 as input and 
assigns a real number value to coalition 𝐶 in the coalition structure 𝐶𝑆. 
𝑤: ℇ𝐶 →  ℝ 
The value of a coalition structure  𝐶𝑆 is given by: 
 𝑉(𝐶𝑆) =  ∑ 𝑤(𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆)
𝐶𝑖∈𝐶𝑆
 
(2.2) 
This is illustrated in Figure 2.2. A mentioned in Chapter 1, externalities are two main types: 
positive and negative. However, in some games, externalities may occur in both positive and 
negative forms. These are called mixed externalities games.  
A mixed externalities game consists of a set of agents, 𝐴𝑔 and a partition function which 
takes, as input, every feasible coalition structure (CS), and for each coalition in each structure, 
outputs a numerical value that reflects the performance of the coalition in that structure which 
can either have positive (increase) or negative (decrease) value when moving from one 
structure to the other. 
 
Figure 2.2 – A typical partition function game and its input. 
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Example 
Given two coalition structures 𝐶𝑆 and 𝐶𝑆′ where 𝐶𝑆 = {{𝐶1}, {𝐶2}, {𝐶3}} and 𝐶𝑆′ =
{{𝐶1}, {𝐶2 ∪ 𝐶3}}  the value of {𝐶1} may be different in  𝐶𝑆′ compared to 𝐶𝑆 as a result of the 
merger between 𝐶2 and 𝐶3. This condition effecting 𝐶1 is usually attributed as an externality 
implied on 𝐶1 by the formation of coalition {𝐶2 ∪ 𝐶3} resulting from the merger of 𝐶2 and 𝐶3 
(Michalak et al., 2008).   
 
Types of PFGs 
Three types of Partition Function Games (PFGs) have been studied in literature: 
 Games with positive externalities (Rahwan et al., 2012). 
 Games with negative externalities (Rahwan et al., 2012). 
 Games with mixed externalities (Banerjee & Kraemer, 2010). 
A brief description of each is as follows: 
1. Games with positive externalities – In games with positive externalities, the merger of 
some coalitions in a coalition structure adds value to the players who are external to 
that coalition, making them better off. In other words, the merger of any two coalitions 
gives a positive impact to other existing coalitions in the system (Rahwan et al., 2012). 
An example of environmental policy arrangement maybe the decision of a coalition 
of countries to cut pollution levels. This decision will impact other countries leading 
to positive externalities (Finus, 2003). 
2. Games with negative externalities – For games with negative externalities, the merger 
of any two coalitions does not benefit the other existing coalitions (Rahwan et al., 
2012). For example, collusion in oligopolies where cooperating organisations explore 
ways to undermine the competitiveness of other companies in the market (Catilina & 
Feinberg, 2006) gives rise to negative externalities. 
3. Games with mixed externalities – In a game with mixed externalities, the formation 
of a new coalition can either induce a positive or negative externality upon other (non-
member) coalitions in the structure. This game is a neither positive only nor negative 
only externality game as considered by Michalak et al. (2008). A game with mixed 
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externalities can be modelled using agent types where two types of agents will form 
coalitions that induces either a positive or negative externality on the other type 
(Banerjee & Kraemer, 2010). 
In general, for games with mixed externalities, it would be very difficult to find a solution to 
the coalition structure generation problem without exploring the entire space and checking 
every coalition structure (Rahwan et al., 2015). To put in perspective, consider a coalition 
structure generation problem with externalities where all the structures have been examined 
except one single structure. It is possible that this single structure has a higher value compared 
to all the other coalition structures in the system resulting from the externalities imposed on 
it.  
In order to understand the degree of complexity involved in solving the CSG problem for 
PFGs, we must compare the size of their search space to the size of the search space for CFGs.  
Storing the values of coalitions by exhaustively listing them in memory is infeasible for all 
but very small PFGs, i.e., those with very few agents. This is because the number of possible 
partitions grows very rapidly as the number of agent increases. For example, for 20 agents, 
there are  4 × 1014 possible structures and exhaustive enumeration requires 394 terabytes of 
memory (Rahwan et al., 2012). For PFGs, any coalition can have as many different values as 
there are coalition structures. Storing the value of each coalition in memory is therefore 
infeasible for any but very small games.  Figure 2.2 gives an indication of the size of search 
space for a PFG of 3 agents.  
We therefore need more concise methods for dealing with this problem. The following section 
provides details regarding our approach for dealing with this problem. Note that Section 2.2.2 
is our contribution and does not form part of literature review.  
 
2.2.2 A compact representation for PFGs 
In order to define coalition values compactly, we used the following approach. The value of 
a coalition in a structure is calculated in terms of two components:  
 an externalities-free value, and 
 an externalities factor. 
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The externalities-free value of a coalition C is defined in the same way as for a CFG, i.e.  
𝑣: 2𝐴 → ℝ. The externalities factor is defined in terms of two components:  
1. The size of the coalition, i.e., the number of member agents. 
2. The size of the structure it is embedded in, i.e., the number of coalitions in the 
structure.  
 For a coalition 𝐶, this factor is denoted ef and is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑒𝑓 =  
|𝐶|
𝑑
 
(2.3) 
where 𝑑 is the number of coalitions in the structure in which C is embedded.. As described 
below, this factor can be used to represent both positive and negative by adding and 
subtracting the externality free value using the formula given in Table 2.5. 
 
2.2.2.1 Positive Externalities 
In a PFG with positive externalities, the merger of any two coalitions decreases their joint 
value (or keeps it constant), and increases the values of other coalitions in the structure (or 
keeps them constant). The value 𝑣(𝐶) of any coalition 𝐶 is calculated as follows. Let 𝑅𝑉 
denote a randomly drawn value from any probability distribution. This random value is 
increased by a factor of 𝑒𝑓 to obtain 𝑣(𝐶) as follows:  
 
 𝑣(𝐶) = 𝑅𝑉 + (𝑅𝑉 × 𝑒𝑓) (2.4) 
 
Therefore, we have the following: 
1. If external coalitions merge, the number of coalitions in the structure, i.e. 𝑑 decreases. As 
a result, 𝑒𝑓 increases. 
2. If 𝑒𝑓 increases, then 𝑣(𝐶) increases as well. 
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Examples of games where only positive externalities occur includes projects to reduce 
deforestation in a group of countries benefits other countries environmentally. Another 
example is the decision by one group of countries to reduce pollution, which has a positive 
impact on other countries or regions, it induces positive externalities. The sharing of cars 
between people in a community, if a car is a coalition then merging two coalitions of people 
into a single car (coalition) benefits the other coalitions as there will be less cars in the 
structure reducing the traffic resulting in a positive externality on other coalitions in the 
structure. 
 
2.2.2.2 Negative Externalities 
Externalities are said to be negative if the merger of two coalitions reduces the value (or keeps 
them constant) of the other coalitions in the structure. Again, 𝑅𝑉 denotes a randomly drawn 
value from any probability distribution. This random value is decreased by a factor of 𝑒𝑓 to 
obtain 𝑣(𝐶) as follows:  
 
 𝑣(𝐶) = 𝑅𝑉 − (𝑅𝑉 × 𝑒𝑓) (2.5) 
 
Therefore, we have the following: 
1. If external coalitions merge, number of coalitions in the structure, i.e.,𝑑 decreases and 𝑒𝑓 
increases, and so will the value to be deducted from 𝑣(𝐶). 
2. If 𝑒𝑓 increases, then 𝑣(𝐶) decreases as the original value is subtracted by 𝑅𝑉 ×  𝑒𝑓 
Situations where negative externalities occur are for example, when high-tech companies 
decide to cooperate in order to develop a new technology standard, other companies lose some 
of their competitive position, i.e., they are subject to negative externalities. Research & 
Development coalitions among pharmaceutical companies, when two companies decide to 
jointly develop a new drug, the market position of other companies is likely to decrease. 
Collusion in oligopolies, exogenous coalition formation in e-market places, as well as multi-
agent systems with shared resources and/or conflicting goals all invoke negative externalities. 
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A PFG with mixed externalities is represented as follows. Recall that when a coalition is 
effected by positive externalities, its value is calculated using Equation (2.4) and when it is 
effected by negative externalities, its value is calculated using Equation (2.5). In order to 
incorporate mixed externalities, we take the following approach which is similar to the 
approach taken by Banerjee and Kraemer (Banerjee & Kraemer, 2010):  
1. The agents in a game are divided into different types.  
2. Then, based on the types of member agents, coalitions are divided into different types.  
3. Finally, based on the types of coalitions, coalition structures are divided into different 
types. 
The underlying idea is that the type of a coalition is correlated to the type of externality it can 
impose on external players.  
Details regarding the types of agents, the types of coalitions and the types of coalition 
structures are the subject of the following section.  
 
2.2.2.3 A Representation for Mixed Externalities 
Using this concept, agents are divided into two distinct types with the restriction that any 
game must contain both types of agents. The two types of agents are: 
i) Type A 
ii) Type B 
Given that there are two type of agents, there can be the following three types of coalitions: 
i) Type AA – All agents in the coalition are Type A. 
ii) Type BB – All agents in the coalition are type B. 
iii) Type MX – Some agents in the coalition are type A while others are type B. 
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Example: 
In a 3-agent comprised of 2 Type A agents and 1 Type B agent, the following types of 
coalitions are possible (supposing that agents a1 and a2 are Type A, and agent a3 is Type B): 
Table 2.1 – Possible Coalition Types for 3-agents. 
Coalition Coalition Type 
{a1} Type AA 
{a2} Type AA 
{a1, a2} Type AA 
{a3} Type BB 
{a1, a3} Type MX 
{a2, a3} Type MX 
{a1, a2, a3} Type MX 
 
Three types of coalitions give rise to the following 5 types of coalition structures: 
i) Type AABB – the structure consists of type AA and type BB coalitions 
ii) Type AAMX – the structure consists of type AA and type MX coalitions. 
iii) Type BBMX – the structure consists of type BB and type MX coalitions. 
iv) Type AABBMX – the structure consists of type AA, type BB and MX coalitions. 
v) Type MXMX – the structure consists only of type MX coalitions. 
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Example: 
In a 3-agent system comprised of 2 Type A agents and 1 Type B agent, the following types 
(see Table 2.2) of coalition structures are possible (supposing that agents a1 and a2 are Type 
A, and agent a3 is Type B):  
 
Table 2.2 – Possible Coalition Structure Types. 
Coalition Structures Coalition Structure Type 
{{a1, a2, a3}} Type MXMX (Grand Coalition) 
{{a1, a2}, {a3}} Type AABB 
{{a1, 3}, {a2}} Type AAMX 
{{a1}, {a2, a3}} Type AAMX 
{{a1}, {a2}, {a3}} Type AABB 
 
In PFGs with only one agent of a type, certain types of coalition structure will not exist. The 
grand coalition will always be Type MXMX and the coalition structure of singletons is always 
type AABB if there is at least one agent of each type. 
 
Example: 
Number of Agents by Type  Coalition Structure Types that Do Not Exist 
1 Type A agent, 𝑛 − 1 Type B agents There will be no Type AAMX coalition structure 
1 Type B agent, 𝑛 − 1 Type A agents There will be no Type BBMX coalition structure 
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The effect of externalities 
We defined the effect of externalities in terms of the types of coalitions. More precisely, the 
impact on a coalition when other coalitions form is defined as follows: 
1) When a Type MX coalition forms as a result of a merger of a Type AA and a Type 
BB coalition, it will give positive externalities to Type AA coalitions but negative 
externalities to Type BB. The collusion will always benefits Type AA coalitions but 
always harms Type BB coalitions. 
2) When a Type MX coalition forms and no Type AA or Type BB are present (i.e. the 
coalition structure consists only of Type MX coalitions), all coalitions in the structure 
are effected negatively. The idea is that Type MX coalition is a collusion between 
Type A and Type B agents. Therefore, if the coalition structure consists only of 
colluders that are colluding against each other, everyone loses. 
3) When a Type AA coalition forms as a result of a merger of two Type AA coalitions, 
all other coalition types that are not singletons have their value increased due to 
positive externalities. 
4) When a Type BB coalition form as a result of a merger of two Type BB coalitions, all 
other coalition types that are not singletons have their value increased due to positive 
externalities. 
Special case for singletons (working alone may not be beneficial): 
1) The effect of the formation of a structure on a singleton Type AA coalition is defined 
as follows. If the structure is Type AAMX or AABBMX, then the externality on the 
singleton is positive.  If the structure is Type AABB, then the externality on the 
singleton is negative.   
2) The effect of the formation of a structure on a singleton Type BB coalition is defined 
as follows. Regardless of the type of the structure, the externality on the singleton is 
negative. 
The effect of externalities for coalition structures with no singletons is shown in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 – Externalities for each coalition type in a structure type. 
Coalition 
Structure 
Type 
Coalition Structure 
Membership 
First Coalition 
Type (Value) 
Second 
Coalition Type 
(Value) 
Third 
Coalition Type 
(Value) 
AABB {{AA}{BB}} {AA} + 
(Increased) 
{BB} +  
(Increased) 
N/A 
AAMX {{AA}{MX}} {AA} + 
(Increased) 
{MX} + 
(Increased) 
N/A 
BBMX {{BB}{MX}} {BB} – 
(Decreased) 
{MX} + 
(Increased) 
N/A 
AABBMX {{AA}{MX}{BB}} {AA} + 
(Increased) 
{MX} + 
(Increased) 
{BB} – 
(Decreased) 
MXMX {{MX}{MX}} {MX} – 
(Decreased) 
{MX} – 
(Decreased) 
N/A 
 
Different consideration is given for singletons. Working alone is always bad for Type BB 
coalitions. However for Type AA coalitions when there is a Type MX coalition in the 
structure, it benefits from this coalition type (see Table 2.4).  
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Table 2.4 – Externalities for singletons. 
Coalition 
Structure 
Type 
Coalition Structure 
Membership 
First 
Coalition 
Type 
(Value) 
Second 
Coalition 
Type 
(Value) 
Third 
Coalition 
Type 
(Value) 
Fourth 
Coalition 
Type 
(Value) 
Fifth 
Coalition 
Type 
(Value) 
AABB {{A}{AA}{BB}{B}} [A] – 
(Decreased) 
[AA] + 
(Increased) 
[BB] + 
(Increased) 
[B] – 
(Decreased) 
N/A 
AAMX {{A}{AA}{MX}} [A] + 
(Increased) 
[AA] + 
(Increased) 
[MX] + 
(Increased) 
N/A N/A 
BBMX {{B}{BB}{MX}} [B] – 
(Decreased) 
[BB] – 
(Decreased) 
[MX] + 
(Increased) 
N/A N/A 
AABBMX {{A}{AA}{MX}{BB}{B}} [A] + 
(Increased) 
[AA] + 
(Increased) 
[MX] + 
(Increased) 
[BB] – 
(Decreased) 
[B] –
(Decreased) 
 
The calculation of the value of a coalition for each of the two types of externalities is 
summarized in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 – Formula for calculating positive/negative externalities. 
Equation Externality Formula 
(2.4) Positive Externality 𝑣(𝐶) = 𝑅𝑉 + (𝑅𝑉 × 𝑒𝑓) 
(2.5) Negative Externality 𝑣(𝐶) = 𝑅𝑉 − (𝑅𝑉 × 𝑒𝑓)) 
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The calculation of the value of a coalition based on the structure it is embedded in is shown 
in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 – Externalities from Other Coalitions in 𝐶𝑆 on Coalition 𝐶. 
Coalition 𝐶 Other Coalitions in CS Value Calculation 
Type AA Single Type (2.4) 
Type BB Single Type (2.4) 
Type AA At least one Mixed Type (2.4) 
Type BB At least one Mixed Type (2.5) 
Type MX Single Type (2.5) 
Type MX At least one Type AA or BB (2.4) 
Type AA Singleton At least one Mixed Type (2.4) 
Type AA Singleton Single Type (2.5) 
Type BB Singleton At least one Mixed Type (2.5) 
Type BB Singleton Single Type (2.5) 
 
The type of externality (i.e., positive or negative) imposed on a coalition in a structure is 
summarised in Table 2.7.  
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Table 2.7 – Externalities on Coalition 𝐶 in Coalition Structure 𝐶𝑆. 
Non-Singleton Coalitions 
 Coalition (𝐶) Type Coalition Structure (𝐶𝑆) Type Externality 
S1.  Type AA Type AABB POSITIVE 
S2.  Type AA Type AAMX POSITIVE 
S3.  Type AA Type AABBMX  POSITIVE 
S4.  Type BB Type AABB POSITIVE 
S5.  Type BB Type BBMX  NEGATIVE 
S6.  Type BB Type AABBMX  NEGATIVE 
S7.  Type MX Type MXMX NEGATIVE 
S8.  Type MX Type AAMX POSITIVE 
S9.  Type MX Type BBMX POSITIVE 
S10.  Type MX Type AABBMX POSITIVE 
Singleton Coalitions 
S11.  Type AA Singleton Type AABB NEGATIVE 
S12.  Type AA Singleton Type AAMX POSITIVE 
S13.  Type AA Singleton Type AABBMX POSITIVE 
S14.  Type BB Singleton Type AABB NEGATIVE 
S15.  Type BB Singleton Type BBMX NEGATIVE 
S16.  Type BB Singleton Type AABBMX NEGATIVE 
 Chapter 2. Coalitional Games 27 
 
 
 
This representation is much more compact relative to the representation where a different 
value is stored for each coalition in each coalition structure. This is because, the externality 
free value (i.e., RV) is all that is needed to be saved in memory.  Externalities are then 
incorporated on the fly by employing Equation 2.4 for positive and Equation 2.5 for negative.  
Let’s view the externalities in the context of Producers (Agent Type B) and Consumers (Agent 
Type A) for each of the scenario in Table 2.7. In a typical setting Producers are traditionally 
competitors thus the assumption is for each case is: 
S1. Suppose a structure of Type AABB has resulted from the merger of two Type AA 
coalitions. Then the externality imposed on each coalition in the resulting structure 
is positive. Intuitively, this means that when small consumer coalitions come 
together to form a bigger coalition of consumers, their purchasing power increases. 
As a result, trade for products at the top end of the market increases and therefore 
both producers and consumers benefit (this corresponds to scenarios S1 and S4) 
except for singleton consumers. Intuitively, this means that, as singletons, they 
have less purchasing power and are at the bottom end of the market and the prices 
of products at this end of the market remain unchanged. The singleton consumers 
correspond to scenario S11. 
S2. Suppose a structure of Type AAMX has resulted from the merger of two Type AA 
coalitions. Then the externality imposed on each coalition in the resulting structure 
is positive. Intuitively, this means that when small consumer coalitions come 
together to form a bigger coalition of consumers their purchasing power increases. 
As a result, trade for products at the top end of the market increases and therefore 
both producers and consumers (i.e. coalitions of Type AA and MX) benefit 
everyone (this corresponds to scenarios S2 and S8). Intuitively this means that, 
even singleton consumers gain because of the existence of Type MX coalitions 
which may contain just one consumer. Since even single consumers in Type MX 
coalition benefits, this advantage is passed on to external singleton consumers .The 
singleton consumers correspond to scenarios S12 and S13. 
S3. Suppose a structure of Type AABBMX has resulted from the merger of two Type 
AA coalitions. Then the externality imposed on each Type AA coalition in the 
resulting structure is positive. Intuitively, this means that when small consumer 
coalitions join together to form a bigger coalition of consumer their purchasing 
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power increases. This translates into real benefit for them and Type AA coalitions 
gets a positive externality. However the coalitions of Type BB get a negative 
externality (this corresponds to S6 and S16). Intuitively, this means that the needs 
of the newly merged Type AA coalition of consumers is met by producers in Type 
MX coalitions. Therefore Type MX coalitions benefit i.e. get a positive 
externality. Type AA singletons (singleton consumers) benefit and get a positive 
externality (this corresponds to S13).  
S4. Suppose a structure of Type AABB has resulted from the merger of two Type BB 
coalitions. Then the externality imposed on each coalition in the resulting structure 
is positive. Intuitively, this means that when small producer coalitions come 
together to form a bigger coalition of producers their production power increases. 
As a result, all coalitions except the smallest of producers gain (are effected 
positively by externalities). What we mean by the smallest of producers is a 
singleton producers. The singleton producers corresponds to scenario S14 that get 
a negative externality. 
S5. Suppose a structure of Type BBMX has resulted from the merger of two Type BB 
coalitions. Then the externality imposed on each Type BB coalition in the resulting 
structure is negative. Intuitively, this means that when small producer coalitions 
join together to form a bigger coalition of producers their production power 
increases, but this does not translate to a benefit but rather results in increased cost 
of creating a merger. This is because of the presence of Type MX coalitions. 
Intuitively this means that the consumers in the Type MX coalitions being already 
together in a coalition with producers prefer to work with those producers and not 
with the newly form merger of producers. This benefits Type MX coalitions and 
translates to positive externality on it. This corresponds to scenario S9. 
S6. Suppose a structure of Type AABBMX has resulted from the merger of two Type 
BB coalitions. Then the externality imposed on each Type BB coalition in the 
resulting structure is negative (this corresponds to S6 and S16). Intuitively, this 
means that when small producer coalitions join together to form a bigger coalition 
of producers their production power increases, but this does not translate to a 
benefit but rather results in increased cost of creating a merger. This is because the 
needs of consumers are met by producers outside the newly formed merger. 
However, existing coalitions of consumers i.e. Type AA coalitions gain from the 
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merger of producers and this translates into positive externality on Type AA 
coalitions (this corresponds to S3 and S13). In the same way Type MX coalitions 
are affected by positive externality.  
S7. Suppose a structure of Type MXMX has resulted from the merger of two Type 
MX coalitions. Then the externality imposed on each Type MX coalition in the 
resulting structure is negative. Intuitively, this means the merger is unnecessary 
and counterproductive.   
S8. Suppose a structure of Type AAMX has resulted from the merger of two Type MX 
coalitions. Then the externality imposed on each Type MX coalition in the 
resulting structure is positive. 
S9. Suppose a structure of Type BBMX has resulted from the merger of two Type MX 
coalitions. Then the externality imposed on each Type MX coalition in the 
resulting structure is positive. However Type BB coalitions are affected 
negatively. 
S10. Suppose a structure of Type AABBMX has resulted from the merger of two Type 
MX coalitions. Then the externality imposed on each Type MX and each Type AA 
coalition in the resulting structure is positive. However Type BB coalitions are 
affected negatively. 
The above discussion is just a possible way of viewing the definition of positive and negative 
externalities. However our aim is not to consider a specific PFG such as that for producers 
and consumers. Rather it is to define a general coalitional game with all three externalities i.e. 
positive, negative and mixed inherent in the game. 
2.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced the key concepts that underlie coalitional games. A brief introduction 
to Characteristic Function Games and Partition Function Games was given. Finally, we 
introduced our approach for a compact representation of PFGs. 
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As outlined Chapter 1, algorithms for finding an optimal coalition structure can be classified 
into 3 categories (Service & Adams, 2011): 
 design-to-time algorithms, 
 anytime algorithms, and 
 heuristic algorithms. 
This chapter provides a review of the existing methods in each of these three categories. 
Section 3.1 is about design-to-time algorithms, Section 3.2 about anytime algorithms, and 
Section 3.3. about heuristic algorithms.  
3.1 Design-to-Time Algorithms 
These algorithms are guaranteed to provide an optimal solution. However, a solution can only 
be provided when the algorithm terminates. Since they are not anytime, it is impossible to 
return any form of solution before completion. These algorithms have mostly been designed 
using dynamic programming (DP). 
3.1.1 Dynamic Programming 
Yeh (1986) developed a method based on dynamic programming (Bellman, 1952). Their 
algorithm maintains two tables 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 that contain an entry for every possible coalition. For 
every coalition 𝐶 ⊆ 𝑁, 𝑓1[𝐶] and 𝑓2[𝐶] are computed as follows: A best possible split (if any) 
for 𝐶 is stored in 𝑓1[𝐶] and its evaluation in 𝑓2[𝐶]. If it is best not to split 𝐶 then 𝑓1[𝐶] contains 
𝐶 and 𝑓2[𝐶] the value of 𝐶. The value of every splitting 𝐶
′, 𝐶′′ of 𝐶 is evaluated as  𝑓2[𝐶′] +
 𝑓2[𝐶′′]. This method does not evaluate the splitting of size 𝑠 until it has finished computing 
  𝑓2 for the coalition of sizes 1 to 𝑠 − 1. Table 3.1 shows an example of how 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 are 
computed for 𝑁={a1,a2,a3,a4}. Once 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 are computed for every coalition, the optimal 
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structure 𝐶𝑆∗ is computed recursively. In the example below, this is done by first 
setting 𝐶𝑆∗={a1,a2,a3,a4}. Then looking at 𝑓1{{a1,a2,a3,a4}} we find it is beneficial to split 
it into {a1,a2} and {a3,a4}. Similarly, it is beneficial to split {a1,a2} into {a1} and {a2}, but 
it is better to keep {a3,a4} as it is. The optimal structure is therefore {{a1}, {a2}, {a3,a4}}. 
Although DP gives an exact optimum, it requires a large amount of memory for storing the 
three tables 𝑣, 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 (see the example in Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1 – An example showing how 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 are calculated. 
Input value Size Coalition Evaluations to determine splitting is beneficial 𝑓1 𝑓2 
v({a1}) = 35 
v({a2}) = 45 
v({a3}) = 30 
v({a4}) = 50 
v({a1,a2}) = 55 
v({a1,a3}) = 65 
v({a1,a4}) = 85 
v({a2,a3}) = 60 
v({a2,a4}) = 75 
v({a3,a4}) = 85 
v({a1,a2,a3}) = 95 
v({a1,a2,a4}) = 125 
v({a1,a3,a4}) = 105 
v({a2,a3,a4}) = 120 
v({a1,a2,a3,a4}) = 145 
1 {a1} v({a1}) = 35 {a1} 35 
{a2} v({a2}) = 45 {a2} 45 
{a3} v({a3}) = 30 {a3} 30 
{a4} v({a4}) = 50 {a4} 50 
2 {a1,a2} v({a1,a2}) = 55                   𝑓2[{𝑎1}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎2}]= 80 {a1} {a2} 80 
{a1,a3} v({a1,a3}) = 65                   𝑓2[{𝑎1}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎3}]= 65 {a1,a3} 65 
{a1,a4} v({a1,a4}) = 85                   𝑓2[{𝑎1}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎4}]= 85 {a1,a4} 85 
{a2,a3} v({a2,a3}) = 60                   𝑓2[{𝑎2}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎3}]= 75 {a2} {a3} 75 
{a2,a4} v({a2,a4}) = 75                   𝑓2[{𝑎2}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎4}]= 95 {a2} {a4} 95 
{a3,a4} v({a3,a4}) = 85                   𝑓2[{𝑎3}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎4}]= 80 {a3,a4} 85 
3 
{a1,a2,a3} 
v({a1,a2,a3}) = 95                       𝑓2[{𝑎1}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎2, 𝑎3}]= 95 
𝑓2[{𝑎2}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎1, 𝑎3}]= 105     𝑓2[{𝑎3}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎1, 𝑎2}]= 85 
{a2} {a1,a3} 105 
{a1,a2,a4} 
v({a1,a2,a4}) = 125                    𝑓2[{𝑎1}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎2, 𝑎4}]= 110 
𝑓2[{𝑎2}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎1, 𝑎4}]= 130       𝑓2[{𝑎4}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎1, 𝑎2}]= 105 
{a2} {a1,a4} 130 
{a1,a3,a4} 
v({a1,a3,a4}) = 105                     𝑓2[{𝑎1}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎3, 𝑎4}]= 120 
𝑓2[{𝑎3}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎1, 𝑎4}]=115     𝑓2[{𝑎4}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎1, 𝑎3}]= 105 
{a1} {a3,a4} 120 
{a2,a3,a4} 
v({a2,a3,a4}) = 120                     𝑓2[{𝑎2}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎3, 𝑎4}]= 130 
𝑓2[{𝑎3}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎2, 𝑎4}]=105         𝑓2[{𝑎4}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎2, 𝑎3}]= 110 
{a2} {a3,a4} 130 
4 
{a1,a2,a3,a4} 
v({a1,a2,a3,a4}) = 145                  𝑓2[{𝑎1}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎2, 𝑎3, 𝑎4}]= 155 
𝑓2[{𝑎2}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎1, 𝑎3, 𝑎4}]= 150 𝑓2[{𝑎3}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎4}]= 155 
𝑓2[{𝑎4}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3}]= 145 𝑓2[{𝑎1, 𝑎2}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎3, 𝑎4}]= 140 
𝑓2[{𝑎1, 𝑎3}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎2, 𝑎4}]= 140 𝑓2[{𝑎1, 𝑎4}] + 𝑓2[{𝑎2, 𝑎3}]= 145 
{a3} {a1,a2,a4} 155 
Figure 3.1 illustrates how this method traverses the coalition structure graph. The nodes of 
the graph represent coalition structures. Nodes are grouped in levels. The coalition structures 
at a level are obtained from the ones at the level below by splitting a coalition in the structure 
below. We start at level L1 (i.e., the node {a1,a2,a3,a4}) and move upwards in the graph until 
an optimal structure (i.e. {{a1},{a2},{a3,a4}}) is found. In this figure, there are 3 paths from 
the initial node to the optimal one indicated as dotted, dashed and bold lines.  
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Figure 3.1 – Example DP movements for 4-agents. 
 
Finding an optimal structure does not require evaluating every possible splitting of every 
possible coalition. It is possible to avoid evaluation of some splittings and still be able to find 
an optimal structure.  
Nodes are divided into 𝑛 levels where n is the number of agents in the system. In the example 
of Figure 3.1, n = 4. The set of coalition structures at level Lk consists of nodes with 
k coalitions. The method begins at  L1 with a coalition structure 𝐶𝑆 consisting of {a1,a2,a3,4}. 
Splitting the coalitions 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝑆 into {𝐶′, 𝐶′′} is shown for example by the dotted line with the 
arrow indicating the movement from the node consisting of 𝐶𝑆 to the node consisting 
of (𝐶𝑆\𝐶) ∪ {𝐶′, 𝐶′′}. DP evaluates all possible splits starting at the bottom node and moving 
upward path through the connected nodes until an optimal node is reached shown as the 
dashed line in Figure 3.1. 
3.1.2 Improved Dynamic Programming 
After evaluating the movements of DP, Rahwan & Jennings (2008a) concluded that it was 
possible to avoid evaluation of some splittings and still be able to find an optimal structure. 
In their method, they exploited this characteristic to more efficiently find an optimal structure. 
This method known as improved dynamic programming (IDP) (Rahwan & Jennings, 2008a) 
improves upon the memory usage (by storing less information from the splittings) and speed 
of DP (by avoiding some splittings). However, IDP, like the original DP is still not anytime 
and has the same time complexity of 𝑂(3𝑛).  
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IDP was designed to perform fewer operations by avoiding unnecessary evaluations of as 
many splitting as possible while maintaining the guarantees of finding the optimal coalition 
structure. It is therefore necessary to eliminate as many unnecessary edges from the coalition 
structure graph as possible while avoiding the removal of those edges that lead to an optimal 
node. The method first ensures that each node in the coalition structure graph is connected to 
another node by at least one path. In a coalition structure graph, any coalition structure that 
has more than two coalitions will have more than one path leading to it (shown in Figure 3.2 
as dotted, dashed and bold lines).  
 
Figure 3.2 – Multiple paths leading to each CS with more than two coalitions. 
 
IDP involves movements through the edges of a coalition structure graph where certain splits 
are not evaluated. This is represented by removing these edges from the graph while 
preserving a path leading to any possible optimal node. The remaining edges that are not 
removed should be sufficient for every node to have a path leading to it, thus IDP only 
evaluates those edges to find the optimal coalition structure. This is shown in Figure 3.3 where 
the dotted lines represent some of the redundant edges removed with every CS with more than 
2 coalitions still having more than one edge connected to it. The removal of these edges means 
IDP performs fewer operations that DP. Simulation results showed that IDP evaluated around 
38% of the splits evaluated by DP (Rahwan & Jennings, 2008a). However, owing to the 
tremendous complexity of dynamic programming, alternative methods with anytime property 
were developed. 
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Figure 3.3 – Redundant edges removed as dotted lines. 
Both design-to-time algorithms are able to return an optimal solution with a time complexity 
of 𝑂(3𝑛). However IDP has some advantages over DP (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 – Comparison between DP and IDP. 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Dynamic 
Programming 
 Returns absolute 
optimal. 
 Requires large amount of memory to 
store the 𝑣, 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 tables. 
 Not Anytime, requires completion to 
return solution 
Improve Dynamic 
Programming 
 Returns absolute 
optimal 
 Avoids exploring 
redundant splittings.  
 Requires large amount of memory 
despite evaluating only 38% of splits 
explored by DP. 
 Not Anytime, requires completion to 
return solution 
In the next section, we will be looking at anytime algorithms. 
3.2 Anytime Algorithms 
The key feature of an anytime algorithm is the ability to allow early termination whilst still 
providing some guarantees on the solution. The disadvantage however is that most anytime 
algorithms have a worst case run time of 𝑂(𝑛𝑛). This means that, in the worst-case, they will 
end up exhaustively searching the entire space of all coalition structures.  
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Anytime methods can be classified into two types: coalition structure graph search methods 
and integer partition based search methods. In the following two subsections, we will look at 
each of these two types of methods. 
 
3.2.1 Coalition Structure Graph Search 
The first anytime algorithm for coalition structure generation was proposed by Sandholm et 
al. (1999). Their algorithm guarantees incremental improvements of the worst-case bound as 
the search progresses. The search space is divided into levels 𝐿𝑘, 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛. A node at each 
level represents a coalition structure with 𝑘 coalitions. For 𝑛 = 4, this is shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4 - Coalition structure graph for 4-agents (Sandholm et al., 1999). 
Each level 𝐿𝑘 consists of nodes with 𝑘 coalitions. The algorithm moves through levels 
𝐿1, 𝐿2 … … . 𝐿𝑛 in a breadth-first search manner and searches through all coalition structures 
at level 𝐿𝑘. This algorithm starts by calculating the value of the structure at level 𝐿1. Once this 
is completed it stores both the coalition structure and its value into memory as the current 
optimal. It then performs an exhaustive search of level 𝐿2 i.e. it computes the value of every 
coalition structure on this level.  
If the value of a structure at this level is found to be greater than the current optimal value 
(which before this was the highest value found in level 𝐿1), this information is updated and 
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both the structure and its value is stored in memory as the current optimal. The levels 
𝐿𝑛, 𝐿𝑛−1 … … . 𝐿3 are then searched sequentially in an exhaustive manner as in level 𝐿2 until 
some stopping conditions are met i.e. the running time has expired or all of the search space 
has been explored. Upon termination, the current optimal value is returned as the output. 
As more levels of the space are searched, this bound drops. The biggest hurdle is that the 
search space at each level is still large, which means an exhaustive search will take 
exponential time. Although this algorithm is anytime and can produce an approximate 
solution within a bound of the optimal, its operations usually takes longer due to the 
exhaustive search needed at each level of the graph. Given that, with any characteristic 
function game (𝐴𝑔, 𝑣) no less that 2𝑛−1 coalition structure needs to be evaluated to obtain a 
bound an initial bound. Thus this algorithm only guarantees to return an optimal coalition 
structure after all the coalition structure values has been computed (that is in the worse-case 
it may end up searching the entire space).  
This may not be practical for when the value of 𝑛 i.e. the number of agent is large. It can also 
be argued that the bounds obtained by this algorithm may not be substantial enough to warrant 
the amount of computation required. For example, if 𝑛 = 12, then to attain a bound of  
𝑛
4
 the 
algorithm needs to search levels 𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿12, 𝐿11, 𝐿10 and 𝐿9 of the coalition structure graph. It 
can be argued that, the number of structures that needs to be explored in these levels is too 
large to for obtaining this relatively small bound. 
Following the concepts proposed above, Dang & Jennings (2004) proposed an improved 
anytime algorithm. Their anytime algorithm performs the first two steps i.e. the value of the 
structure at level 𝐿1 then performs an exhaustive search of level 𝐿2. However the remaining 
search spaces are searched by computing the value of a particular structure as opposed to the 
exhaustive search for Sandholm et al. (1999) algorithm. This means that after computing all 
the values of coalition structures of level 𝐿1 and of level 𝐿2, instead of continuously and 
reviewing all the coalition structures of level 𝐿𝑛 to 𝐿3 it computes the value of particular 
coalition structures instead. The set of structures chosen can be a size that is chosen by an 
arbitrary decision, based on random choice, rather for any particular reason. When a new 
structure is found with a value that is bigger that the current optimal, the structure and its 
value is kept in memory as the new optimal.  It then improves on this estimate by exploring 
more of the search space calculating a new set of structures of different sizes. Whatever 
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structure that is in memory will be returned as the optimal structure when the algorithm 
terminates.  
Rahwan et al. (2007) extended Dang & Jennings (2004) work to produce an improved near-
optimal anytime coalition structure generation algorithm. By examining only a minute portion 
of the space (approx.3 ×  2𝑛−1) it was still possible to come up with near optimal solution. 
This method employed a novel representation of the search space according to configurations 
of coalition structures, thus allowing it to cycle through the list of coalition structures by 
avoiding redundant coalition structures. This method was proven to use 33.3% less memory 
that Sandholm’s. 
 
3.2.2 Integer Partition-Based Search 
Rahwan et al. (2007) developed an algorithm that uses integer programming (IP) with anytime 
property that utilizes pre-processing techniques. They represent the search space by 
partitioning it into sub-spaces according integer partitions so that an upper and lower bound 
on the best coalition structures found in them can be computed. These bounds are used to 
determine which sub-space have the least chance of containing the optimal coalition structure 
and can thus be pruned. With useless sub-spaces eliminated, search is focussed on the 
remaining sub-spaces. An exhaustive search is avoided by using a branch and bound 
technique. Like other anytime algorithms, the worst case situation can still require searching 
the entire space which results in time complexity 𝑂(𝑛𝑛). The following is a more detailed 
description of this method.  
Representing the search space of possible coalition structures as partitions of smaller, disjoint 
sub-spaces allows their independent exploration. In this representation, coalition structures 
are categorised into sub-spaces based on the size of the coalitions they contain instead of the 
number of coalitions (as represented in a coalition structure graph). The advantage with this 
representation is the average values of the coalition structures within each sub-space can be 
computed easily. This allows an upper and lower bound to be calculated based on the value 
of the best coalition structure that is found in each sub-space. Comparing these bounds makes 
it possible to identify those sub-spaces that have a higher potential of containing an optimal 
coalition structure while those that cannot contain a solution can be pruned from the search to 
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avoid redundant explorations. Branch-and-bound is then applied to the remaining sub-spaces 
to further reduce the amount of search. 
The algorithm starts by partitioning the space into sub-spaces that contain coalition structures 
based on the integer partition of the number of agents.  An integer partition of 𝑛 represents a 
multiset of positive integers that amount to the exactly the value of 𝑛. For example, in a system 
of four agents (𝑛 = 4), there are five partitions representing the sub-spaces: [4], [3,1], [2,2], 
[2,1,1] and [1,1,1,1].  
An integer partition can be visualised as a sub-space containing coalition structures as shown 
in Figure 3.5. The sub-spaces are categorised into levels according to their integer partitions. 
Level 𝑃𝑖 corresponds to an integer partition with 𝑖 parts, for example level 𝑃2 corresponds to 
integer partitions with two parts such as [3, 1] and [2, 2]. This allows the partitioning of the 
space into smaller, disjoint sub-spaces to be independently explored to look for optimal 
solutions.  Once the space has been partitioned, IP proceeds with the following steps: 
1) Scan the input and compute the bounds for every sub-space and at the same time: 
i) Identify the  best coalition structures within each subspace by: 
a) calculating the upper bound of the subspace 
b) computing the lower bound of the subspace 
ii) Prune the remaining sub-spaces based on their upper bounds by: 
a) excluding subspaces whose upper bounds are lower than the lower bounds 
in the other subspaces. 
iii) Set a worse-case bound on the quality of the best-known solution (found so 
far) 
 
 
 
2) Search within the remaining sub-spaces (after pruning). Pruning allows the search to 
be more focussed,  and, in particular, it: 
i) avoids making unnecessary comparison to subspaces with lower value upper 
bound thus unlikely to contain the optimal. 
ii) avoids calculating the value of the same coalition structure repeatedly. 
iii) enables the application branch-and-bound to reduce the search time even 
further. 
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The remaining sub-spaces to be searched after scanning the input are those that have been 
pruned where the upper bound is lower that best one found so far. This pruning process is 
repeated with the remaining sub-spaces until the condition to terminate is reached. This 
condition is:  
1) the best coalition structure found so far fits within the best bounds found, and  
2) all sub-spaces remaining has either been searched or pruned.  
Depending on the CFG, IP may be able to quickly find an optimal solution. 
 
Figure 3.5 – An example IP search space and sub-spaces given 4 agents. 
 
The method proposed by Sandholm et al. (1999) and that of Rahwan et al. (2007) both have 
advantages and disadvantages, the highlights are shown in Table 3.3 
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Table 3.3 – Comparison of the Anytime Algorithms. 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Coalition 
Structure 
Graph Search 
 Anytime – able to return 
good quality solutions if 
stopped before completion. 
 Requires searching at least the 
two bottom level of the coalition 
structures graph to establish initial 
bound bounds. 
 Requires exhaustive search at 
each level to improve bound. 
 In the worst case the algorithm 
ends up searching the entire 
space. 
Integer 
Partition-based 
(IP) Search 
 Anytime – able to return 
good quality solutions if 
stopped before completion. 
 Better pruning by removing 
non-promising integer 
partitions based on bound. 
 
 In the worst case the algorithm 
ends up searching the entire 
space. 
In the next section, we will be looking at heuristic algorithms. 
 
3.3 Heuristic Algorithms 
Heuristic methods spend little computational effort to find solutions that are not necessarily 
optimal but are close to optimal (Blumenfeld, 2009). In general, it is difficult to guarantee that 
a method produces an optimal solution. However they provide solutions that are adequate for 
practical use. Their main aim is to find acceptable solutions as quickly as possible. This 
section reviews some of the existing heuristic methods for solving the coalition structure 
generation problem for CFGs.  
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3.3.1 Genetic Algorithms 
Evolutionary computation is a type of technique used in computational and artificial 
intelligence to solve continuous optimization and combinatorial optimization problems. It is 
a form of heuristic or stochastic optimization (Fogel, 1998). In general, such methods 
iteratively progress through the generations in the evolution of a population of individuals. A 
population is selected using a randomized guided search, sometimes with parallel processing, 
to simulate the survival of the fittest individuals (Jones, 2002). A population for the next 
generation is created through recombination, mutation, and selection of relevant individuals 
(Goldberg, 1989).  
Most of the genetic operators are inspired by biological structures similar to those found in 
natural evolution. Genetic algorithms (GA) have been found to be effective in solving function 
optimization and combinatorial optimization problems that are NP-complete (Dasgupta & 
Michalewicz, 1997), as long as there is some regularity in the search space. 
One of the earliest heuristic techniques to solve the coalition structure generation based on 
this approach was proposed by Sen and Dutta (Sen & Dutta, 2000). This is a form of stochastic 
search process to discover the optimal coalition structure. The algorithm employs an order-
based genetic algorithm (OBGA). The advantages of OBGA are its scalability to larger 
problem sizes (Sen & Dutta, 2000). The drawback of OBGA is it has no performance 
guarantees. 
The OBGA algorithm starts by randomly generating an initial population of coalition 
structures. This is followed by a repetition a set of three steps; evaluation, selection and 
recombination (Deb, 2001). First, every member (i.e., a coalition structure) of the current 
population is evaluated.  In the selection phase, individuals are chosen based on their fitness. 
These form the next generation. The final step is recombination, in which new members are 
constructed by revising and swapping combination of individuals (Goldberg, 1989). The 
search covers several levels of the coalition structure graph (see Figure 3.5) at the same time.  
This means, the next set of coalition structures that will be evaluated are constructed based on 
the current set in the population.  
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Regarding crossover, the standard position based uniform, single, and two-point crossover 
operators result in unacceptable coalition structures. Unacceptability arises from multiple 
occurrences of the same agent in a structure. To overcome this, the edge recombination 
(Starkweather et al., 1991) crossover and mutation operators were used to ensure that each 
agent is only represented once in every coalition structure. This is achieved through the order 
preservation capability of the operator which produces a coalition structure with all the agents 
but without any duplication. 
Results of experiments by Sen & Dutta (2000) showed that there was negligible performance 
differences across the coalition sizes. This is due to regularity in the initial population. For 
example, in a set of agents with a group size of 𝑛, coalition structures whose sizes are biggest 
and smallest will be poorly evaluated allowing the algorithm to quickly find the groups with 
the optimal size. Once the coalition structures with the right size is found more resources can 
be devoted to finding the optimal composition.  
 
3.3.2 Simulated Annealing 
Simulated Annealing, a stochastic local search method (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983), has also 
been applied to solve the coalition structure generation problem. (Keinänen & Keinänen, 
2008).  This method combines neighbourhood search with simulated annealing. The algorithm 
works by first setting an initial temperature, an initial value which is reduced by a factor of 
alpha 𝛼 where 0 <  𝛼 <  1. At the start an initial random solution is generated. It then 
continuously loops until a certain termination condition is met. This condition means that the 
system has cooled sufficiently i.e. when a minimum temperature value is used as the exit 
parameter or the maximum number of iterations has been reached and an approximately good 
solution has been found. The intermediate step is to decide whether the current solution is 
better than the initial solution. If it is better, then move to set the new solution as the current 
solution. Otherwise, it is accepted with a certain acceptance probability. Once this is decided, 
the algorithm will move to decrease the temperature and continue looping. 
In more detail, an initial random coalition structure 𝐶𝑆  is generated. Another random coalition 
structure 𝐶𝑆′ is then generated inside the neighbourhood of 𝐶𝑆. If 𝐶𝑆′is superior to 𝐶𝑆, then 
𝐶𝑆′ is the new CS. If not, CS’ is CS by calculating the acceptance probability using the 
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formula 𝑒
𝑉(𝐶𝑆′)−𝑉(𝐶𝑆)
𝜏
 . The parameter τ is a temperature parameter and 𝑒, Euler's number 
which has the value of 2.71828. τ decreases in value after each iteration.  The decrease in 
value follows a defined annealing schedule τ = ατ. Tests conducted using this algorithm 
demonstrated that for certain neighbourhoods with appropriate characteristics, a good enough 
solution can be found within a short runtime. 
 
3.3.3 Greedy-Based Methods 
Di Mauro et al. (2010) proposed a new algorithm called GRASP-CSG. This method combines 
two methods. One is the greedy method called Greedy Randomised Adaptive Search 
Procedure (GRASP), a heuristics approach first proposed by Feo & Resende (1995). The other 
method is a stochastic local search method. It involves greedily constructing a candidate 
solution (coalition structure), and then conducting local search to improve upon the solution.  
The GRASP-CSG algorithm uses a randomised constructive search procedure to compute a 
solution and subsequently performs a local search on this solution. The search is conducted 
to further improve upon the solution provided from the greedy construction. A new candidate 
solution is constructed by adding a randomly selected solution component iteratively based 
on a uniform distribution. The selection comes from a special set known as the restricted 
candidate list or RCL consisting of a number of best ranked solutions. High value components 
i.e. some coalitions with high value from the coalition structures stored in this list are 
randomly selected to form a new coalition structure. 
Once an RCL is constructed, a local search is done. If a neighbour is found to have a higher 
value than any coalition structure in the RCL, it will be added to the RCL. In the next iteration, 
the components from the newly added structure are chosen when a new candidate solution is 
constructed. It was assumed by Di Mauro et al. (2010) that, over time (as the algorithm runs 
for a higher number of iterations), with more high value structures added to the RCL, the 
choice of selection for high value components (member coalitions of the structures in the list) 
will lead to the construction of higher value solutions. 
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3.3.4 Particle Swarm Optimisation 
An algorithm for coalition structure generation based on swarm intelligence (Kennedy & 
Eberhart, 1995) was proposed by Guo & Wang (2006). The particle swarm optimisation 
(PSO) algorithm is designed to find the best subsets of the search space with high quality 
solution candidates. This is achieved by interaction among particles that represents agents in 
coalitions.  Particle group together as swarms. PSO works by initializing a random group of 
particles, i.e., solutions. From this group, it searches for the best solution iteratively. At each 
iteration, every particle is assigned two values Pbest and gbest. Pbest is a private best which 
denotes the best fitness value (coalition structure value) of every particle (solutions) in the 
population based on the initial performed search. The variable gbest represents the global best 
value obtained thus far by any particle in the population. While going through each iteration, 
the individual particles make continuous velocity which determines their rate of exploration 
changes in the solution space to figure out the best direction and distance to cover the areas 
which Pbest and gbest points to. 
Compared to GAs, PSO has no genetic operations such as crossovers and mutation which are 
not relevant to the way PSO works. Instead, it focuses on changing the speed of exploration 
for each particle in the search space. PSO has fewer parameters to be adjusted and can thus 
be easier to optimise. It shares information in a completely unique way. As opposed to the 
approach taken by GA where chromosomes share information with each other resulting in the 
whole swarm moving to the best area in a concurrent path, with PSO information moves in 
one direction where only gbest transfers information to other particles making the subsequent 
iterations follow the current best fitness. In the simulations conducted by Guo & Wang (2006), 
PSO was shown to converge to a solution and obtain the best fitness much quicker than GA 
using information from the history of previous iterations. 
The advantage of this method includes execution speed through parallel processing, 
robustness and ease of managing the search. This is suitable for application in coalition 
formation in a MAS where the number of agents is larger due to its scalable characteristics 
(Dos Santos & Bazzan, 2012).  
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3.3.5 Ant Colony Optimisation 
Ant Colony optimisation (ACO) first introduced by Dorigo et al. (1996) is a stochastic 
metaheuristics that mimics the behaviour of ants walking along a path looking for sources of 
food. The main idea behind ACO is based on the idea of artificial agents behaving as ants. To 
apply ACO, a suitable representation of the problem in the form of a weighted graph is needed 
as the movements of the ants is akin to finding the best path over this graph. The ants build 
new solutions by exploring the paths of the graph and using a pheromone model to keep track 
of promising paths. The pheromone can either be nodes or edges in the graph.  
A variation of the ACO method was formulated for the formation of buyer groups in electronic 
marketplaces. The goal is to form groups of buyers (coalitions) whose utilities will maximise 
the value of the entire coalition structure (Sukstrienwong, 2011). The authors devised an 
algorithm called BCF_2ACO (BuyerCoalitionFormation_2AntColonyOptimisation). They 
applied the concept of coalition structure for fairer distribution of utility to buyer coalitions. 
In their research the values of coalitions are not known priori, i.e. each coalition needs to be 
constructed and its value calculated before a coalition structure can be built. To do this, their 
approach deploys two ant colonies. The first one finds the best way to form buyer coalitions 
according to the total reward received from the sellers, i.e., the utility gained by each buyer 
by finding the best disjoint subsets of all buyers. Once the buyer coalitions have been formed, 
a second ant colony then finds the best way to partition those buyer coalitions into coalition 
structures that are able to achieve the highest total. 
Although like other heuristics, ACO is not guaranteed to return the optimal solution. However, 
BCF_2ACO was shown to perform better compared to the GA method proposed by Hyodo et 
al. (2003) for forming buyer coalitions (Sukstrienwong, 2011). 
Each of the heuristics reviewed have their own strength and weaknesses. Table 3.4 provides 
a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the heuristic methods reviewed. 
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Table 3.4 – A Summary the Heuristic Algorithms. 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Genetic 
Algorithm 
 Scalable to larger problems.  No performance guarantees 
 Requires strict regularity in input. 
Simulated 
Annealing 
 Able to move to worst solution 
in the hope of escaping local 
optima. 
 No performance guarantees 
 Highly depended on 
neighbourhood definition. 
Greedy 
(GRASP-CSG) 
 Greedily construct an initial 
solution then local search helps 
to explore neighbouring 
solution. 
 Requires memory to store high 
value coalitions, candidates for 
greedy construction. 
 No performance guarantees. 
Particle Swarm 
Optimisation 
 Parallel exploration of the search 
space. 
 No performance guarantees. 
 
Ant Colony 
Optimisation 
 History of best path taken using 
pheromones model 
 No performance guarantees 
 Requires space representation 
with weighted graphs. 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides a review of existing algorithms for generating an optimal coalition 
structure for CFGs. These algorithms were divided into three classes: design-to-time, anytime, 
and heuristic. Each of these classes of algorithms has its own strengths and weaknesses. The 
fastest design-to-time algorithms for CFGs have time complexity 𝑂(3𝑛) (Rahwan & Jennings, 
2008a; Yeh, 1986). Although they generate an exact solution, they however must to be 
allowed to run to completion. This can be very time consuming, especially for large games.  
In contrast, anytime algorithms have the key feature that the quality of solution improves with 
time they can be terminated at any time. To get a good may still be time consuming. Unlike 
design-to-time and anytime methods, heuristic methods are designed to quickly return a good 
enough solution.  However, in most cases, they cannot provide guarantees on the quality of 
solutions. 
The next Chapter will focus on the literature review for coalition structure generation for 
partition function games i.e. games with externalities.  
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Chapter 4 Coalition Structure Generation 
for Partition Function Games:  
A Review of Literature 
 
Chapter 3 focused on methods for determining optimal coalition structures for characteristic 
function games. In these types of games, the value of a coalition is independent of how other 
coalitions are formed. However, in some multiagent systems, the value of a coalition depends 
on the how external coalitions are formed. Such systems are modelled as games in partition 
function form (Thrall & Lucas, 1963). 
An example where the formation of an external coalition impacts the value of an existing 
coalition is when a group of companies working together tries to erode the market share or 
competitiveness of other companies in the market. When these companies form alliances and 
develop a new standards that is proprietary which cannot be used by others outside the 
coalition, this reduces the competitiveness of other companies which does not have access to 
these standards. An example of this is the Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) consortium 
and well as the Fifth Generation Computer Systems (FGCS) project which subject negative 
externalities to other companies who were not members (Yi, 2003). 
Recall that, in a PFG, the value of a coalition may be influenced by the creation of another 
coalition in the system. Consider an example of two coalition structures CS and CS’ where  
𝐶𝑆 = {𝐶𝐴, 𝐶𝐵, 𝐶𝐶} and 𝐶𝑆′ = {𝐶𝐴, 𝐶𝐵 ∪ 𝐶𝐶}. 𝐶𝐴 Might have a different value in CS compared 
to CS’ as result of the union between 𝐶𝐵 ∪ 𝐶𝐶  .  This effect is known as externalities and in 
this example, it is imposed on 𝐶𝐴 by the merger between 𝐶𝐵 and 𝐶𝐶  to form coalition 𝐶𝐵 ∪ 𝐶𝐶 . 
Externalities are vital in multiagent systems where coalitions have either contradictory or 
overlapping goals. This chapter reviews the existing methods for coalition structure 
generation in partition function games. Despite the importance of externalities in many 
applications, less attention has been given to the computational aspects of games with 
externalities. At the time of writing, there were no existing heuristic methods for solving the 
CSG problem for the general classes of PFGs. This chapter reviews the existing non-heuristic 
methods. 
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The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 outlines methods based on the Integer 
Partition-based (IP) algorithm. Section 4.2 describes a distributed approach. All the methods 
in sections 4.1 and 4.2 deal with games with either exclusively positive or exclusively negative 
externalities. Section 4.3 describes a method which considers mixed externalities where both 
externalities exists in the same game. 
4.1 Integer Partition-based Algorithm for PFG 
One of the early works that considered coalition structure generation in games with 
externalities was by Michalak et al. (2008). They used the same representation as Rahwan et 
al. (2007) for dividing the space into integer partitions and calculating the bounds for each 
coalition structure size. This is represented by the partition of integers. In an example for  4-
agents, the integer partition [1,1,2] represents a coalition structure with two coalitions of size 
1 and one coalition of size two i.e. 𝐶𝑆 = {{𝑎1}, {𝑎2}, {𝑎3, 𝑎4}}. Each integer partition is 
known as a configuration. 
Initially, their research considered four types of PFG settings: 
 those that are super-additive and have positive externalities (𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
+  ), 
 those that are super-additive and have negative externalities (𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
−  ), 
 those that are sub-additive and have positive externalities (𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
+ ) and 
 those that are sub-additive and have negative externalities (𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
− ). 
They proved that, in each of these four PFG settings it was possible to bound the values of 
every coalition. Of the four games considered above, they showed that for 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
+ , the optimal 
𝐶𝑆 is always the grand coalition while for (𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
− ) the optimal will always be the coalition 
structure of singletons. This would make these two settings trivial when studying the CSG 
problem as the computing of the optimal structure is straightforward. Therefore, they only ran 
simulations and tested their algorithm on the 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
−  and 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
+  settings. 
The primary contribution of their research was devising a way to construct bounds on the 
value of every coalition for every coalition structure in a 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
−  or 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
+  games. Once the 
bounds value of each coalition size is known, this can be used to construct the upper and lower 
bound for each configuration where a configuration is the integer partition denoting the size 
of the coalition structure i.e. [1,1,1,1],[1,1,2],[1,3],[2,2] and [4] for a set of 4-agents. Being 
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able to construct bounds on the value of every coalition in games with externalities gave them 
the ability to adapt the state-of-the-art IP algorithm for CFG for use in a PFG setting.  
Their algorithm for the PFG setting does the same kind of partitioning and pruning of the 
search space as Rahwan et al. (2007) algorithm for CFGs. It also uses a similar way of 
searching through promising subspaces. Important techniques deployed by the IP algorithm 
for CFGs such as avoiding redundant calculation where no 𝐶𝑆 is considered more than once 
is directly transferred into their adaptation of the algorithm for the PFG settings. The branch-
and-bound rule however required modifications to avoid exploring hopeless routes when 
constructing candidate solutions for PFGs. Their simulation results found that in some cases 
for the 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
−  settings, the pruning technique used was less effective and almost all of the 
space needed to be searched to find the optimal. They argued that this is due to the nature of 
𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
−  setting where the value of the structure in a configuration is dependent on the value of 
the structures in the previous levels (see dashed line in Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1 – Integer Partition for six-agents. 
4.1.1  𝑰𝑷
+/−
 Algorithm 
The previous algorithm (Michalak et al., 2008) deals with two specific classes of PFGs known 
as 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
−  and 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
+ . In 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
+ , the merger between any two coalitions will either decrease their 
joint value or keep it constant but increases the values of the other coalitions in that structure 
(or keep it constant as well). That is, the values of the coalitions are weakly sub-additive 
meaning their value can increase because the externalities are positive or it can remain the 
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same (externalities equal to zero). In 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
−  The merger between any two coalitions will either 
increase their joint value or keep it constant but decrease the values of the other coalitions in 
that structure (or keep it constant). This means that the values of the coalitions are weakly 
super-additive, thus their value can decrease because the externalities are negative or it can 
remain the same (where externalities are equal to zero). 
𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
−  and 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
+  are widely used in economics and social sciences to model relationships 
between coalitions which is usually the main focus of the problem studied. An example for 
𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
+  is in the coordination of environmental policy between countries. When countries 
decide to join an international coalition to reduce emissions, this may have a negative impact 
on their economy i.e. slower growth (a sub-additive property). However, their actions could 
have a positive impact on the other countries outside the coalition thus maximising the overall 
welfare of everyone i.e. the world. Similarly, in the pharmaceutical industry, when two 
companies form a coalition to develop a new drug, this can increase their market share (super-
additive property) at the expense of the other players (other coalitions of companies in the 
market) who will likely lose market share. As the internet becomes the de facto marketplace 
of the future and the transactions becomes more complicated, there may be a need for the 
formation of ad hoc coalitions which will need to consider externalities in a more extensive 
manner without the limitations imposed by 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
−  and 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
+  with the assumptions of super- 
and sub-additivity. 
This means that, these two classes (𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
−  and 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
+ ) are too rigid (restricted) to be able to 
represent a number of settings. For example, a merger between coalitions may be beneficial 
when their sizes are smaller. However, if the newly created group is so large that it results in 
issues such as communication problems (the merger should have resulted in positive impact 
for the coalitions), then the cost may far outweigh the benefits. This type of scenario is neither 
super-additive nor sub-additive. 
Due to the strict nature of the 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
+  and 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
−   settings, Rahwan et al. (2009) proposed an 
algorithm called  𝐼𝑃
+/−
 that deals with a wider class of PFGs. These classes of PFGs 
denoted 𝑃𝐹+ and  𝑃𝐹−  which drop the assumptions of super- and sub- additivity, are: 
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  𝑃𝐹+ – Games where externalities are weakly positive externalities, i.e. the 
externalities are always positive (non-negative). Which means the merger of any two 
coalitions will never decrease the value of other coalitions in the system.  
  𝑃𝐹− – Games where externalities are weakly negative externalities, i.e. the 
externalities are always are negative (non-positive). Which means the merger of any 
two coalitions will always decrease the value of other coalitions in the system.  
For these more general type of PFG games, Rahwan et al. (2009) developed a novel anytime 
algorithm with a new way of bounding the value of any group of coalitions in a  𝑃𝐹+ 
/ 𝑃𝐹− game. Compared to the approach taken by Michalak et al. (2008) which bounds the 
value of any given coalition 𝐶, they bound the value to a given partition of 𝐶. Once the bounds 
for each coalition in each partition can be successfully computed, they apply the same 
technique as Rahwan et al. (2007) to prune any unpromising subspace (partitions). Although 
for the general PFG case it is not possible to prune any partition of a subset of agents, they 
were able to show that pruning was possible for  𝑃𝐹+ / 𝑃𝐹−  under specific conditions using 
their own pre-processing techniques. They devised two algorithms for searching these 
subspaces. The first one is a pre-processing algorithm which prunes the subspaces by 
comparing the upper and lower bounds. The second one is  𝐼𝑃
+/−
 which is an updated version 
of the IP algorithm introduced in Rahwan et al. (2009). 
To test their algorithm, they needed to provide a suitable way of generating input instances 
that comply to the  𝑃𝐹+ / 𝑃𝐹−  settings. To this end, they provided an equation for generating 
the input and showed that the input instances generated satisfied the conditions of the  𝑃𝐹+ 
/ 𝑃𝐹− settings. They also showed that although the function they devised consists of  𝑂(𝑛𝑛 ) 
values, it only requires 𝑂(2𝑛 ) values to be stored in memory. This overcomes the limitations 
encountered in Michalak et al. (2008) where they were unable to test their algorithm for any 
problem size larger than 10-agents due to the need of storing the value for every pair (𝐶, 𝐶𝑆) ∶
 𝐶 ∈  𝐶𝑆. Using this function to generate the input, it was possible for them to evaluate and 
provide results PFGs with up to 24-agents. The initial work in (Rahwan et al., 2009)  was only 
tested on the Uniform and Normal distributions. However, they later extended their 
investigation with  𝐼𝑃
+/−
 to include the NDCS distribution (Rahwan et al., 2012). 
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4.2 Distributed CSG with Externalities 
Modern computing brings multiprocessing power to the mass market, in a typical personal 
computer today the central processor or CPU usually includes at least two or more processors. 
This allows for multiple threads to be processed and executed at the same time. It would be 
unwise not to take advantage of this processing power where computers that are capable or 
simultaneously processing 4 or 8 thread are common. The algorithms for solving the CSG 
problem in PFG mentioned so far are centralized i.e. single-thread sequentially executed 
algorithms. Perhaps this was the motivation behind the development of a distributed algorithm 
for solving the CSG problem in PFGs. Distributing the calculations has the benefit of splitting 
the processing and memory costs among the agents. Allocating resources by distributing the 
load so that agents with superior resources and capacity get a bigger chunk of the workload, 
increases overall efficiency. These and other desirable characteristics of a distributed 
approach were highlighted by Rahwan & Jennings (2007). 
A distributed algorithm for the CSG problem in PFG was introduced by Epstein & Bazzan 
(2013). They presented DCSGE (Distributed Coalition Structure Generation with Externality) 
which builds upon the work of  Michalak et al. (2010). The original D-IP algorithm introduced 
in Michalak et al. (2010) is an improvement on the IP algorithm (Rahwan et al., 2009) which 
added parallel processing and can be used for both distributed and centralized environments. 
However, D-IP did not take into account externalities from coalition formation.  
A contribution made by Rahwan et al. (2012) provided the equation to calculate the 
externalities for each coalition.  The main characteristics of this equation are that the 
externalities effecting each coalition must be of a single type, either positive only or negative 
only. This made it possible to set the upper and lower bounds for any coalition and also 
provide worst case guarantees on solution quality. Using the methods for distributing the 
calculation of D-IP; and the equation on calculating externalities in 𝐼𝑃
+/−
, (Epstein & Bazzan, 
2013) combined certain constructs of the two methods to create DCSGE.  
The DCSGE algorithm is split into two stages. Stage one involves evaluating the values of 
the coalitions belonging to selected coalition structures. As explained in Rahwan et al. (2009), 
it is possible to compute the maximum and minimum values of a coalition in for any PFG in 
the  𝑃𝐹+ / 𝑃𝐹− settings. Thus once these are computed, the values are then communicated 
and shared among the agents.  
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At the second stage, the agents then select which configuration i.e. which integer partition it 
will choose to begin search for the optimal 𝐶𝑆 with the information obtained in the first stage. 
The information obtained in the first stage will guide the agents in the second stage to explore 
only promising configuration to enable the optimal to be located more quickly. As the search 
progresses and information on the bounds are exchanged between the agents, more parts of 
the space can be eliminated. The distributed exploration of multiple configurations enable 
more space to be covered at any given time. This, it was hoped, will allow for quicker 
improvements on the bound and thus convergence to the optimal. The authors claim that the 
distributed computation allows for faster elimination of non-promising configuration thus 
reducing amount of space that needed to be searched to return the optimal solution. They 
claim that from simulation results, in some cases just 0.01% of search space needed to be 
searched before an optimal is found.  
 
4.3 PFGs with Mixed Externalities  
The methods reviewed thus far in this chapter deal with PFGs where the externalities are 
either always positive (𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏
+  & 𝑃𝐹+) or always negative (𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
−  & 𝑃𝐹−) (Epstein & Bazzan, 
2013; Michalak et al., 2008; Rahwan et al., 2009; Rahwan et al., 2012). None of these methods 
considered PFG settings where both negative and positive externalities are present i.e. where 
the externalities are mixed such that some externalities are negative while others are positive 
in the same game. Despite being given less attention in the CSG literature, games with mixed 
externalities reflect many real world situations where a merger of two coalitions may 
positively impact one coalition but negatively impact another.  
For example, A merger between to large conglomerates which will create a giant 
conglomerate will have a negative impact (negative externality) on smaller organisations in 
the market At the same time, it will benefit coalitions of stock traders as the shares of the 
newly merged conglomerate will most likely increase in value (positive externality). This 
example represents many real life scenarios where not all the players in an environment is of 
the same type. Thus different types of players merging into different types of coalitions will 
have different impact on other types of players or coalition in the same domain. Based on this 
concept, (Banerjee & Kraemer, 2010) introduced a framework to represent coalitional games 
with mixed externalities i.e. where positive and negative externalities co-exist. 
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They showed that this framework which models externalities on the concept of competition 
and complementation conforms to the previous  𝑃𝐹+ and 𝑃𝐹− setting considered in Rahwan 
et al. (2009) as a special case. For generating the input data, they used an identical approach 
to Rahwan et al. (2009), except when assigning values to each coalition. Whereas in Rahwan 
et al. (2009), the externalities are solely added or subtracted, their approach needed to consider 
the relationship between the type of coalition 𝐶 and each coalition in 𝐶𝑆\{𝐶}. They do this by 
defining two sets of coalition types. One coalition type is a potential collaborator (externalities 
on will be positive on 𝐶) while the other is a competitor (externalities will be negative on 𝐶). 
Thus the values are either added or subtracted on 𝐶 depending on the type of other coalitions 
in the structure. This allows a similar input instance to be generated as in (Rahwan et al., 
2009) which only requires  𝑂(2𝑛 ) values to be stored in memory. 
While in Rahwan et al. (2009) it was possible to prune the integer partition space, this is not 
possible when considering agents of different types as the space now changes into a type-
space where each integer partition contains different types of coalition structures containing 
coalitions with different types of agents. Therefore, they adapted a branch and bound search 
algorithm to their mixed externalities setting for exploring this type-space which allows 
significant pruning of the search space. One of the most important findings from their 
simulations is that their branch and bound algorithm actually increases in performance i.e. the 
speed of the search is faster for a larger number of agents (larger problem instances). Their 
method however, unlike the other methods reviewed in this chapter only works in a PFG 
settings and is not applicable to CFGs. Another lacking feature is that their method is not 
anytime thus requires the search to complete to return a solution. 
 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents a review of existing methods for coalition structure generation for 
partition function games. Most of these methods are based on the IP algorithm (Epstein & 
Bazzan, 2013; Michalak et al., 2008; Rahwan et al., 2009; Rahwan et al., 2012). Moreover, 
all these methods considered games with externalities in either exclusively positive or 
exclusively negative form instead of games where both are present i.e. mixed externalities. 
The only method to consider mixed externalities is Banerjee & Kraemer (2010) which models 
the mixed externalities effect caused by the mixing of agent types.  
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Table 4.1 – Comparison of Methods for CSG in PFGs. 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
IP for PFG (Michalak et 
al., 2008) 
Tested Up to 10-agents. 
 
 Works for CFG and PFG. 
 Anytime properties of IP retained. 
 Able to find Optimal 𝐶𝑆 searching 
just 1.75% of search space at 
minimum. 
 
 Centralised 
 Input requires value stored 
for every pair (C, CS) i.e. 
consumes more memory. 
 Consider games with either 
positive or negative 
externalities separately not 
with both externalities in the 
same game 
 Tested only on Uniform 
Distribution 
 Larger part space needs to 
be explored to find optimal 
in 𝑃𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑝
−  setting. 
𝐼𝑃+ −⁄  (Rahwan et al., 
2009; Rahwan et al., 
2012)  
Tested Up to 24-agents. 
 
 Works for CFG and PFG 
 Anytime. 
 Less memory required to store input 
due to pre-computed externalities on 
each coalition value.  
 Tested three different probability 
distributions (Uniform, Normal and 
NDCS distributions). 
 Able to find Optimal 𝐶𝑆 searching 
just 0.0001% of search space at 
minimum. 
 Centralised 
 Considers games with either 
positive or negative 
externalities exclusively not 
with both in one game i.e. 
mixed externalities. 
 Larger part space needs to 
be explored to find optimal 
in 𝑃𝐹− setting. 
Branch  and Bound for 
Mixed Externalities 
(Banerjee & Kraemer, 
2010)  
Tested Up to 14-agents. 
 
 Considers games with Mixed 
Externalities. 
 Works for both CFG and PFG  
 Uses similar input instance as 
(Rahwan et al., 2012) thus less 
memory required.  
 Able to find Optimal 𝐶𝑆 searching 
just 0.048% of search space at 
minimum. 
 Centralised 
 Tested only on Uniform 
Distribution 
 Not Anytime. 
 
 
DCSGE (Epstein & 
Bazzan, 2013)  
Tested Up to 16-agents. 
 
 Distributed method. 
 Works for both CFG and PFG 
 Can be run as centralised or 
distributed search. 
 Uses similar input instance as 
(Rahwan et al., 2012) thus less 
memory required. 
 More than one distribution type 
considered (Uniform & Normal). 
 Able to find Optimal 𝐶𝑆 searching 
just 0.01% of search space at 
minimum. 
 Considers games with either 
positive or negative 
externalities exclusively not 
with both in one game i.e. 
mixed externalities. 
 Not Anytime. 
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While the methods proposed in Banerjee & Kraemer (2010), Michalak et al. (2008), Rahwan 
et al. (2009) and Rahwan et al. (2012) are centralised, the DCSGE algorithm proposed in 
Epstein & Bazzan (2013) distributes the coalition structure generation process to several 
agents. DCSGE is a more comprehensive algorithm as it can be run in both centralised as well 
as distributed manner. Table 4.1 provides a comparison of the methods for solving the CSG 
problem in PFGs, listing the advantages and disadvantage of each method. 
The performance of each method varies in terms of the minimum amount of search space 
explored before an optimal solution can be found. The method proposed by Rahwan et al. 
(2012) can find the optimal while exploring just 0.0001% of the search space for 24 agents 
while Michalak et al. (2008) needed to explore 1.75% of the space to find the optimal for just 
a 10-agent game.  
It should be noted that while the methods in Michalak et al. (2008), Rahwan et al. (2009) and 
Rahwan et al. (2012) are anytime, the methods in Banerjee & Kraemer (2010) and Epstein & 
Bazzan (2013) are not. From the reviewed literature it was found that no design-to-time 
algorithms exist for CSG in PFG at time of writing. As for heuristic methods, Sen & Dutta 
(2000) explored genetic algorithms to find optimal coalition structures. Their simulations 
were conducted for both CFGs and PFGs, however their search space was restricted by 
stringent regularity unlike the general classes of PFGs considered in this thesis.  
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Chapter 5 Heuristic Methods for Finding 
Optimal Coalition Structure 
 
 
This chapter gives algorithmic descriptions of the following four heuristic methods for 
determining an optimal coalition structure: 
1. A tabu search method we call TACOS (TAbu Search for COalition Structure).  
2. A simulated annealing method. 
3.  An ant colony optimization method  
4. A particle swarm optimization method. 
These four methods form the focus of this research. 
These methods were chosen due to their suitability for adaptation to use neighbourhood 
operators to explore the space. This allows for the same neighbourhood generation operator 
to be used for all the methods. 
 
5.1 Tabu Search for Coalition Structure Generation (TACOS) 
Tabu search (TS), first proposed by Glover & Laguna (1997), is a general purpose heuristic 
that uses of neighbourhood search combined with tabu memory to quickly return high quality 
solutions. The tabu memory is used to store a list of coalition structures (points in the search 
space) already visited by the search. This avoids the same points and points known to be 
inferior in the tabu list from being revisited again as the search progresses. Avoiding already 
visited solutions ensures that the search continues from unexplored regions of the search 
space. It also avoids being stuck at a local maxima enabling better solutions to be found as 
the search continues. 
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TS is a highly adaptable method that can be combined with problem-specific heuristics. In 
some cases, TS has been shown to find solutions very close to optimal (Crainic et al., 2009; 
Lin et al., 2014; Lodi et al., 2004). It has also been used effectively for solving combinatorial 
optimization problems (Chang et al., 1999; Rolland et al., 1996). 
Tabu search is an improvement on a typical Local Search (LS) in that it enables LS to 
overcome local optima. The basic principle of tabu search is to perform local search in the 
neighbourhood of a local optimum. Useful information gained during local search is 
maintained in a memory called tabu list. This information is used to guide the search toward 
potentially good directions and prevent visiting a point repeatedly.  In other words, this list 
records the history of search. A typical Tabu search begins by moving to some local optima. 
To avoid redundancy in making the same move again, moves are stored in one or more tabu 
lists.  
Using the general framework of TS, TACOS was devised to work as follows. To begin, a 
random coalition structure is generated as the initial starting point (see Algorithm 1). This 
start point is set as current best solution and the coalition structure is added as the initial entry 
to the tabu list. The tabu list is an array that keeps those coalition structures that are forbidden 
from being revisited again in subsequent iterations of the search.  
A neighbourhood for the starting coalition structure is generated using a set of neighbourhood 
operators (see section 5.1.1 for details). Three operators are used for neighbourhood 
generation: 
i.  Merge  
ii. Split  
iii. Shift  
Within the neighbourhood generated by these operators, a local maximum and minimum is 
identified. The local minimum is added to the tabu list to prevent future iterations from visiting 
the coalition structure again. A choice was made to only add the worst solution instead of 
adding all visited solutions as this would have contributed to a larger tabu list and consumed 
more memory potentially slow down the search. If a local maxima is found to be better than 
the current best, the maxima becomes the current best.  
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Algorithm 1 TACOS: Tabu search algorithm for finding an optimal coalition structure 
1: 𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑢𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 ← [ ] {Tabu list initially empty} 
2: 𝐶𝑆 ← randomly generated CS; {Generate a random start point} 
3: 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 ← 𝐶𝑆  
4: for 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 ← 1, 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 do 
5:      Generate a neighbourhood 𝑁 of 𝐶𝑆 with chosen operators 
6:      Find the 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 and the 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 in 𝑁 
7:      if 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 not in 𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑢𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 then 
8:           Add 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 to 𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑢𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 
9:      end if 
10:      if 𝑣(𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆) > 𝑣(𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡) then 
11:           𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 ← 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 
12:      end if 
13:      if 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 not in 𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑢𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 then 
14:           Add 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 to 𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑢𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 
15:           𝐶𝑆 ← 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 
16:      else 
17:           𝐶𝑆 ← A randomly generated coalition structure that is not in 𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑢𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 
18:      end if 
19: end for 
20: Return 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 
At any iteration during the search where a local maximum is not in the tabu list, it will be 
added and the search proceeds from this point. Otherwise, if it is already in the tabu list, this 
means that this point and its neighbourhood have already been explored, thus will not be 
visited again. When this happens, a random point is generated repeatedly until a point that is 
not in the tabu list is found and search continues from this newly generated coalition structure. 
This cycle continues for a fixed number of iterations, and once finished the best solution found 
in returned as the optimal. 
 
5.1.1 Neighbourhood Generation Operators 
As is the case with any general purpose heuristic method, a suitable adaptation to the problem 
domain is needed. Tabu search requires a suitable neighbourhood generation operator that is 
problem specific to be defined so that an effective exploration of the search space is possible. 
One of the key factors that influences performance is the choice of neighbourhood operators. 
When defining neighbourhood operators, a key consideration is good coverage of the search 
space. Well-designed neighbourhood operators contribute heavily to the success of tabu 
search and with this in mind, the three operators, i.e., merge, split, shift were designed as 
follows. 
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Merge Operator 
The merge operator generates neighbours of a coalition structure by merging two coalitions 
in the structure.  The 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑖𝑚(𝐶𝑆) of a coalition structure 𝐶𝑆 if 𝐶𝑆 is the 
grand coalition is the grand coalition. Otherwise, 𝑖𝑚(𝐶𝑆) is the coalition structure generated 
by merging the first two coalitions in 𝐶𝑆. The merging is done repeatedly to generate a set of 
structures that form the neighbourhood 𝑁𝑚 of 𝐶𝑆. Thus, the neighbourhood is defined as: 
𝑁𝑚(𝐶𝑆) = 𝑖𝑚(𝐶𝑆) ∪ 𝑖𝑚(𝑖𝑚(𝐶𝑆)) ∪ … .∪ 𝑖𝑚(𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
Merge operation is performed until the merger of two coalitions results in the grand coalition 
where no further merges can be made.  
Consider the following example. Let 𝐶𝑆 = {{a1}, {a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a7, a9, 
a11}, {a10}}.  
Neighbouring CS generated using the MERGE operator 
Neighbour 1 
Neighbour 2 
Neighbour 3 
Neighbour 4 
{{a1, a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}} 
{{a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a8, a12}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}} 
{{a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9, a11, a12}, {a10}} 
{{a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9, a10, a11, a12}} 
 
In the structure 𝐶𝑆 = {{a1}, {a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}}, the first 
two coalitions are {a1} and {a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, thus the first neighbour Neighbour 1 
results from merging {a1} and {a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12} into {a1, a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12} 
resulting in the neighbour Neighbour 1 = {{a1, a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a7, a9, a11}, 
{a10}}. Then, Neighbour 2 is obtained from Neighbour 1 by merging the first two coalitions 
in Neighbour 1. This process repeats until Neighbour 4, which is grand coalition, is generated. 
No further merges are possible. The neighbourhood is therefore comprised of four structures 
Neighbour 1 to Neighbour 4.  
Split Operator 
The split operator generates neighbours by splitting a coalition in the structure. The 
𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑖𝑠𝑝(𝐶𝑆) of a coalition structure 𝐶𝑆 is a 𝐶𝑆 whose member coalitions 
consists of singletons. Otherwise, 𝑖𝑠𝑝(𝐶𝑆) is the coalition structure generated by splitting the 
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largest coalition in 𝐶𝑆 in the middle to generate two coalitions of the same size. If the largest 
coalition has an even number of agents, it will be split in the middle into two coalitions of 
equal size. If the largest coalition has an odd number of agents, it will be split in the middle 
into two coalitions with one coalition containing one more agent than the other. To generate 
a set of neighbours, splitting is repeated until no further splits are possible, i.e., when a 
structure is comprised only of singletons. The neighbourhood 𝑁𝑠𝑝 of a structure 𝐶𝑆 is defined 
as: 
𝑁𝑠𝑝(𝐶𝑆) = 𝑖𝑠𝑝(𝐶𝑆) ∪ 𝑖𝑠𝑝 (𝑖𝑠𝑝(𝐶𝑆)) ∪ … .∪ 𝑖𝑠𝑝(𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠) 
Consider the example coalition structure 𝐶𝑆 = {{a1}, {a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a7, a9, 
a11}, {a10}}. 
Neighbouring CS generated using the SPLIT operator 
Neighbour 1 
Neighbour 2 
Neighbour 3 
Neighbour 4 
Neighbour 5 
Neighbour 6 
Neighbour 7 
{{a1}, {a2, a3, a4}, {a5}, {a6, a8, a12}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}} 
{{a1}, {a2}, {a3, a4}, {a5}, {a6, a8, a12}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}} 
{{a1}, {a2}, {a3, a4}, {a5}, {a6}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a8, a12}, {a10}} 
{{a1}, {a2}, {a3, a4}, {a5}, {a6}, {a7}, {a8, a12}, {a9, a11}, {a10}} 
{{a1}, {a2}, {a3, a4}, {a5}, {a6}, {a7}, {a8, a12}, {a9}, {a10}, {a11}} 
{{a1}, {a2}, {a3, a4}, {a5}, {a6}, {a7}, {a8}, {a9}, {a10}, {a11}, {a12}} 
{{a1}, {a2}, {a3}, {a4}, {a5}, {a6}, {a7}, {a8}, {a9}, {a10}, {a11}, {a12}} 
The largest coalition in 𝐶𝑆 is {a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, so the first neighbour is generated by 
splitting of {a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12} into {a2, a3, a4} and {a6, a8, a12} resulting in the 
neighbouring Neighbour 1 = {{a1}, {a2, a3, a4}, {a5}, {a6, a8, a12}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}}. 
In the structure {{a1}, {a2, a3, a4}, {a5}, {a6, a8, a12}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}} where there 
are 3 largest coalitions.  The first largest coalition, in this case {a2, a3, a4}, will be split. 
Because it is of odd size 3, it is split into {a2} and {a3, a4}.  The resulting neighbouring 
Neighbour 2 = {{a1}, {a2}, {a3, a4}, {a5}, {a6, a8, a12}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}} and this 
process is repeated until no further splits are possible. Seven neighbours Neighbour 1 to 
Neighbour 7 are thus generated.  
Shift Operator 
The shift operator generates neighbours by moving an agent from one coalition to another. 
The 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑖𝑠ℎ(𝐶𝑆) of a coalition structure 𝐶𝑆 is 𝐶𝑆 if it is the grand 
coalition. Otherwise, 𝑖𝑠ℎ(𝐶𝑆) is the coalition structure generated by moving an agent from 
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one coalition to another coalition in the structure.  For moving, each individual agent is 
considered one by one. For each individual agent within a structure, a neighbour is generated 
by moving it to an external coalition. Thus for an agent and a structure, |CS| - 1 neighbours 
are generated. This is repeated for each individual agent. The neighbourhood 𝑁𝑠ℎ of 𝐶𝑆 
defined as: 
𝑁𝑠ℎ(𝐶𝑆) = 𝑖𝑠ℎ(𝐶𝑆) ∪ 𝑖𝑠ℎ(𝑖𝑠ℎ(𝐶𝑆)) ∪ … .∪ 𝑖𝑠ℎ(𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
Consider the example with 𝐶𝑆 = {{a1}, {a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}} 
and the movement of agents 1 and 2. 
Neighbouring CS generated using the SHIFT operator on Agent 1 
Neighbour 1 
Neighbour 2 
Neighbour 3 
Neighbour 4 
{{a1, a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}}  
{{a1, a5}, {a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}} 
{{a1, a7, a9, a11}, {a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a10}} 
{{a1, a10}, {a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a7, a9, a11}} 
Neighbouring CS generated using the SHIFT operator on Agent 2 
Neighbour 1 
Neighbour 2 
Neighbour 3 
Neighbour 4 
{{a1, a2}, {a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}}  
{{a1}, {a2, a5}, {a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}} 
{{a1}, {a2, a7, a9, a11}, {a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a10}} 
{{a1}, {a2, a10}, {a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a7, a9, a11}} 
In the example,  𝐶𝑆 = {{a1}, {a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a12}, {a5}, {a7, a9, a11}, {a10}} has five 
member coalitions. The agent to be shifted cannot shift into its own coalition. Thus, there are  
|𝐶𝑆| − 1 possible shifts.  In this example with |𝐶𝑆| = 5, the maximum number of shift 
operations on an agent is 4. This operation is repeated for the remaining agents in the structure 
until all agents in the shift neighbourhood are generated. 
Consider another example where 𝐶𝑆 = 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠. Each agent generates |𝐶𝑆| −
1 neigbours.  For 27-agents, the shifting of an agent into another coalition generates 26 
neighbouring coalition structures. In total, the neighbourhood consists of 702 coalition 
structures.  
 
5.2 Simulated Annealing for Optimal Coalition Structure 
Simulated annealing (SA) is an enhancement of the randomised local search method. SA is 
analogous to the metropolis algorithm (Metropolis et al., 1953). This method iteratively 
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generates random solutions similar to gradient descent. The main differentiating factor 
between SA and standard gradient descent is the provision for accepting inferior solutions 
with some non-zero probability. This enables escaping local optima and enabling a more 
extensive search for optimal solution.  
The SA method devised in this thesis for solving the CSG problem is given in Algorithm 2. 
The search begins by constructing a random coalition structure 𝐶𝑆 as the starting point. 
 
Algorithm 2 SA: Simulated Annealing search algorithm for finding an optimal coalition structure 
1: 𝐶𝑆 ← randomly generated CS; {Generate a random start point} 
2: 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 ← 𝐶𝑆  
3: 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ← 1.0 {Initialize temperature}  
4: α ← 0.99 {Initialize α used to update temperature} 
5: for 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 ← 1, 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 do 
6:      Generate a neighbourhood 𝑁 of 𝐶𝑆 with shift, merge, split 
7:      𝐶𝑆′ ← A structure from 𝑁 chosen uniformly at random 
8:      if 𝑣(𝐶𝑆′) ≥ 𝑣(𝐶𝑆) then 
9:           𝐶𝑆 ← 𝐶𝑆′ {Update 𝐶𝑆} 
10:      else 
11: 
          𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦 ← 𝑒
𝑣(𝐶𝑆′)−𝑣(𝐶𝑆)
𝑡  {Set probability of accepting an inferior solution} 
12:           𝐶𝑆 ← 𝐶𝑆′ {Update 𝐶𝑆} 
13:      end if 
14:      if 𝑣(𝐶𝑆′) ≥ 𝑣(𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆) then 
15:           𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 ← 𝐶𝑆 {Update 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆} 
16:      end if 
17:      𝑡 ← 𝑡 × 𝛼 {Update 𝑡}What is alpha? Where is this defined? 
18: end for 
19: Return 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 
 
At each iteration a neighbourhood 𝑁 of 𝐶𝑆 is generated. From this neighbourhood, 𝐶𝑆′ is a 
random structure chosen uniformly at random. If the value of 𝐶𝑆′ is better than the value 
of 𝐶𝑆, 𝐶𝑆′  becomes 𝐶𝑆. Otherwise, with an acceptance probability of 𝑒
𝑣(𝐶𝑆′)−𝑣(𝐶𝑆)
𝑡  , 𝐶𝑆′ 
becomes 𝐶𝑆. If the value of 𝐶𝑆 is better than 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆, then 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 ← 𝐶𝑆. At the end of each 
iteration, the temperature is updated. This is repeated for a fixed number of iterations, with 
the best solution found during the course of the search being returned as the optimal solution. 
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5.3 Ant Colony Search for Optimal Coalition Structure 
Ant colony algorithms (Dorigo et al., 1996) are methods which mimic the movement of ants 
along a path between a food source and their colony. This method was used in Dorigo et al. 
(1996) to explore optimal paths in a graph. Ants move around a space searching for food 
source and laying pheromones along the way. The pheromones help other ants in the colony 
to identify which paths are best when searching for food. The stronger the pheromone trail, 
the more likely the other ants will follow this path.  
For the CSG problem that we consider, each of the three neighbourhood operators (defined in 
Section 5.1) is associated with a pheromone level which is a number between 0 and 1. The 
higher the number, the stronger the pheromone. The pheromone levels are initially assigned 
the following values:  
1. Pheromone for shift (Phsh) is 0.1. 
2. Pheromone for merge (Phm) is 0.1. 
3. Pheromone for split (Phsp) is 0.1. 
To begin, a virtual ant generates an initial random coalition structure 𝐶𝑆 and conveys this to 
three other virtual ants. These three ants stand for the three neighbourhood operators shift, 
merge, and split. The ant that corresponds to shift operator generates a random neighbour 
(called neighbour 1) of 𝐶𝑆 using shift. Likewise, the ant that corresponds to merge (split) 
operator generates a random neighbour of 𝐶𝑆 using merge (split).  The neighbours of 𝐶𝑆 
generated by merge are called neighbour 2 and those generated by split are called neighbour 
3.  
Let 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 be the best of neighbour 1, neighbour 2, and neighbour 3. If 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 is better 
than 𝐶𝑆, then the complete neighbourhood of 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 is generated using the same 
neighbourhood operator that generated 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 from 𝐶𝑆. If the best candidate, say X, in this 
neighbourhood is better than 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡, then 𝐶𝑆 is assigned X and the next iteration begins.  
On the other hand, if 𝐶𝑆 is better than 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡, then the best neighbourhood operator is 
calculated based on the strengths of each of the three neighbourhood operators. The 
calculation of operator strength is described in the following box.  
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Strength of a neighbourhood operator: 
OSsh : Denote the strength of shift operator. 
OSm : Denotes the strength of merge operator. 
OSsp : Denotes the strength of split operator.  
The strength of an operator is defined in terms of three factors:  
1. The difference in the value of CS and the value of the neighbour generated by the 
operator. 
2. The pheromone level of the operator. 
3. The cost of the operator.  
A cost is assigned to each operator as follows: 
1. Cost of shift Operator (Csh) – It is assigned the lowest value among the three. 
2. Cost of merge Operator (Cm) – It is assigned a value between the highest and lowest. 
3. Cost of split Operator (Csp) – It is assigned a higher value among the three. 
Then the  strength of shift operator OSsh is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑂𝑆𝑠ℎ =  
(𝑣(𝐶𝑆) − 𝑣(𝐶𝑆′)) × Psh
Csh
 
 
(5) 
OSm and OSsp are calculated analogously.   
 
A complete neighbourhood of 𝐶𝑆 is generated using the highest strength neighbourhood 
operator. If the best candidate, say X, in this neighbourhood is better than 𝐶𝑆, then 𝐶𝑆  is 
assigned X and the next iteration begins. Otherwise, although the value of 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 is lower 
it will become 𝐶𝑆 and the next iteration begins (see Algorithm 3).  
Pheromone Update 
In order to reinforce positive feedback from pheromones and also to avoid getting caught in 
local optima, the pheromone levels are updated as follows.  At the beginning of each iteration, 
once the neighbours are generated, the pheromone level corresponding to the operator that 
generated the highest value neighbour is increased by a random value drawn from a uniform 
distributed between 0 and 1. The more frequently an operator finds the highest quality 
solution, the higher the pheromone level for that operator. 
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Then, to avoid getting stuck in a local optima, the pheromone evaporation schedule is set as 
follows. At every iteration, the value of the pheromones is decreased at the rate of 25%. Thus 
the pheromone values fluctuate throughout the search. This avoids being stuck in a local 
optima. Below, we illustrate with an example how the value of pheromones effects the 
operator strengths when choosing to move to inferior solutions. 
 
Algorithm 3 ACS: Ant Colony search algorithm for finding an optimal coalition structure 
1: 𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠 ← [ ]{initialise pheromones with each operator merge, split, shift} 
2: 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 ← [ ]{initialise cost for each operator merge, split, shift} 
 𝐶𝑆 ← randomly generated 𝐶𝑆; {generate a random start point} 
3: 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 ← 𝐶𝑆  
4: for iterationCount ← 1, maxIterations do 
5:      Generate the neighbourhood 𝑁 of 𝐶𝑆 with shift, merge and split operators 
6:      𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 ←  best neighbouring structure within 𝑁 
7:      if a 𝑣(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 ) in 𝑁 > 𝑣(𝐶𝑆) then 
8:           𝐶𝑆 ← 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 {Update 𝐶𝑆} 
9:           update 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 operator pheromone 
10:           Generate the neighbourhood 𝑁′ of 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 using same operator as 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡  
11:           if a 𝑣(X) in 𝑁′ > 𝑣(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡) then 
12:                 𝐶𝑆 ← X {Update 𝐶𝑆} 
13:               end if 
14:        else 
15:            if all 𝑣(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡) in 𝑁 < 𝑣(𝐶𝑆) then 
16: 
           calculate 𝑂𝑆𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  
(𝑣(𝐶𝑆)−𝑣(𝐶𝑆′))×Poperator
Coperator
 {evaluate inferior solution} 
17:            𝐶𝑆 ← 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 with highest  𝑂𝑆𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 value 
18:            update 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 operator pheromone 
19:            Generate the neighbourhood 𝑁′ of 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 using same as 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 
20:            if a 𝑣(𝑋) in 𝑁′ > 𝑣(𝐶𝑆) then 
21:                   𝐶𝑆 ← 𝑋 {Update 𝐶𝑆} 
22:            else 
23:                a 𝑣(𝑋) in 𝑁′ < 𝑣(𝐶𝑆) then 
24:                  𝐶𝑆 ← 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 {Update 𝐶𝑆} 
25:            end if 
26:        if 𝑣(𝐶𝑆) ≥ 𝑣(𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆) then 
27:           𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 ← 𝐶𝑆 {Update 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆} 
28: end for 
29: Return 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑆 
Example 
For this particular example (see Figure 5.1), at the start of the iteration, the value of 𝐶𝑆 shown 
as ant(start) is 6. Using the three neighbourhood operators, three neighbouring solution shown 
as ant(shift), ant(merge) and ant(split) are generated. Among these three, none has a value 
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higher than ant(start). Thus to decide which solution to use to continue the search from, the 
operator strengths are calculated using the formula given in Equation (5). 
 
Figure 5.1 – Ant colony movement by operator strength. 
The resulting operator strengths for 𝑂𝑆𝑠ℎ, 𝑂𝑆𝑚 and 𝑂𝑆𝑠𝑝 are 6, 7.5 and 0.67 respectively.  
Thus ant(merge) has the highest operator strength. Therefore, the search will continue by 
generating an entire neighbourhood of ant(merge) as shown in Figure 5.1. Within this 
neighbourhood,  ant(mgc6) has a higher value than ant(merge). Thus the next iteration will 
start with ant(mgc6) as the starting solution. 
If none of the neighbours in the colony have a higher value than ant(merge) then ant(merge) 
will become the starting solution for the next iteration. This cycle only applies when the 
neighbouring solutions generated from ant(start) are inferior to ant(start). Otherwise if anyone 
of the ant(shift), ant(merge), ant(split) solution has a higher value, the next iteration will start 
from the ant with the higher value.  
 
5.4 Particle Swarm Search 
Particle swarm optimisation (PSO), a heuristic method for solving combinatorial optimisation 
problems, was first introduced by Kennedy & Eberhart (1995) to emulate social behaviour. 
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This is represented as movements of organisms (particles) for example in a school of fish or 
flock of birds. Using this behaviour to move a swarm toward good solutions in the search 
space is known as swarm intelligence (Kennedy & Eberhart, 1995).  
PSO has been applied to numerous hard problems such as the travelling salesman problem 
(Clerc, 2004) and coalition formation problem (Guo & Wang, 2006). The method can, in 
general, be used to solve any optimisation problem.  Application of this method requires 
correct modelling and adaptation of the problem space to the movement of particles flying 
through the search space looking for solutions. Many variants of the method have been 
proposed (Trelea, 2003). A particle swarm based method devised for solving the CSG 
problem is given in Algorithm 4.   
Algorithm 4 PSS: Particle Swarm search algorithm for finding an optimal coalition structure 
1: 𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 ← [ ] {𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 initially empty} 
2: 𝑎𝑐 ← set initial acceptance criteria {minimum solution quality for 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡} 
3: for iterationCount ← 1, maxIterations do 
4:     𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 ← [ ] {𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 initially empy} 
5:     SP ← Initialize start particles  
6:          𝐶𝑆 ← randomly generated 𝐶𝑆; {SP generate a random start point} 
7:         Generate the neighbourhood 𝑁 of 𝐶𝑆 with selected Neighbourhood Operators 
8:         Sort the neighbours in 𝑁 from highest to lowest {Highest solution on top} 
9:                 Update the highest value found into 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 
10:         SW ← Initialize swarm particles SWx {x is the particle number e.g. SW1) 
11:                 SWx ←  Generate the neighbourhood Nx {x is the index of the neighbour e.g. N1) 
12:                 Update the highest value found for each SWx into 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 
13:     if one of the 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 > 𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 then 
14:          𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 ← 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 
15:          𝐶𝑆 ← 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 
16:     else 
17:          no 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 > 𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 
18:          evaluate highest value 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 
19:          if 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 meets acceptance criteria 
20:                  𝐶𝑆 ← 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 
21:          else 
22:                  𝐶𝑆 ← a randomly generated coalition structure 
23:          end if 
24:      end if 
25: end for 
26: Return 𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 
  
There are two key variables: a global best (gbest) that stores the best solution found so far in 
the entire search space, and personal best (pbest) that is best within a swarm. To begin, gbest 
is initialised to a random coalition structure. Then, a complete neighbourhood of CS is 
generated using all the three neighbourhood operators. Suppose we want to create four 
swarms. Then, the four best coalition structures will be chosen from the generated 
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neighbourhood. These are used to generate four swarms SW1, SW2, SW3, and SW4. Then 
the neighbourhood of each swarm is generated. We then find the pbest for each of the four 
swarm neighbourhoods.  If the best of the four pbest solutions (call it X) is better than gbest, 
then  gbest is updated to X. Otherwise, if the value of gbest is better than X, and value of X is 
at least Y% of the value of CS, then CS is updated to X (this is done to escape local optima). 
Otherwise, CS takes on a random coalition structure and the next iteration is commenced. The 
value of Y is initially set at 50 but is increased with the number of iterations. (see Algorithm 
4).  
Table 5.1 – Comparison of the Heuristic Methods. 
 Tabu Search Simulated Annealing Particle Swarm Ant Colony 
Search 
Movement 
Moves are recorded, 
tabu list keeps a record 
of previous moves to 
guide the search to 
move to areas of the 
search space yet to be 
explored. Moving to a 
solution already found 
in the tabu list is 
prohibited. 
Moves are random and 
accepted on a certain 
acceptance probability. 
Acceptance probability 
depends on several 
parameters such as 
temperature. No record 
is kept of already 
visited solution.  
Moves from one 
good solution to the 
next as a swarm 
(parallel), when a 
non-improving 
solution found a 
fitness function is 
used to determine 
fitness of next move. 
Global best is kept to 
be used when 
calculating fitness. 
Mimic the movement of 
ants in a colony. Start by 
moving to good source 
of food then bring 
colony to find good 
solutions around it. If no 
better solution found, 
refer to history on which 
moves was beneficial 
and moves in that 
direction. 
Advantages Guided search and a 
structured 
neighbourhood 
enables systematic 
search of the solution 
space. Eliminates 
explored solution from 
search, only explores 
new solution space 
avoiding repeated 
moves. 
Moves are quicker as it 
does not need to 
generate a 
neighbourhood 
structure to evaluate its 
movement. Memory 
less implementation, 
requires less resources. 
Inherent parallelism. 
Search moves as a 
swarm with potential 
to horizontally cover 
a wider space. Uses 
small amounts of 
long term memory to 
store global best and 
short term memory 
to store own best.  
Moves are guided by 
trails left by other ants in 
previous search, when a 
non-improving move 
encountered, refer to 
history of moves to 
guide next move, some 
move history preserved.  
Short term memory only 
to store pheromones. 
Disadvantages Requires generation of 
a neighbourhood to 
evaluate moves. 
Requires keeping in 
memory a list called 
tabu list that consumes 
more resources. May 
use a lot of long term 
memory. 
Random selection 
could result in repeated 
moves. Unguided 
jumps could mean 
exploration might be 
stuck in worse parts of 
the search space. 
Sometimes slower 
convergence 
especially when 
many non-improving 
solution encountered 
slowing down 
movement to new 
parts of the space. 
Implementation is 
strictly problem specific, 
care must be given to 
parameters used for 
keeping search history. 
Keeping pheromones for 
too long will effect 
search. 
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented four heuristic methods for finding the optimal coalition structure. 
These methods are Tabu Search, Simulated Annealing, Ant Colony, and Particle Swarm 
Search. Table 5.1 gives a general comparison between the four heuristics. The implementation 
details of these methods was given earlier in this chapter.  
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The four heuristic methods viz., tabu search, simulated annealing, ant colony, and particle 
swarm were evaluated and compared in terms of two criteria:  
1. Running time, i.e., time taken to generate a solution. 
2. Quality of solution, i.e., how close a heuristic solution is to the exact optimum. In 
those cases, where the search for exact optimum was computationally infeasible, an 
upper bound on the exact optimum was used.  
Performance evaluation and comparison was done for CFGs as well as PFGs. All the 
simulations were run on an Apple iMac computer equipped with Intel Core i5 4570R 
Processor running at 2.7 GHz (3.2 GHz Turbo) and 8GB of RAM running Windows 7 
Enterprise Edition. All four heuristic methods were implemented in Python (Python Software 
Foundation, https://www.python.org/). 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 is a description of how the quality of a 
heuristic solution was determined. Section 6.2 is a description of how data was generated for 
evaluating performance. Section 6.3 is a description of how the upper bounds for an exact 
optimum were calculated. 
6.1 Evaluation Method 
The quality of a heuristic solution relative to the exact optimum is calculated as follows. 
Let 𝐶𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑆, 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑆, 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑆 be the solutions (i.e., coalition structures) returned by 
TACOS, simulated annealing, ant colony and particle swarm methods respectively. Let 𝐶𝑆𝑜𝑝𝑡 
be the exact optimal solution. The quality of a solution generated by TACOS is measured as 
follows: 
𝑣(𝐶𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑆)
𝑣(𝐶𝑆𝑜𝑝𝑡) 
× 100  (6.1) 
The quality for simulated annealing, ant colony, and particle swarm is analogous.  
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Quality of solution relative to an upper bound is measured as follows: 
𝑣(𝐶𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑆)
𝑣(𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑) 
× 100  (6.2) 
where 𝑣(𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑) is the upper bound on the exact optimum. Details regarding the 
calculation of 𝑣(𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑) can be found in Section 6.3.  
Time taken to generate a heuristic solution is set as follows. Each of the four heuristic methods 
was given the same average running time over a fixed number of iterations (see Table 6.3). 
This running time was calculated as follows. For 25 agent CFGs, we ran TACOS for 1800 
iterations. This took 30000ms. 
For CFGs, these times were set as shown in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1 – Running Time (rounded to next decimal) for CFGs. 
Input Size Average Running Time (ms) 
25-agents 30000 
27-agents 60000 
For a CFG comprised of 25 agents, the quality of a heuristic solution was evaluated relative 
to the exact optimum. For 27 agents, computing the exact optimum was infeasible, so the 
quality of a heuristic solution was evaluated relative to the upper bound for the exact optimum.  
For PFGs with 10 agents, heuristic solution quality was evaluated relative to the exact 
optimum. For PFGs with 27 agents, heuristic solution quality was evaluated relative to the 
upper bound for the exact optimum. The running times for PFGs were set as shown in Table 
6.2. 
Table 6.2 – Running Time (rounded to next decimal) for PFG. 
Input Size Average Running Time (ms) 
10-agents 180000 
27-agents 300000 
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It should be noted that, for a heuristic method, the number of iterations possible within the 
targeted average running time differs depending on the heuristic method. For example, within 
a 1 minute running time, more iterations may be possible with TACOS compared to ACS or 
PSS.  
The tabu search method TACOS was run in two different modes: single agent mode (this 
corresponds to a single thread) and multiagent (this corresponds to multiple threads) mode. 
The former is denoted TACOS(S) and the latter TACOS(M). A multiagent approach (i.e., 
TACOS(M)) resulted in a lower number of iterations due to the need to initialise multiple 
threads and synchronise them. For a fixed running time, the number of iterations for different 
methods are as given in Table 6.3.  
Table 6.3 – Number of Iterations and the corresponding run time for each method. 
Simulation Type Method Number of Iterations Average Running Time 
25-agent CFG TACOS 1800 30 Seconds 
SA 300 
ACS 6000 
PSS 200 
27-agent CFG TACOS-S 2500 1 Minute 
TACOS-M 1100 
SA 250 
ACS 8000 
PSS 120 
10-agent PFG TACOS 10 3 Minutes 
SA 200 
ACS 30 
PSS 3 
27-agent PFG TACOS-S 12000 5 Minutes 
TACOS-M 6000 
SA 2500 
ACS 1000 
PSS 100 
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6.2 Data Generation for Performance Evaluation 
The data needed to evaluate performance is the value of each coalition. Data sets comprised 
of coalition values were generated randomly using six different probability distributions 
(details regarding these distributions are given in Section 6.2.2). The probability distributions 
chosen are commonly used in recent literature (Michalak et al., 2016; Sandholm et al., 1998) 
with the exception of the Triangular distribution which was chosen to explore a distribution 
that has yet been studied for the CSG problem. 
Since the performance of all four heuristic methods is sensitive to the starting point, which is 
random, each method was run ten-times for each of the datasets generated. Average solution 
quality and average running time were then measured across the ten runs for each data set. 
Ten datasets were generated for each of the six probability distributions. This means that, in 
total, there are 60 datasets for each scenario. Four different scenarios were considered: (25-
agent CFGs, 27-agent CFGs, 10-agent PFGs, and 27-agent PFGs). 
 
6.2.1 Data for Characteristic Function Games 
In CFGs, each coalition has a single value that is independent of external coalitions. Thus, the 
value of each coalition is drawn only once from a probability distribution. The six probability 
distributions used to generate coalition values are as follows: 
1. Uniform: For all 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣(𝐶)~U(0, |C|) 
2. Normal: For all 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣(𝐶)~N(µ, σ2) where µ = |C|, σ = 0.1 
3. Gamma: For all 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣(𝐶)~|C|  × Gamma(k, θ ), where k = 7.5, θ = 0.5 
4. Beta: For all 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣(𝐶)~|C| × Beta(α, β ), where α = β = 0.5. 
5. Exponential: For all 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣(𝐶)~|C|  ×  exp(λ ), where λ = 3. 
6. Triangular: For all 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣(𝐶)~⊿ (a, b, c )  where a = 0, b = 1, c=none 
These distributions were used to generate data for 10-agent, 25-agent and 27-agent games. 
The parameters chosen are similar to those found in literature (Michalak et al., 2016; 
Sandholm et al., 1998). 
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6.2.2 Data for Partition Function Games  
In PFGs, the value of a coalition depends on the coalition structure in which the coalition is 
embedded. Thus, data for PFGs requires much more storage. For example, in a search space 
with 20-agents, if a coalition is a member of 150 different structures, it means that there are 
150 possible values for just this one coalition. Storing all these coalition values for games 
with more than ten agents is infeasible in terms of memory space. Thus, simulations were 
conducted for 10-agent games. A random value for a coalition was drawn for each structure 
it is embedded in. The probability distributions used are the ones listed above. 
Two types of externalities can arise: positive and negative (De Clippel & Serano 2008).  
 Positive externality: An increase in the value of a coalition that results from 
reorganization of external coalitions means the externality on the coalition is positive.   
 Negative externality: A decrease in the value of a coalition that results from 
reorganization of external coalitions means the externality on the coalition is negative.   
In order to facilitate the calculation of upper bounds (see Section 6.3 for details regarding the 
calculation of upper bounds), data for 27-agent games was generated with two different 
parameters for each probability distribution. Depending on the number of member agents, 
coalitions were divided into two types: those of size 2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, and for a given k, those 
of size 𝑖 (𝑖 ≠ 𝑘 and 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛). The value of a coalition was generated using the following 
parameters for probability distributions (here 𝑛 is the number of agents in a game): 
1. Uniform Distribution:  
For all 𝐶𝑖 ∈ 𝐶
𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣( 𝐶𝑖)~U(𝑎, 𝑏) where  𝑎 = 0 and 𝑏 = 𝑛 
For all 𝐶𝑘 ∈ 𝐶
𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣( 𝐶𝑘)~U(𝑎, 𝑏) where 𝑎 = 𝑛
2 and 𝑏 = 2(𝑛2) 
2. Normal Distribution: 
For all 𝐶𝑖 ∈ 𝐶
𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣( 𝐶𝑖)~N(µ, σ2) where µ = 𝑛, σ = 0.2 
For all 𝐶𝑘 ∈ 𝐶
𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣( 𝐶𝑘)~N(µ, σ2) where µ = (𝑛 + 1)
2 , σ = 0.2 
3. Gamma Distribution: 
For all 𝐶𝑖 ∈ 𝐶
𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣( 𝐶𝑖)~Gamma(k, θ ), where k = 7.5, θ = 0.5 
For all 𝐶𝑘 ∈ 𝐶
𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣( 𝐶𝑘)~(𝑛 + 1)
2  × Gamma(k, θ ), where k = 7.5, θ = 0.5  
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4. Beta Distribution: 
For all 𝐶𝑖 ∈ 𝐶
𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣( 𝐶𝑖)~Beta(α, β ), where α = 5 and β = 1 
For all 𝐶𝑘 ∈ 𝐶
𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣( 𝐶𝑘)~ 𝑛
2 × Beta(α, β ), where α = 5 and β = 1 
5. Exponential Distribution: 
For all 𝐶𝑖 ∈ 𝐶
𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣( 𝐶𝑖)~ exp(λ ), where λ = 3. 
For all 𝐶𝑘 ∈ 𝐶
𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣( 𝐶𝑘)~ 𝑛
2  ×  exp(λ ), where λ = 3. 
6. Triangular Distribution: 
For all 𝐶𝑖 ∈ 𝐶
𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣( 𝐶𝑖)~⊿ (a, b, c ) where a = 0, b = 𝑛 , c=none 
For all 𝐶𝑘 ∈ 𝐶
𝐴𝑔, the value 𝑣( 𝐶𝑘)~⊿ (a, b, c ) where a = 𝑛
2, b = 2(𝑛2), c=none 
These parameters only apply to simulations for 27-agent games.  
 
6.3 Calculating Bounds 
We used two different methods for calculating the upper bound on the value of a coalition 
structure. One method is for CFGs and the other for PFGs.  
 
6.3.1 Calculating the Upper Bound for CFGs  
In order to understand the calculation of bounds, we need to first understand how coalition 
structures are represented. The space of all coalition structures, can be represented as a 
coalition structure graph (T. Sandholm et al., 1998) or as integer partitions (Rahwan & 
Jennings, 2007). We shall be using the latter representation as it is more suitable for our 
purposes.   
An integer partition of n is a sequence of positive integers whose sum is exactly 𝑛. As an 
example, consider a set of 𝑛 = 5 agents. There are 7 possible partitions: [5], [2, 3], [1, 4], [1, 
2, 2], [1, 1, 3], [1, 1, 1, 2] and [1, 1, 1, 1, 1]. The parts in an integer partition represent the 
sizes of the coalitions in a coalition structure. For example, the coalition structure 
{{a1},{a2},{a3,a4,a5}} and {{a2},{a3},{a1,a4,a5}} corresponds to the integer partition [1, 
1, 3] as there are three coalitions, two of which are of size one and of size three.  
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The number of integer partitions of n grows exponentially in 𝑛.  For 27-agents, the integer 
partition count is 3010, while there are 134,217,728 possible coalitions, and over five hundred 
forty five quadrillion (≈ 545,717,047,947,902,329) coalition structures.  
The integer partition representation divides the search space into subspaces. All partitions 
with an equal number of parts are put in the same subspace. For example, the two part 
partitions [2, 3] and [1, 4] belong to the same subspace containing all partitions with two parts. 
Therefore, when there are 5 agents, the sub-spaces are defined as shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1 – Space of all coalition structures for 5 agents. 
Here, Π denotes the space of all coalition structures while 𝑆𝑃𝑖 denotes the subspace with 
integer partitions comprised of 𝑖 parts (e.g. 𝑆𝑃2 contains all structures with two parts or two 
coalitions. We let CS|i,j| denote the set of all coalition structures with two parts, the first part 
of which contains i agents and the second part contains j agents.  
The upper bound on the value of structures in the set CS|i,j|  is calculated as follows. Recall 
that the value of a coalition is drawn from a distribution. The maximum value of a coalition 
thus depends on the parameters of the distribution from which it is drawn. For example, for 
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the Uniform distribution 𝑈(𝑎, 𝑏), the values drawn depend on two parameters: 𝑎 and 𝑏. This 
means that the minimum possible value of a coalition is 𝑎 and the maximum is 𝑏.  
The upper bound on the value of structures in the set CS|IP| is the sum of the upper bounds of 
each part in IP. Likewise, the lower bound on the value of structures in the set CS|IP| is the 
sum of the lower bounds of each part in IP. 
For some probability distributions, the upper bound on the value of a coalition cannot be easily 
determined in terms of the parameters of the distribution. For example, for the Normal 
distribution, a randomly drawn value may go up to infinity. For such cases, the upper bound 
on the value of a coalition of a certain size was the highest of all randomly drawn values (in 
the data sets) for coalitions of that size. Then, the upper bound for a coalition structure is the 
sum of the upper bounds for each integer partition of the structure (as in (Rahwan et al., 
2007)).  
For PFGs, the calculation of upper bound is not as straightforward as it is for CFGs.  The 
following section describes upper bound calculation for PFGs. 
6.3.2 Calculating the Upper Bound for PFGs 
For PFGs, externalities must to be considered. Recall from Chapter 2, that externalities are 
modelled by agent type. Recall also that there are two types of agents: Type A and Type B. 
The default ratio between the number of Type A and Type B agents for n-agent games is set 
as follows: 
a) Number of Type A agents is  
𝑛
3
   
b) 𝑁umber of Type B agents is  𝑛 −
𝑛
3
 
Now, the upper bound for the value of a coalition of a given size depends not only on its size 
but also on the structure it is embedded it. In order to incorporate externalities, we introduce 
an externality factor. This factor is then used to calculate the value of a coalition. In PFGs, 
the value of a coalition depends on 
1. the of member agents in it, and 
2. the organization of external coalitions. 
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Thus, we defined externality factor for a coalition as follows.  Let 𝑚 = |𝐶|, denote the size of 
a coalition 𝐶 and 𝑑 = |𝐶𝑆|, denote the number of coalitions in the 
structure 𝐶𝑆 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛. Externalities imposed on a coalition 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝑆 are given by an 
externality factor. The externality factor, 𝑒𝑓, for coalition C in structure CS is calculated as 
follows:  
𝑒𝑓 =  
𝑚
𝑑
   (6.3) 
As with CFGs, the value of a coalition for PFGs is randomly drawn. However, for PFGs, the 
randomly drawn value is combined with the externality factor of the coalition. As there are 
two types of externalities, positive and negative, we have the following two formulae for 
calculating the value of a coalition.  
1. Positive externalities: The value 𝑣(𝐶) of any coalition 𝐶 is calculated as follows. Let 
𝑅𝑉 denote a randomly drawn value from any probability distribution. This value is 
increased by a factor of 𝑒𝑓 to obtain 𝑣(𝐶) as follows:  
 
𝑣(𝐶) = 𝑅𝑉 + (𝑅𝑉 × 𝑒𝑓) (6.4) 
 
2. Negative externalities: The value 𝑣(𝐶) of any coalition 𝐶 is calculated as follows. Let 
𝑅𝑉 denote a randomly drawn value from any probability distribution. This value is 
decreased by a factor of 𝑒𝑓 to obtain 𝑣(𝐶) as follows 
 
𝑣(𝐶) = 𝑅𝑉 − (𝑅𝑉 × 𝑒𝑓) (6.5) 
 
Suppose 2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ n-1 and for a given k, let i≠k. The entire search space will consist of the 
following three types of coalition structures: 
i) Type k structure: A coalition structure all of whose members are coalitions of size 
k. Such a structure is denoted 𝐶𝑆𝑘 . 
ii) Type i structure: A coalition structure all of whose members are coalitions of size 
i. Such a structure is denoted 𝐶𝑆𝑖 . 
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iii) Type i,k structure: A coalition structure some of whose members are coalitions of 
size i and some of size k. Such a structure is denoted 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑘 . 
 
For simulations, we set 𝑘 = 2  since this provided the largest coverage of the search space for 
any number 𝑛 of agents. Table 6.4 shows this for a 27-agent scenario. 
Table 6.4 – Number of Integer Partitions for each 𝑘  for 27-agent games. 
𝑘 Number of Integer Partitions with coalitions of size 𝑘 
2 1958 
3 1575 
4 1255 
5 1002 
6 792 
7 627 
8 490 
9 385 
10 297 
11 231 
12 176 
13 135 
14 101 
15 77 
We denote the upper and lower bound on the value of a coalition as follows: 
i) 𝑈𝐵𝑘 denotes the upper bound on the value of any coalition of size k. 
ii) 𝐿𝐵𝑘 denotes the lower bound on the value of any coalition of size k. 
iii)  𝑈𝐵𝑖 denotes the upper bound on the value of any coalition of size i. 
iv)  𝐿𝐵𝑖 denotes the lower bound on the value of any coalition of size i. 
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The parameters of the probability distributions are set such that the following relation is true. 
 𝐿𝐵𝑘 ≫ 𝑈𝐵𝑖  (6.6) 
The data (i.e. the values of coalitions drawn from the six probability distributions mentioned 
earlier) was verified so that it satisfies the relationship in Equation (6.6) such that the value 
of any coalition structure with at least one size 𝑘 coalition is always greater than the value of 
any coalition structure without a coalition of size 𝑘.  
The upper bound on the value of any coalition structure of type 𝐶𝑆𝑖 are computed as follows: 
 𝑈𝐵(𝐶𝑆𝑖 ) =
𝑛
𝑖
×  𝑈𝐵𝑖 
(6.7) 
 
Likewise, the upper bound on the value of any coalition structure of type 𝐶𝑆𝑘 are computed 
as follows: 
 𝑈𝐵(𝐶𝑆𝑘 ) =
𝑛
𝑘
×  𝑈𝐵𝑘 
(6.8) 
And for type 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑘, some of whose members are coalitions of size 𝑖 and others of size 𝑘, the 
upper bound on the value is:      
 
𝑈𝐵(𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑘) = ( ∑  𝑈𝐵𝑖
𝐶∈𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑘,|𝐶|=𝑖
+ ∑  𝑈𝐵𝑘
𝐶∈𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑘,|𝐶|=𝑘
) 
 
(6.9) 
We will illustrate the calculation of bounds in the context of the following example. 
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Example: 
Consider a 4 agent PFG.  For 4 agents, there are 5 possible integer partitions: [1,1,1,1], [1,1,2], 
[1,3], [2,2] and [4]. Assume that 𝑘 = 2.   
 
Recall form Chapter 2 that there are two types of agents: Type A and Type B.  From these 
two agent types, three different types of coalitions can be formed:  
1. Type AA: Recall that such a coalition contains only Type A agents.  
2. Type BB: Recall that such a coalition contains only Type B agents. 
3. Type MX coalitions: Recall that such a coalition contains both Type A and Type B 
agents.   
This means that there are five distinct types of coalition structures possible:   
1. Type AABB: Recall that such a structure contains some coalitons of Type AA and 
others of Type BB.  
2. Type AAMX: Recall that such a structure contains some coalitons of Type AA and 
others of Type MX. 
3. Type BBMX: Recall that such a structure contains some coalitons of Type BB and 
others of Type MX. 
4. Type MXMX: Recall that such a structure only contains coalitons of Type MX. 
5. Type AABBMX: Recall that such a structure contains some coalitons of Type AA, 
some of Type BB and others of Type MX.  
In this 4 –agent example, suppose agent types are as follows: 
i) There is only one Type A agent. 
ii) There are three Type B agents. 
Since there is only 1 Type A agent, there can be only 2 (out of the five possible types listed 
above) types of coalition structures: 
i) Type BBMX whose member coalitions are of Type BB and Type MX. 
ii) Type AABB whose member coalitions are of Type AA and Type BB. 
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Although the grand coalition can be formed, externalities on it are not considered as they are 
no external coalitions in that structure. In this example, because there is only one Type A 
agent, the coalitions of size 𝑘 (recall also that k=2) can only be of Type BB and that only 
partitions [1, 1, 2] and [2, 2] have coalitions of size 𝑘. 
Due to (6.6), any integer partition that does not contain coalitions of size 𝑘 can be ruled out 
from having the upper bound. Let 𝑅𝑉1 denote the randomly drawn value for a coalition of size 
𝑖 and 𝑅𝑉2 that for size 𝑘. The inequality  𝐿𝐵k ≫ 𝑈𝐵𝑖 means that the upper bound on 𝑅𝑉1 will 
always be lower than the lower bound value of 𝑅𝑉2. With this in mind, the upper bound for 
each integer partition containing a coalition of size 𝑘 can be calculated using Equations (6.8) 
and (6.9) as shown in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 – Upper bound for partitions containing coalition of size 𝑘. 
Type Possible 
Partition 
Value of structure Upper bound 
BBMX [2,2] 𝑅𝑉2 − (
2
2
× 𝑅𝑉2) + 𝑅𝑉2 + (
2
2
× 𝑅𝑉2) 2 ∗ 𝑈𝐵(𝑅𝑉2)  
 [1,1,2] 𝑅𝑉1 − (
1
3
× 𝑅𝑉1) + 𝑅𝑉1 − (
1
3
× 𝑅𝑉1) + 
𝑅𝑉2 + (
2
3
× 𝑅𝑉2) 
4
3
𝑈𝐵(𝑅𝑉1) + 
5
3
𝑈𝐵(𝑅𝑉2) 
AABB [1,1,2] 𝑅𝑉1 − (
1
3
× 𝑅𝑉1) + 𝑅𝑉1 − (
1
3
× 𝑅𝑉1) + 
𝑅𝑉2 + (
2
3
× 𝑅𝑉2) 
4
3
𝑈𝐵(𝑅𝑉1)+ 
5
3
𝑈𝐵(𝑅𝑉2) 
In this example, there can be only two types of coalition structures: BBMX and AABB.  
First, consider Type BBMX structure shown as Row 1 in Table 7.8. For partition [2,2] there 
can only be a coalition structure of Type BBMX where  the value of Type BB coalition is 
decreased due to the presence of a Type MX coalition (refer to Chapter 2 for details on 
determining positive or negative externalities). Thus the upper bound for partition [2,2] is 
twice the upper bound for RV2. The upper bound for RV2 is the highest randomly drawn value 
(for size 2 coalition) between all data sets.   
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For the other partition [1,1,2], when the coalition structure is of Type BBMX and coalition 2 
is TypeMX, the other two coalitions can only be Type BB as there is only one Type A agent. 
Thus,  the value of coalition 2 is changes into 
5
3
𝑈𝐵(𝑅𝑉2).  Each one of the other two coalitions 
will be Type BB. Then, due to the presence of a Type MX coalition, their values are decreased. 
Thus, the total value of this coalition structure is 
4
3
𝑈𝐵(𝑅𝑉1)+ 
5
3
𝑈𝐵(𝑅𝑉2) which is lower than 
2 ∗ 𝑈𝐵(𝑅𝑉2) due to the relationship in (6.6). 
Next, consider Type AABB structure shown as the third row in Table 6.5. When the coalition 
structure is of Type AABB and coalition 2 is Type BB while the other two coalitions is of 
Type AA and Type BB respectively the value of coalition 2 is increased thus the upper bound 
 
5
3
𝑅𝑉2. For the other two coalitions, their values are decreased with 
4
3
𝑅𝑉1 being the sum of the 
value of both coalition. Thus, the total value of this coalition structure is 
4
3
𝑅𝑉1+ 
5
3
𝑅𝑉2 that is 
also lower than 2𝑅𝑉2. 
Thus, between all 3 inter partitions possible, the upper bound for integer partition [2, 2] is the 
highest (note that this integer partition contains the maximum number of size 𝑘 coalitions) 
and this will be taken as the upper bound for performance evaluation.  
6.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided information on the simulation setup for evaluating the methods 
implemented. First we presented our method of evaluating the performance of each algorithm. 
This is followed by information how the input instances are generated. Lastly we provided 
details on how the bound for each setting was obtained. 
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Chapter 7 Performance Analysis for the 
Individual Probability Distributions 
 
All four heuristic methods, tabu search, simulated annealing, particle swarm, and ant colony 
were evaluated in the simulation set up detailed in Chapter 6. This chapter is about the results 
of simulations and a comparative performance analysis of these four methods. More precisely, 
the objectives of this chapter are as follows:  
1. To study the performance of each of the four heuristic methods for each of the six 
probability distributions for CFGs.  
2. To study the performance of each of the four heuristic methods for each of the six 
probability distributions for PFGs. 
3. To study the effect of an increase in the number of agents on the performance of each 
of the four heuristic methods for each of the six probability distributions for CFGs. 
4. To study the effect of an increase in the number of agents on the performance of each 
of the four heuristic methods for each of the six probability distributions for PFGs. 
Recall that data sets comprise values of coalitions. These values were generated randomly 
using six different probability distributions. For CFGs, the evaluation was done for two 
settings: 25 agent CFGs and 27 agent CFGs. These settings were chosen because 25-agent 
was the maximum size where an actual optimal can be obtained for comparison and 27-agents 
was the maximum coalition value data that can be accepted by Python. 
For PFGs, the evaluation was done for two settings: 10 agent PFGs and 27 agent PFGs. All 
heuristic methods were run for the some duration of time. These two settings was chosen 
because 10-agent was the maximum size where an actual optimal can be obtained in PFGs, 
27-agents was the maximum coalition value data that can be accepted by Python. This was 
the reasoning behind the choice of the four scenarios considered in this thesis .The run time 
was fixed so that TACOS achieved a solution that was 80% of optimal.  
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The results for CFGs are given in Section 7.1 
and for PFGs in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 is a study of the effect of the number of agents on 
heuristic performance for CFGs and for PFGs.  
 
7.1 Performance for Characteristic Function Games 
We will first consider 25 agent CFGs in Section 7.1.1 and then 27 agent CFGs in Section 
7.1.2. These results are the averages of 100 runs over 10 datasets for each game. 
 
7.1.1 Performance for 25-Agent CFGs 
We will examine performance for each of the six probability distributions individually.  
The Uniform Distribution 
The run time was set at 30 seconds. The performance of a heuristic solution is measured as a 
percentage of the exact optimum. The performance of each heuristic method is shown in Table 
7.1.  All the four heuristic methods performed well with each returning an average solution 
quality that is above 90% of the optimum (see Table 7.1).  
TACOS(S) performed the best achieving a solution that is 99.77% of the optimum within 30 
seconds. This is followed by ACS at 98.01%, then PSS with 96.97% with SA yielding the 
lowest results of 93.38% of optimum. Note that all methods are quite close to each other and 
even the worst performing heuristic achieves over 93% of the optimum.  
Let us now examine the number of neighbours explored by each method (see Table 7.1). SA 
explored the most number of neighbours as it ran for a higher number of iterations, however 
this did not translate into best performance among all the methods here. The reason for this is 
that SA is a memory less method. It does not remember the good/bad performing neighbours, 
only the solution that is best so far. TACOS(S) on the other hand explored just slightly more 
neighbours than PSS and achieved 2.8% higher solution quality relative to PSS.  
These results show that exploring more neighbours does not necessarily give a better quality 
solution. It is important to remember the good/bad neighbours. This results in: 
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1. Avoiding repeatedly visiting the same neighbours. 
2. Directing search in the promising directions.  
Table 7.1 – Average Performance for 25-agent CFGs (Uniform Distribution). 
Uniform Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈30 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈30 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 204901 99.77 
SA 1391243 93.38 
ACS 306913 98.01 
PSS 204259 96.97 
 
The Normal Distribution 
For Normal distribution (see Table 7.2), ACS performed the best, with an average solution 
quality that is better than TACOS by 1.72% (with ACS at 96.92% vs 95.20% for TACOS(S)). 
Note that ACS explored more coalition structures than TACOS(S) here, and this translated to 
a real performance gain for ACS. Third place again belongs to PSS followed closely by SA, 
with PSS having only 0.73% advantage over SA which is again the lowest performing method.  
Table 7.2 – Average Performance for 25-agents CFGs (Normal Distribution). 
Normal Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈30 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈30 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 206511 95.20 
SA 1486927 92.84 
ACS 305823 96.92 
PSS 202742 93.57 
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Looking at the number of neighbours explored, the ordering in Table 7.2 for Normal 
distribution is the same as the ordering in Table 7.1 for the Uniform distribution. Despite this, 
the performance ranking in the tables is different, except for SA which got rank four for both 
distributions. 
 
The Gamma Distribution 
We shall now take a look at the Gamma distribution. TACOS(S) again takes the lead with a 
solution quality of around 78.54% of optimal (see Table 7.3). This time, SA is the second best 
performing method followed by ACS and PSS. The performance of SA here could be due to 
the higher average number of neighbours explored compared to ACS and PSS. PSS is the 
lowest performing method. Here, the average number of coalition structures explored by 
TACOS(S) is the least, yet TACOS returned the highest average solution quality 
demonstrating its search efficiency.  
Table 7.3 – Average Performance for 25-agents CFGs (Gamma Distribution). 
Gamma Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈30 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈30 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 201653 78.54 
SA 1496818 65.38 
ACS 305143 63.83 
PSS 204885 63.59 
All the methods performed poorly for the Gamma distribution compared to Uniform or 
Normal distributions. Thus, simulation run time was extended to 60 seconds in order to 
investigate if this can improve performance.  The results for the extended run time are shown 
in Table 7.4. With the exploration of as many as twice the number of neighbours, TACOS(S) 
was able to return a solution quality of 82.14% while the other methods showed only marginal 
increases in solution quality.  
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Table 7.4 – Extended Running Time for 25-agent CFGs (Gamma Distribution). 
Gamma Distribution Extended Running Time 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 414632 82.14 
SA 1843561 67.49 
ACS 633682 65.80 
PSS 325852 64.80 
 
The Beta Distribution 
For the Beta distribution, all four methods performed very well with each returning an average 
solution quality that is better than 98% of the optimum. TACOS(S) takes the lead again 
followed closely by PSS, ACS and SA. The differences in performance between TACOS(S), 
PSS and ACS are negligible as all three method exceeded 99% average solution quality.  
With regard to the number of neighbours explored, the ordering remains in the same as that 
for the Gamma distribution (with 30 sec run time).  
Table 7.5 – Average Performance for 25-agents CFGs (Beta Distribution). 
Beta Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈30 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈30 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 201369 99.99 
SA 1395754 98.82 
ACS 305775 99.29 
PSS 202658 99.52 
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The Exponential Distribution 
For the exponential distribution (see Table 7.6), TACOS(S) returned the best solution quality 
of 73.91% in 30 seconds. SA is second best with a 22.39% gap between the two. In the third 
place is ACS and the worst performing method is PSS.  
With regard to the number of neighbours explored, SA ranks first yet the quality of its solution 
is the worst.  
 
Table 7.6 – Average Performance for 25-agents CFGs (Exponential Distribution). 
Exponential Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈30 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈30 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 205038 73.91 
SA 1391455 51.52 
ACS 305694 49.99 
PSS 203781 44.20 
 
Since the best heuristic for exponential distribution, i.e., TACOS(S), only achieved 73% of 
the optimum, each method was given an extended running time of 30 seconds (i.e., a run time 
of 60 seconds). Once again TACOS(S) exceeded the performance of the others (see Table 
7.7). However, SA lost its second place to ACS and came in last after PSS.  
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Table 7.7 – Extended Running Time for 25-agent CFGs (Exponential Distribution). 
Exponential Distribution Extended Running Time 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 409321 82.24 
SA 19102038 53.46 
ACS 621054 59.38 
PSS 630462 53.76 
 
The Triangular Distribution 
For the triangular distribution, all four heuristic methods performed well (see Table 7.8). The 
highest performance is attained by TACOS(S) followed by ACS, PSS and then SA.  
 
Table 7.8 – Average Performance for 25-agent CFGs (Triangular Distribution). 
Triangular Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈30 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈30 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 203617 97.91 
SA 1477862 87.44 
ACS 305208 92.78 
PSS 205103 92.08 
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Figure 7.1 and Table 7.9 show a combined comparative summary of the results.  
  
  
  
Figure 7.1 – Performance Comparison for 25-agents (CFG) ≈30 seconds running time. 
TACOS(S) performed well across all distributions and is the highest performing method for 
five out the six probability distribution. It was only outperformed slightly by ACS for the 
Normal distribution where ACS takes the lead with 96.92% compared to 95.20% for 
TACOS(S). 
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Table 7.9 – Performance of Each Method for 25-agent CFGs (1 Best – 4 Worst). 
Performance Uniform Normal Gamma Beta Exponential Triangular 
1 TACOS(S) ACS TACOS(S) TACOS(S) TACOS(S) TACOS(S) 
2 ACS TACOS(S) SA PSS SA ACS 
3 PSS  PSS ACS ACS ACS PSS 
4 SA SA PSS SA PSS SA 
SA and PSS trade places as the lowest performing method for 3 out the total of the six 
distributions considered.  
A comparison of best and worst solutions 
To further analyse the overall performance of each method, we will now take a look at the 
highest and lowest coalition structure value attained by each method for each distribution (see 
Table 7.10). Highest (Lowest) indicates the highest value attained by a heuristic between all 
the data sets.  
Table 7.10 – Best and Worst Solutions (25-agent CFGs). 
25-Agent CFG - Highest and Lowest CS Value found (% of Optimal) 
Distribution Uniform Normal Gamma Beta Exponential Triangular 
Method Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest 
TACOS 99.96 99.47 97.02 94.10 91.74 69.12 100 99.99 88.59 57.73 99.70 95.81 
SA 99.25 73.85 94.63 91.39 76.85 56.07 99.99 92.42 80.89 41.20 97.40 75.38 
ACS 99.61 95.44 99.51 92.83 80.75 51.86 99.99 92.42 82.74 31.66 97.45 84.80 
PSS 99.68 91.32 95.61 91.88 77.10 50.97 99.99 97.27 70.97 27.32 97.40 84.03 
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For the Uniform distribution, the highest quality solution is 99.96% of the optimal value and 
the lowest is 99.47%. The gap between the highest and lowest value is small demonstrating 
the ability of TACOS in consistently finding high quality solution. The gap between highest 
and lowest value found increases with ACS at 4.17% and PSS at 8.36% respectively.  The 
highest gap of 25.40% is shown by SA. Thus SA is the most variational of all the four heuristic 
methods considered. 
ACS returned highest quality solution for the Normal distribution and indeed it is the best 
performing method for this distribution, slightly outperforming TACOS(S). Although ACS is 
the highest performing method, the gap between the highest and lowest solution value found 
is also the highest among all the methods at 6.68%. However, it was still able to outperform 
all the others possibly due to frequently returning solutions that are closer to the highest value 
which is already 2.48% higher than the second best method TACOS(S). TACOS(S) still 
maintains its consistency by having the smallest gap of 2.92%, which is smaller than both SA 
and PSS at 3.23% and 3.73% respectively. ACS was best for the Normal distribution although 
the randomness exhibited by the gap between the highest and lowest deserves further 
attention. 
For the Gamma distribution, ACS had the widest gap between the best and worst quality 
solutions. This was followed by PSS, TACOS and then by SA. The best coalition structure 
found by SA is just 76.85% of the optimal making it the lowest performing method here 
although it has the smallest gap. TACOS(S) found the coalition structure with the best value 
of 91.74% of the optimal.  
All the heuristics performed well for the Beta distribution. The best quality solution for all the 
methods exceeded 99% with TACOS(S) finding the optimal 𝐶𝑆 in just a few of its runs. 
TACOS(S) is again the highest performing method for this distribution although the 
performances of the other algorithms are indistinguishable. ACS again has the largest gap of 
7.58% which is slightly more than simulated annealing. TACOS(S) once again attained the 
smallest gap between the highest and lowest value solution found. 
For the Exponential distribution, TACOS(S) returned the best solution at 88.59% of the 
optimal. The lowest performing method here was PSS. The method with the largest gap of 
51.08% was ACS. TACOS(S) once again demonstrating it efficiency by having the smallest 
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gap of 30.86%. This rather large gap explains why the overall average performance for all 
these methods (see Table 7.7 and Table 7.8) are lower compared to other distributions. 
TACOS(S) again performs best for the Triangular distribution where it found the highest 
value solution which is 99.70% of optimal. It also has the smallest gap between the highest 
and lowest value found among all the methods thus demonstrating its consistency in searching 
through the space and returning high value solution. 
 
7.1.2 Performance for 27-Agent CFGs 
For 27-agent CFGs, the average running time was 60 seconds. TACOS was run in a single 
thread mode denoted TACOS(S) and also in a multi-threaded mode TACOS(M). Each thread 
simulates an agent running the search. Since searching for the exact optimum was 
computationally infeasible for 27 agent CFGs, the performance was measured as a percentage 
of the upper bound.  
The Uniform Distribution 
For the Uniform distribution (see Table 7.11), both TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) performed 
better than all the other methods. TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) have almost similar 
performance.  
Table 7.11 – Average Performance for 27-agents CFGs (Uniform Distribution). 
Uniform Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 310317 99.83 
TACOS(M) 286063 99.81 
SA 1145346 92.45 
ACS 851413 97.48 
PSS 331455 96.67 
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ACS is the second best performing method, followed by PSS while the worst performance 
comes from SA despite exploring a higher number of neighbouring structures. This is 
consistent with the findings for the 25-agent CFG. 
 
The Normal Distribution 
For the Normal distribution (see Table 7.12), the results for 27 agents are consistent with those 
for 25-agent CFGs.  ACS performed the best, marginally outperforming both TACOS(S) and 
TACOS(M) by about 2.03% and 1.99% respectively. The two methods at the bottom remain 
PSS and SA. SA coming in last in terms of overall average solution quality. 
Table 7.12 – Average Performance for 27-agents CFGs (Normal Distribution). 
Normal Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 308268 87.64 
TACOS(M) 284456 87.68 
SA 1112277 85.65 
ACS 818941 89.67 
PSS 700302 85.97 
 
The Gamma Distribution 
For the Gamma Distribution (see Table 7.13), TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) again performed 
better than all the other methods. The performance between TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) are 
within a fraction of each other with TACOS(S) slightly ahead by 0.49%. Third place is ACS 
followed by PSS in fourth and SA coming in last with an average solution quality that is just 
41.75% of the upper bound  
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Table 7.13 – Average Performance for 27-agents (Gamma Distribution). 
Gamma Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 309051 63.92 
TACOS(M) 283474 63.43 
SA 1004789 41.75 
ACS 807410 52.27 
PSS 367344 47.51 
Since none of the methods were able to attain better than 64% solution quality, simulations 
were conducted with an extended running time of 3 minutes (triple the original running time). 
The results are shown in Table 7.14. 
Table 7.14 – Extended Running Time for 27-agent CFGs (Gamma Distribution). 
Gamma Distribution Extended Running Time 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 921025 67.66 
TACOS(M) 861019 65.83 
SA 3625934 44.01 
ACS 1655885 58.84 
PSS 412880 48.72 
Although there was an increase in the number of neighbours explored, the increase in average 
solution quality for each method was small. Thus the performance for the Gamma distribution 
requires further investigation. Perhaps, a dedicated TACOS-GAMMA algorithm that is 
optimised only for Gamma can be formulated. In this thesis, the focus is on general-purpose 
heuristics methods that work well with all distributions. 
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The Beta Distribution 
The results for the Beta distribution are shown in Table 7.15. Consistent with the performance 
exhibited for the 25-agent CFGs, all heuristics performed well. Four out of five methods 
returned an excellent average solution quality of over 99%. Even SA returned an overall 
average solution quality of 97.05% of the upper bound. Both TACOS(S) and TACOS(M)  
performs exactly the same returning an average solution quality of 99.99% of the upper bound. 
As with the other distributions, SA was the lowest performing method. However, this time 
the gap between it and the others is really small, just 2.95% of TACOS(S) and TACOS(M)  
Table 7.15 – Average Performance for 27-agents CFGs (Beta Distribution). 
Beta Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 310065 99.99 
TACOS(M) 285016 99.99 
SA 1020971 97.05 
ACS 836271 99.54 
PSS 363258 99.33 
 
The Exponential Distribution 
The results for the Exponential distribution are in Table 7.16. With 27-agents, there is a 
noticeable reduction (relative to the results for 25 agent CFGs) of performance for all 
methods. TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) remains the highest performing method, however the 
average quality of solution was 51% of the upper bound. ACS came in second with a huge 
difference of 37.58%. Both PSS and SA returned a poor sub-30% average solution quality 
with SA returning the lowest average solution quality of just 22.24% of upper bound.  
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Table 7.16 – Average Performance for 27-agent CFGs (Exponential Distribution). 
Exponential Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 313318 51.59 
TACOS(M) 285125 51.82 
SA 1080725 22.24 
ACS 827223 37.58 
PSS 314245 29.25 
 
Due to the lower performance, further simulations were conducted with an extended time 
period three times the original running time. The results are shown in Table 7.17. 
Running the algorithms three times longer did not translate into tangible performance 
increases. All the methods recorded a less than encouraging increase given the extra amount 
of time to search the space. TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) only recording a 1% to 2% increase 
despite exploring about three time more neighbours. This performance is similar to the one 
encountered with the Gamma distribution and deserves attention in future extensions of this 
research. 
Table 7.17 – Extended Running Time for 27-agent CFGs (Exponential Distribution). 
Exponential Distribution Extended Running Time 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 917710 53.01 
TACOS(M) 863159 52.73 
SA 3084480 28.18 
ACS 1660544 38.91 
PSS 1011361 35.86 
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The Triangular Distribution 
For the Triangular distribution (see Table 7.18), like the Uniform, Normal and Beta 
distributions, all methods performed reasonably well exceeding 90% on average. TACOS(S) 
and TACOS(M) are the best performing methods with both returning an average solution 
quality of around 97%. ACS was consistently just behind TACOS while SA and PSS both 
returned an average solution quality of around 91.9%. 
 
Table 7.18 – Average Performance for 27-agent CFGs (Triangular Distribution). 
Triangular Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈60 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 309005 97.82 
TACOS(M) 285701 97.75 
SA 1048315 91.92 
ACS 854167 93.56 
PSS 265965 91.99 
 
As with any parallelised implementation, more resources are needed for initialising the search. 
As such TACOS(M) runs at a lower number of iterations for the same amount of time (see 
previous chapter for details). Consistent with the simulation results for 25-agents, the for 27-
agents exhibit a similar pattern. Both TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) are consistently the best 
performing method for all other distributions except the Normal distribution (see Table 7.12). 
For the Normal distribution, ACS very slightly outperformed TACOS(M) by returning an 
average solution quality that is 1.99% higher (89.67% for ACS vs . 87.68% for TACOS(M)). 
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Figure 7.2 and Table 7.19 show a combined comparative summary of the results. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 – Performance Comparison for 27-agents (CFG) ≈ 60 seconds running time. 
Table 7.19 – Performance of Each Method for 27-agent CFGs (1 Best – 5 Worst) 
Performance Uniform Normal Gamma Beta Exponential Triangular 
1 TACOS(S) ACS TACOS(S) TACOS(S) TACOS(M) TACOS(S) 
2 TACOS(M) TACOS(M) TACOS(M) TACOS(M) TACOS(S) TACOS(M) 
3 ACS TACOS(S) ACS ACS ACS ACS 
4 PSS  PSS PSS  PSS  PSS PSS 
5 SA SA SA SA SA SA 
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The lower performing methods here are PSS and SA for all distributions with SA consistently 
returning the lowest performance across all distributions. We shall now take a look at the 
performance of each method on individual distributions starting with the Uniform 
distribution.  
27-Agent CFG - Highest and Lowest CS Value found (% of Upper Bound) 
Distribution Uniform Normal Gamma Beta Exponential Triangular 
Method Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest 
TACOS(S) 99.98 99.64 92.25 82.40 79.47 56.76 100.00 99.99 76.84 41.15 99.25 96.41 
TACOS(M) 99.95 99.56 92.42 82.36 79.47 55.43 100.00 99.99 82.45 40.22 99.25 96.18 
SA 99.63 81.47 89.54 80.41 56.05 30.43 99.98 81.88 37.32 13.29 94.76 88.83 
ACS 99.65 89.79 94.18 84.11 62.15 38.68 100.00 95.67 59.00 22.17 98.65 88.30 
PSS 99.63 86.48 90.92 81.41 59.09 36.37 100.00 96.24 46.66 17.08 97.13 84.79 
Table 7.20 – Best and Worst Solutions (27-agent CFGs). 
A comparison of best and worst solutions  
We will now take a look at the performance of each method in terms of the highest and lowest 
quality solutions found (see Table 7.20).   
For the Uniform distribution, TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) showed the smallest gap. This re-
affirms the findings from the 25-agent simulations that TACOS consistently returns high 
quality solutions with less randomness on their quality. SA had the highest gap which explains 
why it is the lowest performing method in terms of average solution quality. ACS has the third 
smallest gap while PSS has the fourth. This is consistent with the performance of these 
methods in terms of average solution quality. 
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The situation is different for the Normal distribution.  All four methods showed the same 10% 
gap. Recall that only for this distribution ACS is the highest performing method in terms of 
average solution quality, and indeed as demonstrated here ACS returns the highest solution 
quality that is 1.76% higher than the nearest competitor TACOS(M). The frequency with 
which ACS was able to return such high solution may be a contributing factor to its marginally 
superior 1.99% lead over TACOS(M). PSS and SA remained in the second last and last places 
respectively. This is consistent with their performance for 27-agent simulations. 
For the Gamma distribution, the gap was wider for all the heuristic methods. When compared 
to the average solution quality, the best is significantly higher than the average. For example, 
while the highest quality for TACOS(S) for the Gamma distribution is 79.47% of the upper 
bound, the overall average quality was a mere 67.66%. This shows that while TACOS was on 
occasions able to discover high quality solutions, the frequency of such high quality solutions 
being found is much less resulting in a lower overall average of 11.81% shy of the highest 
quality found. This implies that, for the Gamma distribution,  heuristic methods were all 
effected by hits and misses where the gap is high, resulting in a wider range of solution quality 
which hampers the overall average performance. 
For the Beta distribution, the gaps is smallest for TACOS(S) and TACOS(M), and this is 
followed by PSS and ACS. For some simulations, TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) returned 
solutions that is 100% the value of the upper bound.  The highest quality found by ACS is 
slightly higher than the quality of PSS, although the gap is smaller for PSS. ACS was able to 
perform better than PSS despite its larger gap. As it was with other distributions, ACS was in 
third place right behind TACOS(S) and TACOS(M). 
The results for the Exponential distribution showed a similar pattern to the Gamma 
distribution. Big gaps exist which hamper the performance of all the methods. Although a 
single search may return a solution as high as 82.45% such as that returned TACOS(M), the 
overall average is much. Thus, for this distribution, all the methods return solutions of varying 
qualities; they  sometimes give good results but are mostly bad. 
The Triangular distribution is one of the distributions where all the heuristic methods gave 
good overall performance. TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) has the smallest gap of less than 3%. 
This puts both of them ahead of all the other methods. ACS comes in just after these two, 
although as was found in the other distributions, the higher gap for ACS has less influence on 
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its average performance. It has a higher gap compared to SA but outperforms SA on average. 
This is also true for PSS. Although SA has a smaller gap, it performed poorly compared to 
ACS and PSS.  
 
7.2 Performance for Partition Function Games 
For Partition Function Games, simulations were run for 10-agents with heuristic solutions 
compared to the exact optimum.  For 27-agents, the heuristic solutions were compared to the 
upper bound because it is computationally infeasible to find an exact optimum.  
The simulations involved 100 runs for each 10 dataset for each distribution. For 10-agents, 
each method was run for an average of 3 minutes and for 27-agents each method was run for 
an average of 5 minutes. We will discuss the performance of each method for each individual 
distribution and then give a combined summary of the main results. 
7.2.1 Performance for 10-Agent PFGs 
TACOS(S) gave good results and so TACOS(M) was not evaluated. 
For the Uniform distribution (see Table 7.21), the average solution quality was above 90% of 
the optimum.  TACOS(S) gave the best average performance with the other methods 
following closely behind with a 1-2% gap in between them.  
Table 7.21 – Average Performance for 10-agent PFGs (Uniform Distribution). 
Uniform Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 416 97.35 
SA 53666 93.64 
ACS 281 95.70 
PSS 535 94.42 
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The Normal Distribution 
ACS performed better than other heuristic methods (see Table 7.22). ACS led by a very slim 
margin of 0.12%. PSS and SA took the third and fourth places respectively. 
Table 7.22 – Average Performance for 10-agent PFGs (Normal Distribution). 
Normal Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 466 96.96 
SA 53168 96.34 
ACS 269 97.07 
PSS 587 96.63 
 
The Gamma Distribution 
The results are as shown in Table 7.23. TACOS(S) and ACS performed reasonably well 
despite exploring fewer neighbours compared to the other methods. Both PSS and SA, despite 
exploring more neighbours, performed rather poorly.  
 Table 7.23 – Average Performance for 10-agent PFGs (Gamma Distribution). 
Gamma Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 435 84.77 
SA 53206 74.58 
ACS 299 81.70 
PSS 573 78.70 
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The Beta Distribution 
All methods performed well for 10-agent PFGs. All methods were able to provide an average 
solution quality that is at least 95% of the optimal (see Table 7.24). 
Table 7.24 – Average Performance for 10-agent PFGs (Beta Distribution). 
Beta Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 429 99.09 
SA 53202 95.50 
ACS 282 98.76 
PSS 553 97.60 
 
The Exponential Distribution 
Exponential distribution continues to be a difficult distribution (see Table 7.25). The best 
performing method, TACOS(S), was only able to provide an average solution quality of 
67.29%. The other methods gave an even lower average solution quality with SA managing 
just 54.41%. This consistently poor performance for CFGs and PFGs deserves further 
attention. This is part of future work. 
Table 7.25 – Average Performance for 10-agent PFGs (Exponential Distribution). 
Exponential Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 440 67.29 
SA 53469 54.41 
ACS 254 64.28 
PSS 516 59.19 
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The Triangular Distribution  
For the Triangular distribution (see Table 7.26), all the methods except SA exceeded 90% 
average solution quality. TACOS(S) was the best performing method while SA was the 
poorest but returning an overall average of 88.96%. 
Table 7.26 – Average Performance 10-agent PFGs (Triangular Distribution). 
Triangular Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Optimal  
(≈180 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 431 93.55 
SA 53962 88.96 
ACS 261 92.66 
PSS 581 91.14 
 
A combined summary of results 
Figure 7.3 and Table 7.27 provide a combined summary of the results for 10 agent PFGs. 
Table 7.27 – Performance of Each Method for 10-agents PFGs (1 Best – 4 Worst). 
Performance Uniform Normal Gamma Beta Exponential Triangular 
1 TACOS(S) ACS TACOS(S) TACOS(S) TACOS(S) TACOS(S) 
2 ACS TACOS(S) ACS ACS ACS ACS 
3 PSS  PSS PSS PSS PSS PSS 
4 SA SA SA SA SA SA 
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Figure 7.3 – Performance Comparison for 10-agents (PFG) ≈ 180 seconds running time. 
TACOS(S) outperformed all other methods for Uniform, Gamma, Beta, Exponential and 
Triangular distributions. Consistent with other results shown so far, ACS again slightly 
outperformed TACOS(S) for the Normal distribution (see Figure 7.3). For all other 
distributions, ACS was the second best method for all distributions followed by PSS and SA 
(see Table 7.27). 
A comparison of best and worst solutions  
Next we will take a look at the best and the worst solutions found for each heuristic method 
by distribution. These results are shown in Table 7.28. For the Uniform distribution, all the 
methods were able to at one point in their search locate the actual optimum. Although, the 
gaps between the best and worst meant that the method with the smallest gap, i.e., TACOS(S) 
outperformed all the others in terms of average solution quality.  
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Table 7.28 – Best and Worst Solutions (10-agent PFGs). 
10-Agent PFG - Highest and Lowest CS Value found (% of Optimal) 
Distribution Uniform Normal Gamma Beta Exponential Triangular 
Method Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest 
TACOS(S) 100.00 91.38 99.64 94.77 100.00 69.13 100.00 97.13 100.00 37.78 100.00 86.22 
SA 100.00 84.17 99.14 93.74 100.00 56.54 100.00 84.41 81.50 32.35 100.00 75.63 
ACS 100.00 84.80 99.14 93.08 100.00 57.12 100.00 95.56 100.00 35.53 100.00 77.40 
PSS 100.00 80.95 99.14 93.74 99.51 60.00 100.00 88.63 100.00 30.86 100.00 83.14 
For the Normal distribution, the gap was around 5% to 6% for all the methods which is why 
their performances was indistinguible from each other, with ACS taking a very narrow lead 
over TACOS(S) (see Table 7.23).  
For the Gamma distribution, TACOS(S), SA and ACS were in some instances able to reach 
the actual optimal solution during the search. However with the gaps of 30% or more, the 
overall average of each method was much lower. SA which has the highest gap of 43.46% is 
the worst performing method for the Gamma distribution. 
Conversely for Beta, all the methods at some point in the search was able to locate the exact 
optimal solution and the gaps between the best and the worst solutions were narrower. This 
contributes to the better average performance of each method for this distribution. 
Unsurprisingly, SA, the method with the highest gap is the poorest performing method for the 
Beta distribution. 
For the Exponential distribution, TACOS(S), ACS and PSS were able to locate the optimal 
solution at least once during the course of simulations. However, the gap was between 60-
70% for each method. This meant a lack of consistency. With solutions ranging from the 
highest (100% of the optimal) to the lowest (≈ 30% of the optimal), the average overall 
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performance suffers as a result. This is true for all the methods for the Exponential 
distribution. 
The Triangular distribution on the other hand was always a heuristic friendly distribution. All 
the methods including SA were at some point able to find the optimal solution. The small gap 
between the best and worst solutions meant that all the heuristics performed well for this 
distribution type (see Table 7.28). 
 
7.2.2 Performance for 27-Agent PFGs 
For 27-agents PFGs, performance of the heuristic methods was evaluated with respect to the 
upper bounds (details regarding the calculation of upper bounds can be found in Chapter 6). 
The externalities inherent in PFGs make the task of finding a solution that is close to optimum 
much harder relative to CFGs. Thus each heuristic method was given a longer run time of 5 
minutes.   
The Uniform Distribution 
TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) performed ahead of all the other methods (see Table 7.29 
although the average solution quality returned by ACS is just 0.35% lower than TACOS(M). 
The third best was SA followed by PSS.  
Table 7.29 – Average Performance for 27-agent PFGs (Uniform Distribution). 
Uniform Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈300 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈300 Seconds Running Time)  
TACOS(S) 1343787 90.73 
TACOS(M) 760977 88.81 
SA 959743 67.19 
ACS 675131 88.46 
PSS 646751 60.48 
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The Normal Distribution 
For the Normal distribution (see Table 7.30), TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) outperformed ACS 
which had consistently been the best performing method for this distribution for 25 and 27-
agent CFGs as well as 10-agent PFGs. For this particular case, this could be due to the larger 
number of neighbours explored. Both TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) explored more neighbours 
than ACS. 
 
Table 7.30 – Average Performance for 27-agent PFGs (Normal Distribution). 
Normal Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈300 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈300 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 1348962 98.69 
TACOS(M) 768815 98.61 
SA 955210 82.99 
ACS 672218 93.59 
PSS 642057 74.19 
 
 
The Gamma Distribution 
As the number of agents increase, the performance of all the heuristics on the Gamma 
distribution decreases due in part to the higher complexity of the problem due to a larger space 
and externalities considered (see Table 7.31). 
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Table 7.31 – Average Performance for 27-agents PFGs (Gamma Distribution). 
Gamma Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈300 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈300 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 1341988 56.15 
TACOS(M) 765587 54.18 
SA 955437 38.14 
ACS 680327 55.92 
PSS 644015 33.31 
 
Running the search for an increased duration of time did not help increase the overall average 
by a significant amount. Marginal increases was recorded which re-affirms the need to extend 
investigation into the peculiarity of the Gamma distribution and its relationship to heuristic 
performance in future work. One consistent trend is that the order in which each method 
performed remained the same with TACOS(S) giving a dismal best average of just 58.138% 
and the lowest performing method remaining to be PSS and returning an average of just 
34.876% (see Table 7.32). 
Table 7.32 – Extended Running Time for 27-agent PFGs (Exponential Distribution). 
Gamma Distribution Extended Running Time 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈600 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈600 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 2637194 58.14 
TACOS(M) 1498678 55.07 
SA 1902333 40.96 
ACS 1356438 58.67 
PSS 1340154 34.88 
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The Beta Distribution 
For the Beta distribution (see Table 7.33), all four heuristics methods performed well. 
TACOS(S), TACOS(M) and ACS returned an average solution quality above 90% of the 
upper bound. SA and PSS trailed behind at 77% and 68% respectively. 
Table 7.33 – Average Performance for 27-agent PFGs (Beta Distribution). 
Beta Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈300 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈300 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 1344200 98.79 
TACOS(M) 764556 97.47 
SA 959117 77.11 
ACS 683536 94.28 
PSS 647730 68.21 
The Exponential Distribution 
Like the Gamma distribution, the Exponential distribution was difficult for all four heuristic 
methods to handle. TACOS(S) and ACS lead the table. SA and PSS performs the worst 
returning a less than 20% average solution quality (see Table 7.34). 
Table 7.34 – Average Performance for 27-agens PFGs (Exponential Distribution). 
Exponential Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈300 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈300 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 1346263 33.89 
TACOS(M) 764497 31.62 
SA 952678 16.72 
ACS 675094 33.88 
PSS 643249 14.06 
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Extending the running time by twice, enabled all the methods to explore a larger portion of 
the space (see Table 7.35). However, this still failed to increase the average solution quality 
by any significant amount. With the extended time, ACS was the only method with a good 
increase in average solution quality. 
Table 7.35 – Extended Running Time 27-agent PFGs (Exponential Distribution) 
Exponential Distribution Extended Running Time 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈600 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈600 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 2682541 34.40 
TACOS(M) 1496641 37.78 
SA 1891400 18.82 
ACS 1332405 46.71 
PSS 1291644 16.29 
The Triangular Distribution 
With Triangular distribution, TACOS(S), TACOS(M) and ACS were able to exceed 80% 
average solution quality. However, no method exceeded 90% while both SA and PSS again 
falling below 70% (see Table 7.36).  
Table 7.36 – Average Performance for 27-agent PFGs (Triangular Distribution). 
 Triangular Distribution 
Method Average Neighbours Explored  
(≈300 Seconds Running Time) 
Average Performance - % of Upper Bound  
(≈300 Seconds Running Time) 
TACOS(S) 1346947 89.07 
TACOS(M) 757745 87.77 
SA 953529 67.68 
ACS 676111 85.94 
PSS 643064 61.21 
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A combined summary of results 
A combined summary of results is given in Figure 7.4 and Table 7.37. TACOS returned a 
high quality solution for 4 out of the 6 distribution (see Figure 7.4). TACOS(S) was the best 
performing method for all six distributions.  
  
  
  
Figure 7.4 – Performance Comparison for 27-agent (PFG) ≈ 300 seconds running time. 
TACOS(M) was the second best method for the Uniform, Normal, Gamma, Beta and 
Triangular distributions, while ACS took the second best spot for Exponential distribution. 
The poorest performing method for all distributions was PSS while SA was slightly better 
than PSS across all distributions (see Table 7.37). 
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Table 7.37 – Performance of Each Method for 27-agents PFG (1 Best – 5 Worst). 
Performance Uniform Normal Gamma Beta Exponential Triangular 
1 TACOS(S) TACOS(S) TACOS(S) TACOS(S) TACOS(S) TACOS(S) 
2 TACOS(M) TACOS(M) ACS TACOS(M) ACS TACOS(M) 
3 ACS ACS TACOS(M) ACS TACOS(M) ACS 
4 SA SA SA SA SA SA 
5 PSS PSS PSS PSS PSS PSS 
 
A comparison of best and worst solutions  
We shall now evaluate the performance of each method with regard to the best and the worst 
quality solutions found (see Table 7.38). For the Uniform distribution, TACOS(S) and 
TACOS(M) returned the best average solution quality and indeed this is consistent with the 
lowest gap. Although ACS was able to find a better solution, the gap was bigger so that when 
it comes to the average performance, it lost to TACOS(S) and TACOS(M). Both SA and PSS 
have huge gaps relegating them to the bottom of the performance spectrum. 
For the Normal distribution, TACOS again had the smallest gap proving the consistency of 
the method in always returning high quality solution. The gap was highest for PSS which is 
no surprise that it is the poorest performing method for this distribution. 
For the Gamma distribution, ACS comes in second after TACOS(S) overtaking TACOS(M) 
and all the other methods.  
For the Beta distribution, TACOS(S), TACOS(M) and ACS were able to find solutions that 
are 100% of the upper bound.  The gap between the best and the worst solutions was lower 
for all methods except PSS which came in last in terms of performance. 
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Table 7.38 – Best and Worst Solutions (27-agent PFGs). 
27-Agent PFG – Highest and Lowest CS Value found (% of Upper Bound) 
Distribution Uniform Normal Gamma Beta Exponential Triangular 
Method Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest 
TACOS(S) 96.33 84.49 98.95 98.14 66.43 42.30 100.00 95.13 47.79 29.13 94.01 84.76 
TACOS(M) 94.91 83.13 98.95 98.14 64.92 41.25 100.00 92.46 44.29 18.52 96.48 79.29 
SA 80.61 55.18 90.79 82.07 46.54 27.55 88.25 72.32 27.82 7.53 77.71 63.26 
ACS 98.48 76.30 99.21 86.91 67.98 40.74 100.00 88.47 53.82 7.53 94.83 76.95 
PSS 80.64 43.23 90.74 58.93 48.80 19.65 89.84 51.17 26.12 8.07 78.66 48.52 
 
All the methods performed poorly for the Exponential distribution. Again, investigating this 
forms part of future work.  
For the Triangular distribution, the gap was high for all the methods. However, the good 
quality solution found by TACOS(S), TACOS(M) and ACS are attributed to these methods 
more frequently returning higher quality solutions.  
 
7.3 The Effect of Number of Agents on Performance 
We will now look at the effect on each method as the number of agent increases. For CFGs, 
we will compare the performance for 25-agent games with that for 27-agent games. For PFGs, 
we will compare the performance for 10-agent games with 27-agent games. 
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7.3.1 Performance for CFGs 
TACOS(M) was run only for 27-agent games while TACOS(S) was run for both 25 and 27 
agent games, thus comparison will only be made for TACOS(S).  We will examine the change 
in the performance of a heuristic method for each of the six probability distributions. 
The Uniform Distribution 
For the Uniform distribution, all the methods experience very little degradation in 
performance. Their performances are almost identical for both 25-agent and 27-agent games 
taking almost no impact from the increase in the number of agents (see Figure 7.5). 
 
Figure 7.5 – Performance for 25-agent and 27-agent CFGs (Uniform Distribution). 
The Normal Distribution 
Next we will take a look at Normal distribution. Increasing the number of agents has a slight 
impact on all the methods (see Figure 7.6). The drop in performance is roughly the same for 
all four methods.  
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Figure 7.6 – Performance for 25-agent and 27-agent CFGs (Normal Distribution). 
 
The Gamma Distribution 
For the Gamma distribution, all the methods experienced a large reduction in performance 
(see Figure 7.7). SA is the most effected with the largest gap in its performance as the number 
of agents increases while ACS shows the smallest decline. 
 
Figure 7.7 – Performance for 25-agent and 27-agent CFGs (Gamma Distribution). 
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The Beta Distribution 
We will now look at the Beta distribution. Similar to the Uniform distribution, the 
performance of all four methods for Beta distribution is excellent (shown in Figure 7.8). There 
is barely noticeable degradation in performance from the increase in the number of agents. 
 
 
Figure 7.8 – Performance for 25-agent and 27-agent CFGs (Beta Distribution). 
 
The Exponential Distribution 
Now, let’s take a look at the performance for Exponential distribution. Huge reductions in 
performance can be seen across all the methods as the number of agents increase (see Figure 
7.9). The largest impact again is on SA which see its performance drop by more than 50%.  
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Figure 7.9 – Performance for 25-agent and 27-agent CFGs (Exponential Distribution). 
The Triangular Distribution 
Figure 7.10 shows the performance for the Triangular distribution. For this distribution, all 
the method performed very well. TACOS(S) and PSS showing little or no reduction in 
performance while SA and ACS actually performed better for 27-agent games. 
 
Figure 7.10 – Performance for 25-agent and 27-agent CFGs (Triangular Distribution). 
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7.3.2 Performance for PFGs 
For PFGs we will examine the effect on the performance of a method for 10-agent games and 
for 27-agent games. Here, TACOS(M) was run for only 27-agent games while TACOS(S) 
was run for both 10 and 27 agent games. We will examine the change in performance of each 
method for each of the six probability distributions. 
The Uniform Distribution 
For the Uniform distribution (see Figure 7.11), the drop in performance with the increase in 
the number of agents was more for some methods than for others.  TACOS(S) showed the 
lowest impact compared to the other methods. PSS is most effected losing more than 30% of 
its performance.  
 
Figure 7.11 – Performance for 10-agent and 27-agent PFGs (Uniform Distribution). 
The Normal Distribution 
Next we will look at the Normal distribution. For this, all methods except TACOS(S) showed 
a reduction in performance (shown in Figure 7.12). Surprisingly, TACOS(S) actually 
performs better for 27-agent games. PSS is the most impacted again, losing its performance 
in by more than 20%. 
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Figure 7.12 – Performance for 10-agent and 27-agent PFGs (Normal Distribution). 
The Gamma Distribution 
For the Gamma distribution, the impact is quite bad for all the methods as shown in Figure 
7.13. Each method lost more than 25% of its performance as the number of agents increased. 
This means that the Gamma distribution is not a heuristic friendly distribution.  
 
Figure 7.13 – Performance for 10-agent and 27-agent PFGs (Gamma Distribution). 
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The Beta Distribution 
 
Figure 7.14 – Performance for 10-agent and 27-agent PFGs (Beta Distribution). 
 
Next is the Beta distribution (see Figure 7.14). Here, the performance of TACOS(S) for 10-
agent and 27-agent games is consistent with no real reduction seen. ACS showed a very small 
decrease while SA and PSS again showed the highest reduction in performance. 
 
The Exponential Distribution 
None of the methods performed well for 10-agent games for this distribution. Increasing the 
number of agents to 27 resulted in all the methods performing worse and losing at least 50% 
of their performance (see Figure 7.15). This pattern echoes the performance on CFGs. 
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Figure 7.15 – Performance for 10-agent and 27-agent PFGs (Exponential Distribution). 
The Triangular Distribution 
For the Triangular distribution, the impact is not so bad for TACOS(S) and ACS. Both 
methods scaled well with smaller degradation in performance as the number of agents 
increased. As was the case with the other distributions, SA and PSS are the most impacted 
(see Figure 7.16). 
 
Figure 7.16 – Performance for 10-agent and 27-agent PFGs (Triangular Distribution). 
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7.4 Statistical Test on Results 
To statistically analyse the performance of each method, a statistical test using Confidence 
Intervals (CI) was done. A confidence interval (also referred to as an interval estimate) is a 
range (or an interval) of values used to estimate the true value of a population parameter 
(Triola, 2006). Here we are using CI to compare with the actual average (mean) presented in 
the results. The purpose is to measure consistency by taking a number samples from the 
results, calculate the CI then draw some conclusion between the relationships of the values 
obtained from the CI and the actual mean. 
Samples were randomly taken from the results data and CI was calculated for each individual 
distribution for the four different scenarios (25-agent CFGs, 27-agent CFGs, 10-agent PFGs 
and 27-agent PFGs). In each scenario the number of samples is n = 33, thus the critical value 
found using 32 degrees of freedom (where 𝑡𝛼
2⁄
 has 𝑛 − 1 degrees of freedom) is 𝑡𝛼
2⁄
= 2.037 
such that the margin of error 𝐸 is calculated as 𝐸 = 2.037 ∙ 𝑠
√33
⁄  where 𝑠 is the sample 
standard deviation. The CI is then computed as: 
?̅? − 𝐸 < 𝜇 < ?̅? + 𝐸 
Therefore, the confidence interval limit is be between ?̅? − 𝐸 and ?̅? + 𝐸 where 𝜇 denotes the 
population mean. This limit is being calculated based on a 95% confidence level as this is 
most commonly used in the majority of studies found in literature (Triola, 2006). We will now 
take a look at each of the scenarios considered starting with 25-agent CFGs. 
 
7.4.1 Tests on 25-agent CFG 
We start with 25-Agent CFGs. The CI for each of the six probability distributions were 
individually computed. 
The Uniform Distribution 
For the Uniform distribution we can see that CI limit for TACOS and ACS are the narrowest 
while SA has the widest limit (see Table 7.39). This is to say that for say, we are 95% 
confident that the average performance is between 89.65% and 94.64%. The results shown in 
section 7.1.1 shows that the average solution quality found for SA was 93.38% of the optimal 
which is within the CI calculated using the randomly chosen samples.  
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This is true for all the other methods as well, however their CI limit is much smaller compared 
to SA. A smaller CI limit indicates that these other methods are more consistent as the 
solutions they found were less varied which led to their higher performance. The order 
between the widest and narrowest CI limits also follows the pattern of the actual 𝜇 found in 
the results with the method with the smallest interval limit TACOS(S) performing best, 
followed by ACS, PSS and finally SA. The CI limit for TACOS(S) is very small that as can 
be seen in Figure 7.17. 
Table 7.39 – Confidence Interval 25-Agent CFG (Uniform Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 99.77, 𝑠 = 0.12 99.73 < 𝜇 < 99.81 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 92.14, 𝑠 = 7.04 89.65 < 𝜇 < 94.64 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 97.15, 𝑠 = 0.87 97.79 < 𝜇 < 98.41 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? =  98.10, 𝑠 = 1.60 96.58 < 𝜇 < 97.72 
 
 
The Normal Distribution 
For the Normal distribution, the ACS has the widest CI limit between 96.10 and 97.10 (see 
Table 7.40). However because the CI of ACS does not overlap with the CI of any other 
method, it could suggest that ACS performed differently compared to the others where it 
found solutions with higher quality that were at least 96% of the optimal. This means that in 
this particular distribution it was able to outperform TACOS(S) with a CI that has smaller 
limit but finds solutions whose quality is no higher than 95.33% of the optimal. None of the 
CI overlap each other and the actual average performance falls within the CI for all the 
methods. 
Table 7.40 – Confidence Interval 25-Agent CFG (Normal Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 95.10, 𝑠 = 0.66 94.86 < 𝜇 < 95.33 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 92.72, 𝑠 = 0.76 92.45 < 𝜇 < 92.99 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 96.60, 𝑠 = 1.42 96.10 < 𝜇 < 97.10 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 93.41, 𝑠 = 1.03 93.04 < 𝜇 < 93.78 
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The Gamma Distribution 
The Gamma distribution was one of the worst performing distributions for all the methods. 
When calculating the CI, it was found that the CI was wider for all the methods (see Table 
7.41). This gap between the lower and upper limit of the CI shows that none of the methods 
could generate solutions with consistent solution quality. The CI of SA, ACS and PSS overlap 
each other which explains the similar performance for these methods. TACOS(S) had the 
smaller CI limit and conversely had the best performance for the gamma distribution here 
with an average solution quality of 78.54% which is within the CI computed. 
Table 7.41 – Confidence Interval 25-Agent CFG (Gamma Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 78.05, 𝑠 = 4.10 76.60 < 𝜇 < 79.51 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 64.86, 𝑠 = 6.46 62.56 < 𝜇 < 67.15 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 64.63, 𝑠 = 6.33 62.38 < 𝜇 < 66.87 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 62.95, 𝑠 = 6.57 60.62 < 𝜇 < 65.28 
 
The Beta Distribution 
For the Beta distribution, again the CI for SA, ACS and PSS overlap each other although the 
CI limit for PSS was narrowest among the three (see Table 7.42). This also corresponds to 
its overall average performance as found in section 7.1.1 where it outperformed both SA and 
ACS. TACOS(S) leads the pack with the narrowest CI limit which also corresponds to its 
overall performance for the Beta distribution in 25-agent CFGs. The CI for TACOS(S) also 
does not overlap with any other methods indicating a different consistency level compared 
to the others. 
Table 7.42 – Confidence Interval 25-Agent CFG (Beta Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 99.99, 𝑠 =0.002 99.99 < 𝜇 < 100.00 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 98.72, 𝑠 = 2.42 97.86 < 𝜇 < 99.58 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 99.07, 𝑠 = 0.40 98.31 < 𝜇 < 99.84 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 99.50, 𝑠 = 2.16 99.36 < 𝜇 < 99.64 
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The Exponential Distribution 
As it was with the Gamma distribution, the CI limit for the Exponential distribution for each 
method is also wider (see Table 7.43). This indicates that the samples taken, the estimated 𝜇 
is within a wider range of values which could be due to the variations of the solution quality 
found. Unfortunately, a wider CI also meant that the performance for each method was lower 
for this distribution. TACOS(S) which was the best performing method here managed an 
average solution quality of 73.91% which is within the CI limits computed. 
  
Table 7.43 – Confidence Interval 25-Agent CFG (Exponential Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 74.75, 𝑠 = 8.49 71.74 < 𝜇 < 77.76 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 52.76, 𝑠 = 8.20 49.85 < 𝜇 < 55.67 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 51.37, 𝑠 = 9.05 48.16 < 𝜇 < 54.57 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 45.38, 𝑠 = 8.69 42.30 < 𝜇 < 48.46 
 
 
The Triangular Distribution 
The Triangular distribution exhibits the same pattern as for SA, ACS and PSS where their CI 
limit was wider compared to TACOS(S) (see Table 7.44). The CI for ACS and PSS overlap 
each other which explains their similar performance. Similarly the upper limit of CI for SA 
was less than 90% which means it is the lowest performing method for this distribution while 
TACOS(S) has the narrowest CI which means it is also the top performing method on average. 
 
Table 7.44 – Confidence Interval 25-Agent CFG (Triangular Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 97.94, 𝑠 = 0.71 97.69 < 𝜇 < 98.20 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 87.88, 𝑠 = 5.74 85.84 < 𝜇 < 89.91 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 92.98, 𝑠 = 2.71 92.02 < 𝜇 < 93.94 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 92.28, 𝑠 = 3.47 91.04 < 𝜇 < 93.51 
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Figure 7.17 – Confidence Intervals 25-agent CFGs (% of Optimal). 
Figure 7.17 shows the CI for each method in each individual distribution for the 25-agent 
CFG setting. The next section will take look at 27-agent CFGs. 
 
7.4.2 Tests on 27-agent CFG 
For the 27-agent CFG setting, simulations were conducted with both the single-threaded 
TACOS(S) as well as the multi-threaded TACOS(M). Now let us look at the CI computed for 
the 27-agent CFGs starting with the Uniform Distribution. 
 
The Uniform Distribution 
For the Uniform distribution, the CI limit for SA was the widest (see Table 7.45). Unlike the 
pattern found with the 25-agent CFG for the Uniform distribution, the CI for ACS and PSS 
overlap each other indicating similar performance although the actual results found that ACS 
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slightly outperformed PSS on the overall average. TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) whose CI are 
narrower compared to the others had the best performance and their respective averages fall 
within the CI computed here. 
Table 7.45 – Confidence Interval 27-Agent CFG (Uniform Distribution).  
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 99.85, 𝑠 = 0.09 99.82 < 𝜇 < 99.88 
TACOS(M) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 99.83, 𝑠 = 0.09 99.80 < 𝜇 < 99.86 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 93.47, 𝑠 = 5.36 91.57 < 𝜇 < 95.37 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 97.89, 𝑠 = 2.27 96.27 < 𝜇 < 98.69 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 97.04, 𝑠 = 2.18 97.09 < 𝜇 < 97.81 
 
 
The Normal Distribution 
ACS was the best performing method for the Normal distribution (see section 7.1.2) and this 
average falls within the computed CI. When computing the CI for this distribution it was 
found that the CI for ACS was the only one that did not overlap any other method. TACOS(S) 
and TACOS(M) has overlapping CIs, so do SA and PSS. The methods with overlapping CI 
performs similarly to each other and average for each method still falls within the CI 
computed here. 
 
Table 7.46 – Confidence Interval 27-Agent CFG (Normal Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 87.56, 𝑠 = 2.60 86.63 < 𝜇 < 88.48 
TACOS(M) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 87.60, 𝑠 = 2.59 86.68 < 𝜇 < 88.51 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 85.53, 𝑠 = 2.47 84.66 < 𝜇 < 86.41 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 89.56, 𝑠 = 2.33 88.73 < 𝜇 < 90.40 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 85.86, 𝑠 = 2.36 85.03 < 𝜇 < 86.68 
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The Gamma Distribution 
For the 27-agent CFGs, the performance for each method for the Gamma distribution was so 
good. The CI for each method was wider for this distribution which can be directly contributed 
by the variations in the solution quality of the samples chosen. The average performance does 
fall within the computed CI showing the consistency of sampling. However this also means 
that the wider CI indicates that randomness of the results which means none of the methods 
was able to consistently find high quality solutions when the input is generated with the 
Gamma distribution. Table 7.47 shows the CI for each method for the Gamma distribution. 
 
Table 7.47 – Confidence Interval 27-Agent CFG (Gamma Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 63.41, 𝑠 = 4.58 61.78 < 𝜇 < 65.03 
TACOS(M) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 62.96, 𝑠 = 5.28 61.09 < 𝜇 < 64.83 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 41.17, 𝑠 = 5.81 39.11 < 𝜇 < 43.23 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 52.03 , 𝑠 = 4.52 50.42 < 𝜇 < 53.63 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 47.30, 𝑠 = 4.53 45.70 < 𝜇 < 48.91 
 
The Beta Distribution 
The Beta distribution found the narrowest CI for TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) between 99.98 
and 99.99 (see Table 7.48). The rest had a wider CI but overall, this coincides with the actual 
results and the ranks between the best and worst performing method follows the pattern shown 
by the CI where the method with a narrower CI generally performing better than those with a 
wider CI. 
 
Table 7.48 – Confidence Interval 27-Agent CFG (Beta Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 99.99, 𝑠 =0.001 99.98 < 𝜇 < 99.99 
TACOS(M) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 99.99, 𝑠 =0.001 99.98 < 𝜇 < 99.99 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 97.78, 𝑠 = 2.34 96.95 < 𝜇 < 98.61 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 99.72, 𝑠 = 0.74 99.46 < 𝜇 < 99.98 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 99.49, 𝑠 = 0.50 99.31 < 𝜇 < 99.67 
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The Exponential Distribution 
Each method continues to experience a drop in performance for the Exponential distribution. 
As it was with the Gamma distribution, the CI for each method here was wider. This pattern 
corresponds to the actual results where the wider the CI, the lower the performance of the 
method. The average performance for each method fall within the CI shown in Table 7.49. 
Table 7.49 – Confidence Interval 27-Agent CFG (Exponential Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 51.63, 𝑠 = 6.10 49.47 < 𝜇 < 53.79 
TACOS(M) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 51.87, 𝑠 = 6.77 49.47 < 𝜇 < 54.27 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 22.36, 𝑠 = 6.16 20.18 < 𝜇 < 24.54 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 37.96, 𝑠 = 6.82 35.54 < 𝜇 < 40.38 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 29.26, 𝑠 = 5.37 27.36 < 𝜇 < 31.17 
 
 
The Triangular Distribution 
The CI for ACS and PSS overlap each other for the Triangular distribution (see Table 7.50). 
Although the actual average falls within the CI limit, the results indicates that the two methods 
did not have similar performance as ACS outperformed PSS. The CI for SA and PSS also 
overlap, however the CI computed is more indicative of the results as these two methods 
performed similarly. TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) had the narrowest CI limits which also 
translates into the actual average performance where they were the top performing methods 
for this distribution. 
 
Table 7.50 – Confidence Interval 27-Agent CFG (Triangular Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 97.76, 𝑠 = 0.68 97.51 < 𝜇 < 98.00 
TACOS(M) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 97.66, 𝑠 = 0.75 97.39 < 𝜇 < 97.93 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 91.21, 𝑠 = 2.45 90.34 < 𝜇 < 92.08 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 93.23, 𝑠 = 2.19 92.46 < 𝜇 < 94.01 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 91.64, 𝑠 = 2.83 90.64 < 𝜇 < 92.65 
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Figure 7.18 shows the CI for each method in each individual distribution for the 27-agent 
CFG setting. From this figure we can clearly see how the CI of some methods are wider than 
the others and which methods have their CI overlapping each other. 
 
Figure 7.18 – Confidence Intervals 27-agent CFGs (% of Upper Bound). 
The next section will take look at PFGs in which 10-agent and 27-agent PFGs were considered 
for each distribution. 
 
7.4.3 Tests on 10-agent PFG 
Next, we will look at 10-agent PFGs. Only the single-threaded TACOS(S) was ran for the 10-
agent PFG setting. CI was computed for each of the six distributions for all four methods. We 
will look at each of these beginning with the Uniform distribution. 
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The Uniform Distribution 
For the Uniform distribution, SA has the widest CI, this corresponds to its lower performance 
compared to the other methods (see Table 7.51). TACOS(S) which has the narrowest CI 
coincidentally performs well. ACS performs better than PSS despite having a wider CI. This 
is due to the worst solution quality returned by ACS being higher than PSS (see Table 7.28) 
despite the wider range of results returned by ACS. 
Table 7.51 – Confidence Interval 10-Agent PFG (Uniform Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 97.34, 𝑠 = 1.70 96.74 < 𝜇 < 97.94 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 93.57, 𝑠 = 4.46 91.99 < 𝜇 < 95.15 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 96.15, 𝑠 = 2.83 95.15 < 𝜇 < 97.15 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 94.61, 𝑠 = 3.57 93.34 < 𝜇 < 95.88 
 
The Normal Distribution 
ACS is the best performing method for the Normal distribution in 10-agent PFG. However 
the CI computed is found to be wider than TACOS(S) which means the quality of solutions 
returned by TACOS(S) is more consistent. The CI does give some indication of why ACS 
performed better than the other. If we look at the overall average performance (the real mean 
of the results), for ACS the average is towards the upper limit of the CI while for TACOS(S) 
it leans towards the lower limit of its CI. This means than it returns higher quality solutions 
than times than TACOS(S) which explains it higher overall average performance. 
Table 7.52 – Confidence Interval 10-Agent PFG (Normal Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 96.67, 𝑠 = 0.98 96.32 < 𝜇 < 97.02 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 96.02, 𝑠 = 1.08 95.64 < 𝜇 < 96.40 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 96.86, 𝑠 = 1.36 96.38 < 𝜇 < 97.34 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 96.32, 𝑠 = 1.33 95.85 < 𝜇 < 96.79 
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The Gamma Distribution 
For the Gamma distribution, the CI computed for all the methods are wide (see Table 7.53). 
This means that none of the methods were consistent in the quality of solutions returned.  
However, TACOS(S) is the best among the four with a narrower CI. This is consistent with 
its performance as the best performing method on average for the Gamma distribution. For 
the rest of the methods, their CI also corresponds their performance and the method with the 
widest CI (SA) performed worst for the Gamma distribution. 
Table 7.53 – Confidence Interval 10-Agent PFG (Gamma Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 83.13, 𝑠 = 7.82 80.36 < 𝜇 < 85.90 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 72.19, 𝑠 = 9.66 68.76 < 𝜇 < 75.62 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 80.20, 𝑠 = 9.04 76.99 < 𝜇 < 83.41 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 76.74, 𝑠 = 9.12 73.51 < 𝜇 < 79.97 
 
The Beta Distribution 
All the methods performed well for the Beta distribution (see Figure 7.3), among these 
TACOS which has the narrower CI (see Table 7.54) is the best performing method. The rest 
of the method ranks in performance from best to worst according to their interval size with 
the method that has a wider CI performing worst, in this case it is SA. 
Table 7.54 – Confidence Interval 10-Agent PFG (Beta Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 98.82, 𝑠 = 0.91 98.50 < 𝜇 < 99.14 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 93.87, 𝑠 = 5.17 92.04 < 𝜇 < 95.70 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 98.28, 𝑠 = 1.45 97.77 < 𝜇 < 98.79 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 96.66, 𝑠 = 2.93 95.62 < 𝜇 < 97.70 
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The Exponential Distribution 
For the Exponential distribution even for a smaller number of agents, all the heuristics 
struggled to consistently return higher quality solutions. The only anomaly found from the 
computed CI is that SA has the narrowest CI (see Table 7.56) despite being the worst 
performing method among all the methods. This could be due to the random sample taken 
favouring SA, however the overall average for each method still falls within their computer 
CI. 
Table 7.55 – Confidence Interval 10-Agent PFG (Exponential Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 67.22, 𝑠 = 12.86 62.66 < 𝜇 < 71.78 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 54.13, 𝑠 = 12.49 49.70 < 𝜇 < 58.56 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 64.16, 𝑠 = 12.89 59.59 < 𝜇 < 68.73 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 59.70, 𝑠 = 14.64 54.51 < 𝜇 < 64.89 
 
The Triangular Distribution 
TACOS(S) is the best performing method for the Triangular distribution, correspondingly 
the computed CI for TACOS(S) is the narrowest. Consequently here the method with the 
widest CI, SA is the worst performing method.  ACS and PSS comes in second and third 
position with their computed CI reflecting the overall average performance. 
Table 7.56 – Confidence Interval 10-Agent PFG (Triangular Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 93.73, 𝑠 = 3.18 92.60 < 𝜇 < 94.86 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 88.86, 𝑠 = 4.52 87.26 < 𝜇 < 90.46 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 92.41, 𝑠 = 3.64 91.12 < 𝜇 < 93.70 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? =  90.79, 𝑠 = 4.16 89.31 < 𝜇 < 92.27 
 
Figure 7.19 shows the CI for each method in each individual distribution for the 10-agent PFG 
setting, it help to depict how wide the CI for each method is compared to another. We can 
also see that the CI of some methods overlap each other indicating a similar performance 
envelope. 
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Figure 7.19 – Confidence Intervals 10-agent PFGs (% of Optimal). 
 
7.4.4 Tests on 27-agent PFG 
Finally, we calculate the CI for 27-agent PFGs. As this size of the problem is larger for this 
setting, simulations were conducted for both TACOS(S) and TACOS(M). We will now take 
a look at the CI computed for each input distribution starting with the Uniform distribution. 
The Uniform Distribution 
The CI for both TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) is narrower than the other methods for the 
Uniform distribution. This is followed by ACS. In consequent to this TACOS(S), TACOS(M) 
and ACS are the top performing methods here (see Figure 7.4). PSS which has the widest CI 
(see Table 7.57) is the worst performing method. 
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Table 7.57 – Confidence Interval 27-Agent PFG (Uniform Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 91.03, 𝑠 = 2.88 90.01 < 𝜇 < 92.05 
TACOS(M) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 89.21, 𝑠 = 2.91 88.18 < 𝜇 < 90.24 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 68.16, 𝑠 = 7.10 65.65 < 𝜇 < 70.68 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 88.79, 𝑠 = 3.71 87.48 < 𝜇 < 90.11 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 61.33, 𝑠 = 8.11 58.45 < 𝜇 < 64.20 
 
The Normal Distribution 
For the Normal distribution, TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) has a very narrow CI which can 
hardly be shown (see Figure 7.20). PSS has the widest CI (see Table 7.59) which corresponds 
to it performance where it is the worst performing method for the Normal distribution. 
Table 7.58 – Confidence Interval 27-Agent PFG (Normal Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 98.62, 𝑠 = 0.17 98.56 < 𝜇 < 98.68 
TACOS(M) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 98.61, 𝑠 = 0.24 98.52 < 𝜇 < 98.69 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 82.91, 𝑠 = 1.40 82.41 < 𝜇 < 83.40 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 92.76, 𝑠 = 4.53 91.15 < 𝜇 < 94.36 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 75.76, 𝑠 = 8.39 72.79 < 𝜇 < 78.74 
 
The Gamma Distribution 
ACS has the widest CI for the Gamma distribution. However it the average performance is 
better than PSS and SA. From the CI shown in Figure 7.20 we can see that the CI of ACS 
overlaps with TACOS(S) and TACOS(M). This indicates that it returns higher quality 
solution similar to TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) which are higher than those returned by PSS 
and SA which also has wide CIs however they do not overlap with the CI of ACS (see Table 
7.59). 
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Table 7.59 – Confidence Interval 27-Agent PFG (Gamma Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 57.42, 𝑠 = 3.70 56.11 < 𝜇 < 58.73 
TACOS(M) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 55.51, 𝑠 = 4.02 54.08 < 𝜇 < 56.93 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 39.46, 𝑠 = 3.99 38.04 < 𝜇 < 40.87 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 57.43, 𝑠 = 4.75 55.74 < 𝜇 < 59.11 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 34.75, 𝑠 = 4.57 33.13 < 𝜇 < 36.38 
 
The Beta Distribution 
For the Beta distribution, PSS has the widest CI compared to the other methods. Moreover, 
the solutions returned are considerably worse compared to the other method.  This wider CI 
also means that the range of solution quality returned is erratic and non-consistent. ACS which 
has a narrower CI compared to SA, performed just behind TACOS(S) and TACOS(M).  
Table 7.60 – Confidence Interval 27-Agent PFG (Beta Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 98.46, 𝑠 = 1.29 98.00 < 𝜇 < 98.92 
TACOS(M) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 97.06, 𝑠 = 1.44 96.55 < 𝜇 < 97.57 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 76.21, 𝑠 = 3.03 75.14 < 𝜇 < 77.28 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 93.63, 𝑠 = 2.29 92.82 < 𝜇 < 94.44 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 66.53, 𝑠 = 5.53 64.57 < 𝜇 < 68.49 
 
 
 
The Exponential Distribution 
The widest CI for the Exponential distribution was found to be for ACS. The random sample 
taken returned a wide CI for ACS although the average performance falls in the middle of the 
upper and lower CI limit. This indicates that the quality of solution given by ACS is highly 
inconsistent and involves extremes of high and low values. TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) still 
have the narrower CIs compared to the others (see Table 7.61) and are the best performing 
methods here. However the wide CI for ACS overlaps with TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) which 
shows that its performance falls with the performance of these two. 
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Table 7.61 – Confidence Interval 27-Agent PFG (Exponential Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 33.29, 𝑠 = 5.90 31.20 < 𝜇 < 35.38 
TACOS(M) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 31.46, 𝑠 = 5.76 29.42 < 𝜇 < 33.50 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 16.77, 𝑠 = 4.82 15.06 < 𝜇 < 18.48 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 34.00, 𝑠 = 11.09 30.07 < 𝜇 < 37.93 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 14.06, 𝑠 = 3.70 12.75 < 𝜇 < 15.37 
 
The Triangular Distribution 
PSS has the widest CI for the Triangular distribution and it does not overlap with any of the 
other methods. Its upper limit is also much lower than the second worst performing method, 
SA. The average performance of each method falls within the computed CI shown in Table 
7.62. TACOS(M) has a rather wide CI however it overlaps with that of TACOS(S) indicating 
their average performance should be similar of which they are. 
Table 7.62 – Confidence Interval 27-Agent PFG (Triangular Distribution). 
Method Descriptive Statistics 95% Confidence Interval 
TACOS(S) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 88.94, 𝑠 = 2.07 88.21 < 𝜇 < 89.67 
TACOS(M) 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 87.65, 𝑠 = 3.45 86.43 < 𝜇 < 88.87 
SA 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 67.55, 𝑠 = 3.19 66.42 < 𝜇 < 68.68 
ACS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 85.84, 𝑠 = 3.04 84.76 < 𝜇 < 86.92 
PSS 𝑛 = 33, ?̅? = 60.98, 𝑠 = 6.82 58.56 < 𝜇 < 63.39 
 
Figure 7.20 shows the CI for each method in each distribution for the 27-agent PFG setting.  
It can be seen from the figure below that PSS consistently have a wide CI. Surprisingly SA 
exhibits a consistently narrow CI across the distributions. However, its perform within its own 
performance envelope where the upper limit in each distribution is much lower than the lower 
limits of TACOS(S), TACOS(M) and ACS.  
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Figure 7.20 – Confidence Intervals 27-agent PFGs (% of Upper Bound). 
It must be noted however, while we were able to draw certain conclusions from the 
comparison between the various CIs calculated, these should only be taken as tentative 
indications. To make definitive conclusions would require more involved statistical testing 
which is outside the scope of this research but is worthy of consideration in future work. 
 
 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the simulations and discussed the performance of each 
of the four heuristic methods for each of the six probability distributions. For CFGs, the 
solution quality was measured relative to the exact optimum for 25 agent games and to the 
upper bound on the exact optimum for 27 agent games.  For PFGs, solution quality was 
measured relative to the exact optimum for 10 agent games and to the upper bound on the 
exact optimum for 27 agent games.   
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In terms of the ranking between the methods, In CFGs, TACOS is the best ranking method in 
the majority of distributions tested with the exception of the Normal Distribution where ACS 
was best. In PFGs for the smaller problem size of 10-agents, the same pattern follows the CFG 
ranking, TACOS is the best ranking method in the majority of distributions while ACS was 
best performing for the Normal distribution. TACOS(S) was the overall best performing 
methods for the larger PFG games in all distributions. In summary, for CFG, TACOS was the 
best method for over 83% of the time while for PFG it was 91% of the time the best performing 
method. This makes TACOS the highest ranking method among the 4 in both CFG and PFGs. 
When comparing the impact of an increase in the problem size, i.e. the number of agents, we 
noticed stark differences between CFGs and PFGs. For CFGs, increasing the number of agents 
had a much lower impact on the reduction in the performance of each method. This is true 
except for SA whose performance was severely impacted for the Gamma and Exponential 
distributions. Remarkably, its performance increased for the Triangular distribution as the 
number of agents increased from 25 to 27 agents. 
For PFGs, as the complexity of the problem increases (a larger problem space resulting from 
the more agents), noticeable decrease in performance can be see for all the methods. When 
comparing the performance for 10-agent and 27-agent PFGs, TACOS and ACS suffered the 
least impact for each individual distribution. The performances of SA and PSS were severely 
reduced for each distribution type with PSS being the method most effected by the increase 
in the number of agents. In the next chapter, we attempt to analyse the average performance 
of each method across all the distributions. 
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Chapter 8 Performance Analysis Across 
Distributions 
 
 
As is now clear from Chapter 7, the performance of heuristic methods depends on the 
probability distribution from which the values of coalitions are drawn.  Chapter 7 gave a 
detailed analysis of the performance of each heuristic method for each of the six probability 
distributions. However, it is also important to know how the performance of these methods 
compares, on average, across all the six probability distribution. Further, in order to fully 
understand the performance of heuristics, we need to know how well they can scale to larger 
games. Another consideration is the impact of externalities on the performance of heuristic 
methods. To this end, the objectives of this chapter are as follows:  
1. To examine the performance of the heuristic methods averaged over all the six 
probability distributions. This analysis is important because it is conceivable that the 
values of coalitions are drawn from various different distributions and not just one 
single distribution. Note that all the four heuristic methods (tabu search, simulated 
annealing, ant colony, and particle swarm) are oblivious to the probability distribution 
from which the values of coalitions are drawn.  
2. To examine the scalability of the four heuristic methods. The practical value of any 
heuristic method depends on its scalability. It is therefore important to know which 
heuristics scale well and which ones do not.  
3. To analyse how externalities affect the performance of heuristics. The introduction of 
externalities makes the search problem considerably harder. It is therefore important 
to understand the extent to which externalities impact the performance of heuristic 
methods.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.1 is a comparative analysis of the average 
performance of the four heuristic methods for CFGs. This analysis is conducted first for 25 
agent games and then for 27 agent games. Section 8.2 is a comparative analysis of the average 
performance of the four heuristic methods for PFGs. This analysis is conducted first for 10 
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agent games and then for 27 agent games. Section 8.3 shows the effect of the number of agents 
and the effect of externalities on the performance of a heuristic. Section 8.4 describes the 
memory usage. 
 
8.1 Average Performance for CFGs 
We will first compare the average performance of the heuristics for 25 agent CFGs. The 
performance of each of the four heuristics, averaged across all the six distributions, is shown 
in Figure 8.1. 
 
 
Figure 8.1 – Average performance (25-agent CFGs). 
 
TACOS(S) is the best performing method with an average solution quality was about 91% of 
the exact optimum.  There are two reasons for best performance of TACOS(S). First, although 
TACOS(S) performed best for the Beta distribution (just like the other three heuristic 
methods), the gap between the best and worst solutions (see Table 8.1), is smallest for 
TACOS(S). This gap is around 26% (99.9 – 73.9 as shown in row 1 of Table 8.1).  After 
TACOS(S), ACS is second followed by PSS and then SA. PSS and SA have nearly identical 
performance.  
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Table 8.1 –Best and worst performance across distributions (25-agent CFGs). 
Method Best 
Performance 
Value – % of 
Optimal 
Worst 
Performance 
Value – % of 
Optimal 
TACOS(S) Beta 99.99 Exponential 73.91 
SA Beta 98.82 Exponential 51.52 
ACS Beta 99.29 Exponential 49.99 
PSS Beta 99.52 Exponential 44.20 
 
In terms of the numbers of neighbours explored (see Table 8.2), SA explored the most number 
of neighbours. PSS, although exploring a lot less neighbours was able to match SA in 
performance. On the other hand, while ACS explores more neighbours than TACOS(S), the 
latter still performed better than ACS.  This superior performance of TACOS is attributed to 
its memory; it uses memory to avoid repeatedly visiting the same points in the search space.  
Table 8.2 – Average number of neighbours explored (25-agent CFGs). 
Method Average neighbours explored 
TACOS(S) 203848 
SA 1440010 
ACS 305759 
PSS 203905 
Next we will take a look at the performance for 27-agent games for which TACOS was run 
in single-threaded TACOS(S) mode as well as the multi-threaded TACOS(M) mode. Figure 
8.2 shows the average performance for all the four heuristics. Consistent with the results for 
the 25-agent games, both TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) were  ahead of the other methods. This 
is followed by ACS, then PSS and then SA. Unlike the 25-agent games, the difference 
between the performance of SA and PSS is noticeable (it was almost identical for 25-agents). 
TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) gave identical performance with very negligible differences in 
overall average. 
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Figure 8.2 – Average performance (27-agent CFGs). 
As before, there is a link between average performance and the the gap between the best and 
worst solutions found by a method. Table 8.3 shows the distribution for which each method 
performed best and also the distribution for which each method performed the worst. As with 
25 agent games, each of the four heuristic methods performed best for the Beta distribution 
and worst for the Exponential distribution.  TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) have the smallest 
gap. The gap is widest for the worst performing method, i.e., SA. 
Table 8.3 – Best and worst performance across distributions (27-agent CFGs). 
Method Best 
Performance 
Value – % of 
Upper Bound 
Worst 
Performance 
Value – % of 
Upper Bound 
TACOS(S) Beta 99.99 Exponential 51.59 
TACOS(M) Beta 99.99 Exponential 51.82 
SA Beta 97.05 Exponential 22.24 
ACS Beta 99.54 Exponential 37.58 
PSS Beta 99.33 Exponential 29.25 
 
As was the case with 25-agent games, the method that explored the maximum number of 
neighbours was SA (see Table 8.4). Although PSS explored the smallest number of 
neighbours but it performed slightly ahead of SA. On the other hand ACS explorer twice as 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
TACOS(S) TACOS(M) SA ACS PSS
83.47 83.41
71.84
78.35 75.12
Average Performance Across  All Distributions
27-Agent CFGs
% of Upper Bound
 Chapter 8. Performance Analysis Across Distributions 147 
 
 
 
many neighbours compared to TACOS(S) and TACOS(M), however this did not translate 
into an advantage for the method as its performance across all distributions is lower than them. 
Table 8.4 – Average number of neighbours explored (27-agent CFGs). 
Method Average number of neighbours explored 
TACOS(S) 310004 
TACOS(M) 284973 
SA 1068737 
ACS 832571 
PSS 390428 
 
8.2 Average Performance for PFGs 
The average performance for PFGs was measured for 10-agent and 25-agent games. We will 
start by looking at the 10-agent games. The performance of each method averaged across the 
six distributions is shown in Figure 8.3.  
 
Figure 8.3 – Average performance (10-agent PFGs). 
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TACOS(S) gave the best average performance, followed by ACS, then PSS and then SA. 
TACOS(S), ACS and PSS formed best for the Beta distribution (see Table 8.5) while SA 
performed best for the Normal distributions.  All heuristics performed worst for the 
Exponential distribution.  
Table 8.5 – Best and worst Performance across distributions (10-agent PFGs). 
Method Best 
Performance 
Value – % of 
Optimal 
Worst 
Performance 
Value – % of 
Optimal 
TACOS(S) Beta 99.09 Exponential 67.29 
SA Normal 96.34 Exponential 54.41 
ACS Beta 98.76 Exponential 64.28 
PSS Beta 97.60 Exponential 59.19 
 
Here too, best performance corresponds to smallest gap between the best and worst solutions.  
With regard to the number of neighbours, TACOS(S) explored the fewest neighbours and 
achieved the best performance. ACS explored fewer neighbours compared to PSS and SA, 
but performed better than both these methods (see Table 8.6).  
Table 8.6 – Average number of neighbours explored (10-agent PFGs). 
10-Agent Average neighbours explored 
TACOS(S) 203848 
SA 1440010 
ACO 305759 
PSO 203905 
 
The average performance for 27-agent games is shown in Figure 8.4. Surprisingly, it was 
TACOS(S) that took the lead. In this case, more iterations allowed TACOS(S) to take the lead 
although TACOS(M) was very close.  
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Figure 8.4 – Average performance (27-agent PFGs). 
The best performing distribution was different for different methods (see Table 8.7). 
TACOS(S) and ACS performed best for the Beta Distribution. TACOS(M), SA and PSS 
performed best for the Normal distribution. All four methods performed worst for the 
Exponential distribution.  
Table 8.7 – Best and worst Performance across distributions (27-agent PFGs). 
Method Best 
Performance 
Value – % of 
Upper Bound 
Worst 
Performance 
Value – % of 
Upper Bound 
TACOS(S) Beta 98.79 Exponential 33.39 
TACOS(M) Normal 98.61 Exponential 31.62 
SA Normal 83.00 Exponential 16.72 
ACS Beta 94.28 Exponential 33.88 
PSS Normal 74.19 Exponential 14.06 
 
Let us now examine the number of neighbours explored (see Table 8.8).  TACOS(S) explored 
the maximum number of neighbours. This suggests why it performed the best. This is also 
true when comparing the performance of SA against PSS, SA explored more neighbours than 
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PSS which reflected in its performance being better than PSS. Similarly, ACS explored more 
neighbours compared to PSS and it too performed better than PSS.  
In summary, as the size of search space grew, the relation between the number of neighbours 
explored and the average performance became more evident. 
Table 8.8 – Average number of neighbours explored (27-agent PFGs). 
27-Agent Average neighbours explored 
TACOS(S) 1345358 
TACOS(M) 763696 
SA 955952 
ACS 677070 
PSS 644478 
 
8.3 Performance Comparison for Each Method 
We shall now take a look at how the number of agents effects the performance for each 
method for both CFGs and PFGs.  
 
8.3.1 CFGs: The Effect of Number of Agents on Performance  
Figure 8.5 shows the effects of the number of agents on performance. Still looking at the 
overall average across distributions, we can see that when increasing the number of agents 
from 25 to 27, the overall average slightly decreases. Note that for 25 agents the comparison 
was made to the optimal while for 27 agents it was made to the upper bound. It would be ideal 
to be find the exact optimum for 27-agent games but this was not practical in terms of 
computation time and memory space.  
Each one of the four methods deteriorated in performance with the increase in the number of 
agents. However, the degree to which performance dropped varied from method to method. 
The drop was least for ACS and most for SA.  
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Figure 8.5 – Effects of the number of agents on performance (CFGs). 
 
8.3.2 PFGs: The Effect of Number of Agents on Performance  
For PFGs, the effects of the number of agents on performance is shown in Figure 8.6. From 
the results it can be seen that when the number of agent is small i.e. 10 agents, the average 
performance of all the heuristics across distributions is mostly encouraging with very small 
differences between them. Increasing the number of agents affected the performance of 
different methods to different degrees. For some methods, an increase in the number of agents 
resulted in a bigger drop in performance relative to others. Between the four heuristics, the 
drop was least for TACOS(S). This suggests that TACOS(S) is the most scalable between all 
the four methods.  
Once again, it must be noted that performance is compared to the upper bound and not to the 
exact optimum.  
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Figure 8.6 – Effects of the number of agents on performance (PFGs). 
 
8.3.3 The Effect of Externalities on Performance 
We shall now take a look at how externalities impact the performance of the four methods. 
This comparison is done in terms of the average performances across all six distributions for 
27-agent CFGs and PFGs.  
Figure 8.7 shows the difference in performances for each method. This depicts the effects of 
externalities on performance.  The performances were measured against an upper bound. 
TACOS(S) and TACOS(M) performed best for both CFGs and PFGs for 27-agents. All the 
methods experienced a reduced performance when considering a PFG compared to CFG. 
TACOS(S), TACOS(M) and ACS showed a smaller reduction in performance while SA and 
PSS showed a sharper decline.  
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Figure 8.7 – The effects of externalities on performance (27-agent games) 
 
8.4 Memory Usage 
The results of simulation showed that TACOS is the best performing between all four heuristic 
methods. The main difference between TACOS and the other methods is that it uses long term 
memory while the other methods are memory-less. Thus, we will now examine the memory 
usage of TACOS for each of the four settings: 25 and 27 agent CFGs, and 10 and 27 agent 
PFGs. The size memory used for storing the tabu list depends on the number of iterations in 
TACOS. For TACOS(S) the number of iterations was 2500. In each iteration, at most two 
coalition structure can get added to the list. So the memory needed for the tabu list will be 
2500 times the memory space needed to store two coalition structure. This is additional 
memory needed by TACOS but not by the other 3 heuristics.  
 
8.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the results of the simulations and discussed the performance of each 
method across all the distributions. For 25-agent and 27-agent CFGs, TACOS(S) is the best 
performing method. Even though SA explored on average the most number of neighbours, it 
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is the worst performing method across all distributions. When increasing the number of agents 
from 25 to 27, each method experienced a reduction in performance. ACS took the least 
performance hit while SA's performance degrade the most and was almost 10% lower. In 
terms of scalability, ACS is the most scalable as it showed the lowest gap in performance 
when moving to a bigger search space. However, TACOS(S) still managed to be best method 
by being able to return an overall average solution quality of more than 80% across all 
distributions. 
For PFGs, it was still TACOS(S) that performed best on average over all distributions for both 
10-agent and 27-agent games. The performance for all four methods was very similar for 10-
agent games. However, increasing the number of agents to 27 saw SA and PSS taking the 
biggest impact with a performance drop of over 20%. For 27-agent games SA explored more 
neighbours and was slightly better than PSS. The average performance across all distributions 
was below 80% for 27-agent PFGs with TACOS(S) having the best average performance 
compared to the other methods. 
When comparing 27-agent CFG and PFG games, we were able to see that externalities caused 
an impact on the performance of all the methods. TACOS(S), TACOS(M) and ACS were the 
least impacted when comparing CFGs against PFGs. The introduction of externalities have a 
greater impact on PSS which was the worst performing method. While it performed better 
than SA for a smaller number of agents, increasing the number of agents reduced its 
performance dramatically. The gap between the best and the worst solutions found is higher 
for PSS compared to SA. This means it is the least scalable method when it comes to PFGs 
which explains its poor performance. 
The analysis provided an observation on the relationship between the overall performance and 
the scalability of the methods. While ACS is more scalable, its performance is not the best. 
While the gap is slightly bigger for TACOS, its performance is consistently the best.   
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Chapter 9 Conclusion and Future Work 
 
 
This chapter presents conclusions and avenues for future work.  
 
9.1 Conclusions 
The problem of determining the optimal coalition structures is something that arises in many 
multiagent systems. This problem is computationally hard. Existing solutions to this problem 
are mostly design-to-time or anytime especially for PFGs. These solutions have exponential 
time complexity which means they are suitable only for small multiagent systems. For large 
systems, there is a need for methods that can quickly generate a solution that is not necessarily 
optimal but is close to the optimum. The aim of this research is to address this need.  
More precisely, this research was aimed at exploring four different heuristic approaches, viz., 
tabu search, simulated annealing, ant colony search, and particle swarm search.  
These four heuristic algorithms were devised so that they can be applied to different types of 
coalition games. In particular, there are two types of coalition games, viz., those in 
characteristic function form and those in partition function form. Two of these methods, viz., 
tabu search and simulated annealing are single agent approaches. The other two, viz., ant 
colony search and particle swarm search are population based.  
The main contributions of this research are as follows.  
Contributions 
 A primary contribution of this research is devising the four heuristic algorithms for 
finding an optimal coalition structure. Although the heuristic methods are not entirely 
novel, they only provide a general framework that must be tailored to the problem at 
hand. Our contribution is in tailoring these methods for solving the CSG problem for 
CSGs and also for PFGs 
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 The second contribution of this thesis is the development of a compact representation of 
the values of coalitions. A compact representation is crucial in finding optimal coalition 
structures for PFGs in reasonable time. The representation we developed allows for the 
feasible representation of values of coalitions for PFGs. Without this representation, it 
would be impractical to run or test the heuristic methods.  
 The third contribution was development of a method for calculating the upper bound on 
the value of an optimal coalition structure. The performance of the heuristics was 
evaluated relative to these bounds. Without this method for calculating the bounds, it 
would be impractical to evaluate performance since it is impractical to compute the exact 
optimum for large games.  
 The fourth contribution of this thesis is the testing of our implementations of the four 
heuristic methods for CFGs using six different probability distributions. It must be noted 
that all the implemented heuristics are oblivious to the probability distributions from 
which the input is drawn. The performance of each heuristic method was analysed for 
each individual distribution. Specifically, performance was evaluated in terms of running 
time, the quality of the solution, and the scalability to larger games.   
 The fifth contribution of this thesis is the testing of our implementations of the four 
heuristic methods for PFGs using six different probability distributions. Again, it must 
be noted that all the implemented heuristics are oblivious to the probability distributions 
from which the input is drawn. The performance of each heuristic method was analysed 
for each individual distribution. Again, performance was evaluated in terms of running 
time, the quality of the solution, and the scalability to larger games.  
 The sixth contribution of this thesis is average performance evaluation. The average 
refers to average taken across all the six probability distributions. Again, the evaluation 
was in terms of running time, the quality of the solution, and the scalability to larger 
games.  Further, the impact of externalities on heuristic performance was also analysed. 
 
A summary of the main results:  
 Empirical results suggest that the performance of each algorithm is influenced by the 
probability distribution from which the input is drawn, as well as on the size of the 
problem. 
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 All the heuristic methods performed reasonably well for four of the six distributions. 
These four distributions are Uniform, Normal, Beta and Triangular. 
 For the other two distribution types, Gamma and Exponential, the performance was not 
so good with some methods performing much worse than others. We investigated the 
results and found that this is due to the gaps between the best and worst solution found. 
Thus it can be concluded that none of the heuristics was able to consistently find high 
value solutions in the problem instances with these input probabilities. We also come to 
the conclusion that the lower performance in these two distribution was significantly 
lower than other distributions and deserves further attention. 
 When it comes to scalability, we found that each method takes a hit in overall average 
performance when moving from a smaller to larger problem games. The difference is that 
some heuristics take a larger hit than others. This varies across distributions but the 
pattern observed is that for PFG games, the decrease in performance is more obvious.  
 We would like to note that, although we used (Rahwan & Jennings, 2007) integer 
partition graph approach to compute the bound, we did not use these bound to do any 
pruning of the search space i.e. removing non-promising integer partitions. Rather, the 
heuristics implemented were allowed to search the entire space of coalition structures. 
This was done to measure the real viability of heuristics as a general purpose method 
which theoretically can perform well even when the input is not known a priori, i.e. when 
it is impossible to compute bounds as the values of the coalitions are not known. Despite 
no pruning of the space and concentrating the methods to search only promising 
subspaces, the heuristics performed well in 4 out of the 6 probability distribution types. 
This stand to shows that the heuristics are quite promising method for finding an optimal 
coalition structure in CFGs and PFGs. 
 
Summary of results for CFGs 
In terms of overall performance, each method has its own advantages and disadvantages in 
performance. Table 9.1 shows a comparative summary of the performance for each method 
in the CFG as well as the advantages and disadvantages of each method. 
 For CFGs, TACOS returns the best quality solution on average across all the 
distributions. This is despite it being the method that explores the least number of 
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neighbours. It is also consistent as evident by the lowest gap between the best and worst 
solution found. The drawback is that it needs more memory to store the tabu list. Also, it 
was found that parallelising the search with TACOS(M) lowers the performances slightly 
as the cost of initialising parallel process resulted in fewer iterations and consequently 
fewer neighbours being explored compared to TACOS(S). 
 
Table 9.1 – Comparative summary of the performance of all methods (CFGs). 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
TACOS  Returns the best quality solution 
across all six distributions 
despite the lowest number of 
neighbours explored. 
 Lowest gap between best and 
worst solution 
 Requires more memory to store 
tabu list. 
 Parallelisation lowers 
performance as TACOS (M) 
explores fewer neighbours than 
TACOS(S). 
SA  No additional memory 
analogous to tabu list 
 Explores the most neighbours 
but performs worst due to 
redundant explorations.  
 Highest gap between best and 
worst solutions. 
 Least scalable 
ACS  No additional memory 
analogous to tabu list 
 Less memory than TACOS 
 Quality of solution almost as 
good as TACOS  
 Most Scalable 
 Average overall performance 
lower than TACOS. 
PSS  No additional memory 
analogous to tabu list 
 Parallelisation does not justify 
quality of solution 
 
 For SA, it had the advantage of not needing additional memory as it does not store any 
information that is analogous to the tabu list. However, it would seem that although it 
explores the most neighbours, it is the worst performing method. This could be attributed 
to redundant exploration as it does not keep track of previously explored solutions. It was 
also shown to be the least scalable, taking the most performance hit when moving to a 
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bigger problem size.  Moreover, it can be said that it is the most random with the highest 
gap between the best and worst solution. 
 Like SA, ACS also does not maintain a large list like the tabu list used by TACOS, it too 
has the advantage of requiring less memory. One of its strengths is that, despite this, it 
returns an overall average quality of solution that is comparable to TACOS. It is also the 
most scalable, taking the least hit on performance as problem size increases. However, 
its only shortcoming is that overall average performance is slightly lower than TACOS. 
 PSS is the average performer for CFGs, its advantage like SA and ACS is low memory 
usage. Its performance is comparable with SA overall. However, being a parallelised 
method, the performance does not justify the extra cost incurred to by parallelisation i.e. 
the extra time needed to initialise parallel threads. 
Summary of results for PFGs 
We shall now summarise the results for the performance of each method in the PFG setting. 
Table 9.2 provides a comparative summary of the performance for each method, listing their 
advantage and disadvantages. 
 The result is consistent for TACOS in PFGs as well. Again it is the best performing 
method across all the distribution types. It exhibited the lowest gap between the best and 
worst solution and for PFGs it is the most scalable method with a smaller performance 
hit with the increase in problem size. The same disadvantages are inherited however, it 
does require more memory (to store the tabu list) and parallelisation has the same effect 
as it was for CFGs, i.e., lower performance. 
 SA is the least scalable method for PFGs, having the biggest drop in performance when 
moving to larger games. It still suffers from redundant exploration as evident by the fact 
that the number of neighbours explored did not gave it an advantage as other methods 
that explored less gave better results. It still however, has the advantage of using less 
memory than TACOS. 
 ACSs performance in PFGs is analogous to its performance in CFGs. It requires no 
additional memory as there is no tabu list. Also, it is the least impacted by externalities 
when considering the same problem size. The impact for ACS in settings where there are 
externalities (PFGs) and where there are no externalities (CFGs) is smaller compared to 
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the other methods. Its only disadvantage is that its overall average performance is slightly 
lower than that of TACOS. 
 
Table 9.2 – Comparative summary of the performance of all methods (PFGs).  
 Advantages Disadvantages 
TACOS  Returns the best quality solution 
across all six distributions 
 Lowest gap between best and 
worst solution 
 Most Scalable 
 Requires more memory to store 
tabu list 
 Parallelisation lowers 
performance as TACOS (M) 
explores fewer neighbours than 
TACOS(S). 
SA  No additional memory 
analogous to tabu list 
 Explores the most neighbours 
but performs worst due to 
redundant explorations.  
 Redundant exploration 
 Least scalable 
ACS  No additional memory analogous 
to tabu list 
 Quality of solution almost as 
good as TACOS 
 Least impacted by externalities 
 Average overall performance 
lower than TACOS 
PSS  No additional memory 
analogous to tabu list 
 Parallelisation does not justify 
quality of solution 
 Highest gap between best and 
worst solutions. 
 Impacted the most by 
externalities 
 Least scalable 
 
 Finally, we take a look at the performance of PSS in PFGs. Its only advantage is that it 
requires no additional memory for storing a tabu list unlike TACOS. However it is the 
worst performing method for PFGs. It has the highest gap between the best and worst 
solution found. It is the most impacted by externalities, losing a lot of performance when 
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considering PFGs with the same problem size. Lastly, it is also the least scalable in the 
PFG setting, taking the most performance hit as the problem becomes larger i.e. moving 
from 10 to 27-agents. 
With the main contributions and summary of main results given, we shall now look at some 
future work that could be done to further the work done in this research. 
 
9.2 Future Work 
From the extensive experiments and the conclusions drawn from this research, we found that 
more can be done to further this research and continue to contribute to the field of knowledge. 
In the future we would like to extend this research as follows: 
 Investigate the possibility of implementing short term memory for tabu search – This 
can be done by introducing a tabu tenure where the size of the tabu list is limited. This 
will help to reduce the memory usage of TACOS. The effect of having a smaller tabu 
list has to be investigated to determine its effect compared to the current 
implementation where the size of the increases with the number of iterations. 
 Improve performance for Gamma and Exponential – Although overall the heuristics 
performed well in the majority of the distributions considered, they did not perform 
quite as good for the Gamma and Exponential distributions. This deserves further 
investigation with the possibility of creating versions of the algorithms with 
neighbourhood operators that are tailored to such distributions.  
 Building combined heuristic algorithms – Looking at best and the worst solutions 
found for Gamma and Exponential, the gap for these two distributions suggests that 
the value of the input coalitions sits between two extremes that is so random that no 
heuristic can perform well. Thus as future work, it might be interesting devise a 
method which combines two or more heuristics such as combining greedy with tabu 
search or ant colony with tabu search which may yield better results. As greedy works 
by constructing solutions based on high value components, it may help to start the 
algorithm with a greedy solution rather than the random solution used currently as the 
starting point. Combination of ant colony with tabu search allows the algorithm to 
remove forbidding moves i.e. coalition structures in the tabu list and keeps track of 
promising neighbourhood operators. Searching the space with historically good 
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operators while avoiding already explored solutions should increase the algorithms 
performance. 
 Improvements on neighbourhood operators – Although the neighbourhood operators 
performed rather well in most case, their performance for Gamma and Exponential is 
still left to be desired. For future work, improved operators with better exploration 
guarantees should be devised. These operators must be of better quality to be able to 
boost the performance of the heuristics. More analysis will have to be conducted on 
operator performance alone in order to achieve this. 
 Conduct more thorough statistical testing and analysis to further investigate the 
difference in performance from one distribution to the other. Advance, more detailed 
statistical analysis techniques such as ANOVA to be considered.  
 Devise ways for larger games – Another limitation that we would like to address is the 
limiting size of the problem. Due the limit imposed by storing the value of all 
coalitions which only allow us to run simulations of up to 27-agents, perhaps a way 
can be devised to restrict the problem instance that allow generating input for integer 
partitions where the optimal coalition may be. This way instead of generating the value 
of all the coalitions, we just generate the value of the coalitions in the promising 
partitions as contemplated by (Changder, Dutta, & Ghose, 2016b). We then have to 
modify the algorithm and their neighbourhood operators to generate only 
neighbourhoods that are of the size of the promising integer partitions. This to deserve 
further research and if successful will allow the CSG problem to be scaled to a larger 
number of agents.
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Appendix I – Generating the Input Data 
Python comes with pseudo-random number generators for various distributions. This is 
included in the Python Library random.py (see https://docs.python.org/2/library/random.html 
for more information). 
The following functions from the Python random module was used to generate the values for 
each subset: 
1. random.uniform(a, b) 
2. random.triangular(low, high, mode) 
3. random.betavariate(alpha, beta) 
4. random.expovariate(lambd) 
5. random.gammavariate(alpha, beta) 
6. random.normalvariate(mu, sigma) 
 
The parameters chosen are given in Chapter 6. 
 
Here are some example pseudocode for the data generation for the 25-agent CFG, 27-agent 
CFG and 10-agent PFG. 
 
An example pseudocode for generating the coalition value for the uniform distribution: 
 
for each 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑔 
 cardinality = |C| 
 coalitionvalue = random.uniform(0,cardinality) 
 
write to inputfile.csv coalitionvalue 
 
Another example for the beta distribution: 
 
for each 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑔 
 cardinality = |C| 
 coalitionvalue = cardinality × random.betavariate(0.5,0.5) 
 
write to inputfile.csv coalitionvalue 
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For the 27-agent PFG where the value of coalitions of size 𝑘 are different from other 
coalition sizes, here are the example pseudocode for generating the coalition values. 
 
For the uniform distribution: 
 
 Initialize n = number of agents 
Initialize k = 2 
 
for each 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑔 
 cardinality = |C| 
  if cardinality == k 
  coalitionvalue = random.uniform(n2 , 2(n2)) 
 else 
  coalitionvalue = random.uniform(0, n) 
 
write to inputfile.csv coalitionvalue 
 
An example pseudocode for the beta distribution: 
 
Initialize n = number of agents 
Initialize k = 2 
 
for each 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑔 
 cardinality = |C| 
  if cardinality == k 
  coalitionvalue = n2 × random.betavariate(0.5,0.5) 
 else 
  coalitionvalue = random.betavariate(0.5,0.5) 
 
write to inputfile.csv coalitionvalue 
 
 
